Nixon v. Malloy, s. 560, 1088.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SWEENEY, J.
• Citation: Nixon v. Malloy, 52 R.I. 430, 161 A. 135 (R.I. 1932)
• Decision Date: 29 June 1932
• Docket Number: Nos. 560, 1088.,s. 560, 1088.
• Parties: NIXON v. MALLOY et al. SAME v. BENOIT.

161 A. 135

NIXON

v. MALLOY et al.

SAME

v. BENOIT.

Nos. 560, 1088.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 29, 1932.

Petition for writ of certiorari by Robert B. Nixon against William H. Malloy and others, and petition in equity in the nature of quo warranto by the same petitioner against Albert F. Benoit.

Decree in accordance with opinion.

Lawrence F. Nolan, of Pawtucket, for petitioner.

J. Howard McGrath, of Providence, for respondents.

SWEENEY, J.

This petition in equity in the nature of quo warranto is brought under authority of chapter 379, Gen. Laws 1923, to determine the title to the office of clerk of the board of canvassers and registration of the city of Central Falls. Petitioner and respondent Benoit each claim to be entitled to said office.

The petitioner also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the city council and certain other officers of said city. This petition seeks to quash an amendment to the ordinance of said city providing for the biennial designation of a clerk of said board and the vote of the city council electing respondent Benoit clerk of said board for two years.

The question raised by the contentions of the parties is in regard to the power and authority of the city council to designate a clerk of the board for a term less than six years.

The statute requiring the election of said board is chapter 1422, Pub. Laws 1916, as amended by chapter 1962, Pub. Laws 1920. Section 1 of said chapter 1422 provided that the city council should forthwith elect a board of canvassers and registration for said city consisting of three members, one of whom should be designated at the time of his election as clerk of said board. The act stated that the member designated as clerk should hold office until the first Monday in March, A. D., 1922. Biennally thereafter, in the month of February, one member of said board was to be elected for the term of six years, to hold office from the first Monday in March following such election and until his successor was chosen and qualified to succeed the member of said board whose term would next expire. The act also provided that one member of said board, other than the clerk thereof, should be elected by the board as presiding officer.

Said chapter 1422 required said board to have charge of the registration of all persons entitled by law to vote upon being registered, and conferred upon the board all of the duties previously imposed upon the city clerk and board of aldermen relative to registration and elective meetings, counting the ballots, and making returns thereof, and prescribed other powers and duties. Additional powers and duties of the board are set forth in chapter 7, Gen. Laws 1923. Section 3 of said chapter 7 directs that in Central Falls the clerk of said board shall be "designated at the time of his election."

Boards of canvassers and registration are state officers and are not municipal officers. So held by this court in the case of Gainer v. Dunn, 29 R. I. 232, 69 A. 336. The court said, when considering the powers of the board of canvassers and registration of the city of Providence: "While its members are elected in joint committee of the two branches of the city council, the board is in no sense a department of the municipal government. Its tenure of office, powers, duties, and liabilities and all its functions are created, imposed, and defined by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the Constitution and laws of this state, and no municipal ordinance can enlarge or diminish them, inasmuch as the exercise of the elective franchise is not a subject of municipal control or regulation. While their, jurisdiction and their duties are territorially limited to the city of Providence, their duties are of general concern; and thus they constitute a board of state officers exercising a state function, rather than a board of municipal officers exercising a municipal function."

The statute...