Nitterhouse Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Glass
| Decision Date | 01 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:15-CV-2154 |
| Parties | NITTERHOUSE CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC., and NITTERHOUSE MASONRY PRODUCTS, LLC, Plaintiffs v. GLASS, MOLDERS, POTTERY, PLASTICS & ALLIED WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, CLC, and its LOCAL UNION 201B, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Caldwell)
Plaintiffs are Nitterhouse Concrete Products, Inc. ("NCP") and Nitterhouse Masonry Products, LLC ("NMP"). Defendants are the Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC and its Local Union 201B (hereinafter "Defendants" or "Union"). Presently before the court are Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 35) and both parties' responses to this court's order (Doc. 50) giving notice to Plaintiffs, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), of its intent to enter summary judgment, sua sponte, in favor of Defendants on all claims.
Plaintiffs filed this suit alleging that they each had a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the Union and that the Union breached the CBAs by failing to indemnify Plaintiffs for withdrawal liability under the pension plan for Plaintiffs' employees ("the Plan"). Plaintiffs' complete withdrawal from the Plan followed the Union's decision to no longer represent Plaintiffs' employees after the expiration of the latest CBAs.
Plaintiffs make a breach-of-contract claim (Count I) and also seek a declaratory judgment (Count II) that the Union is obligated to indemnify or hold Plaintiffs harmless from Plaintiffs' withdrawal liability under the Plan. Plaintiffs' claim is premised on language in the CBAs in which the Union "further agree[d] to indemnify and save harmless the Company from any claim or liability which may arise by reason of the existence of the Plan." The Plan calculated NCP's withdrawal liability at $430,291, and NMP's withdrawal liability at $250,407.
The Union filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), making as its sole argument that it was not liable to indemnify Plaintiffs because any duty to indemnify did not survive the expiration of the CBAs. By memorandum and order dated March 3, 2016, we denied that motion. Nitterhouse Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, No. 1:CV-15-2154, 2016 WL 827131, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2016); (Doc. 18).
As noted, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming they are entitled to indemnity from the Union for their withdrawal liability. The Union opposes summary judgment, arguing there are genuine disputes of fact concerning the construction of the indemnity agreement, including whether the duty to indemnify survived the termination of the CBAs. Furthermore, after ordering and receiving supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the obligation to indemnify survived the termination of the CBAs, we gave notice to Plaintiffs of our intent to enter summary judgment, sua sponte, in favor of Defendants on all claims. (See Docs. 47, 50); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f)(1). Both partieshave filed responses to our notice of intent to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and the matter is ripe for disposition.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs the grant of summary judgment. The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Material facts are those that could affect the outcome of the proceeding, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
In pertinent part, parties moving for, or opposing, summary judgment must support their position by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). "The non-moving party cannot rest on mere pleadings or allegations," El v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007), but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2001).
We first address a procedural issue Plaintiffs raise. In accord with Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 56.1, Plaintiffs filed a statement of material facts in numbered paragraphs. Local Rule 56.1 requires the non-moving party to respond to the numbered paragraphs and provides that any material facts in the moving party's statementnot objected to are deemed admitted. In accord with the Rule, the Union filed a "Response" to Plaintiffs' statement of material facts corresponding to Plaintiffs' numbered paragraphs, either admitting those facts or contending there exists a genuine issue to be tried on certain facts.
But the Union did more than that. As a continuation of its response to Plaintiffs' statement of material facts, it filed a "Statement of Additional Facts Material to Resolution of Plaintiffs' Motion" in numbered paragraphs, continuing with the numbering where Plaintiffs' numbered paragraphs left off. (See Doc. 41 at ECF pp. 25-48). The Union set forth ninety-four additional numbered paragraphs covering twenty-two pages.
Plaintiffs assert that the Local Rules do not provide for the non-moving party to file its own statement of material facts, and hence there is no requirement that they respond to the Union's additional facts under the risk of having them deemed admitted. Plaintiffs state they have nonetheless responded to the additional facts, sometimes admitting them, but have chosen to do so without the submission of additional evidence. Plaintiffs maintain that their choice not to submit additional evidence should not be taken as an admission that the additional facts are accurate. They contend that the additional facts crucial to the Union's position are disputed and that none of them are material to a resolution of Plaintiffs' motion. They further contend the Union's submission of additional facts is simply a way of submitting an additional twenty-two pages of briefing without having obtained approval to do so.
Although the Union's submission of additional facts does not precisely conform with Local Rule 56.1, the facts are supported by citations to the record, and hence the court believes it should take them into account if they are material. The Unioncertainly has the right to submit evidence material to a resolution of summary judgment. We further note that Plaintiffs have admitted many of the facts, so their decision not to submit additional evidence may not have any bearing on the resolution of summary judgment.
With this understanding, the following is the record for the purpose of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and this court's notice of intent to enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The record is based on the parties' statements and counter-statements of material facts, along with the evidence submitted in support, as well as any additional evidence provided to support the responses to our notice of intent to enter summary judgment. We will also rely on evidence the Union brings to our attention by way of its statement of additional facts. We will sometimes borrow the parties' language without attribution. When we cite to only one party's statement, or counter-statement, of material facts, we do so because the other party has admitted the relevant facts.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, was passed to regulate pension and welfare benefits plans. See M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 933 (2015). The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461, was enacted to solve a funding problem ERISA had created for pension plans. Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 513 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1995). Prior to the passage of the MPPAA, ERISA only allowed a multiemployer plan to seek reimbursement for unfunded benefits from companies that had withdrawn from the plan within five years ofthe plan becoming insolvent. Id. at 416. This sometimes encouraged a company to take its chances by withdrawing from a financially weak plan hoping that the company could outlast the five-year period for seeking reimbursement for unfunded benefits. Id. at 416-17. The MPPAA changed that by "provid[ing] that an employer who withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan must pay a charge sufficient to cover that employer's fair share of the plan's unfunded liabilities." Id. at 415.
An employer completely withdraws from a plan when it "(1) permanently ceases to have an obligation to contribute under the plan, or (2) permanently ceases all covered operations under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1383(a). An "obligation to contribute," in turn, refers to an obligation arising "(1) under one or more collective bargaining (or related) agreements, or (2) as a result of a duty under applicable labor management relations law." Id. § 1392(a). The Plan sponsor is responsible for determining and collecting withdrawal liability. Id. § 1382. Among other entities, a plan sponsor can include a board of trustees that establishes or maintains the plan. Id. § 1002(16)(B).
Plaintiffs NCP and NMP are Pennsylvania corporations, with their principal offices located in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 36, Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts ("PSMF") ¶¶ 1 & 2)). NCP and NMP are engaged in the business of selling pre-cast concrete...
To continue reading
Request your trial