Nixon v. US, H88-0052(G).
Decision Date | 19 December 1988 |
Docket Number | No. H88-0052(G).,H88-0052(G). |
Parties | Walter L. NIXON, Jr., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
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James M. Cole, Public Integrity Section, Crim. Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Boyce Holleman, Michael B. Holleman, Boyce Holleman, A Professional Ass'n, Gulfport, Miss., William H. Jeffress, Jr., David Overlock Stewart, Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
The motion of Petitioner Walter L. Nixon, Jr., to vacate his conviction and sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, is before the Court for a decision on the merits after an evidentiary hearing.
On August 29, 1985, a special federal grand jury for the Southern District of Mississippi in Hattiesburg returned a fourcount indictment against Petitioner who was then the Chief Judge of that Court. The Hattiesburg grand jury charged Petitioner with four offenses. Count I alleged the acceptance of an illegal gratuity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(g), based upon Petitioner's receipt of certain mineral royalty investments from Wiley Fairchild, a Hattiesburg businessman. Counts II, III and IV alleged perjury before the same grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The trial jury returned verdicts of not guilty on Counts I and II, but guilty on Counts III and IV. The late Honorable James H. Meredith, the United States District Judge who tried the case, sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of five years imprisonment on each of the two perjury counts. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 827 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762 (1988).
Petitioner thereafter filed the instant motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He raises five grounds for post-conviction relief:
On August 5, 1988, Petitioner moved to amend his second ground for relief to add an additional specification of the government's knowing use of false testimony. On August 18, 1988, the Court denied this motion to amend. Thereafter, Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court took under advisement. On August 29 and 30, 1988, an evidentiary hearing was held in Jackson, Mississippi, on the first three grounds.1
At the § 2255 evidentiary hearing, John Baltar, Wiley Fairchild, Barry Hess, and Michael Fawer testified for Petitioner. Jan Little, Reid Weingarten, H. Marshall Jarrett, Weldon Kennedy, Kenneth White-Spunner, Jr., and Donald Lawless testified for the United States. The parties submitted extensive pre- and post-hearing briefs and many documents including grand jury transcripts, the trial transcript, the post-trial motion hearing transcript and the House Sub-Committee impeachment hearing transcript.
The Court has examined Petitioner's five grounds for post-conviction relief in the context of the narrow scope of collateral attack permitted by § 2255. A § 2255 proceeding is not a retrial of the case. Petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief pursuant to § 2255 only if he establishes a jurisdictional or constitutional error, or an error of law which is so fundamental that it inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice or in a proceeding inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185-186, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2240-41, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 2087, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). On his claims for relief, Petitioner has the burden of sustaining his factual contentions by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Bondurant, 689 F.2d 1246, 1251 (5th Cir. 1982); Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir.1980).
At the outset, it should be noted that this is not a typical § 2255 proceeding. Petitioner has made allegations which relate to the government's motives in investigating him, impaneling a special grand jury, propounding certain questions to him before the grand jury and eventually prosecuting him.
The evidence relating to the two perjury counts in issue is quite limited. However, in order to fully consider Petitioner's allegations, this Court must examine a complex factual background beyond the actual scope of the trial. Three separate sets of events—the Petit Bois Island condemnation proceedings, the Hattiesburg Airport drug bust followed by the Drew Fairchild criminal prosecution, and Petitioner's mineral royalty investments with Wiley Fairchild— combine to form this background. The following is an organized chronology of these events.
1) In 1979, Petitioner contacted Hattiesburg attorney Carroll Ingram and asked Ingram to investigate the possibility of Petitioner making an oil investment with Ingram's client, Wiley Fairchild, a Hattiesburg businessman and the president of Fairchild Construction Co.
2) On August 4, 1980, federal and local Forrest County, Mississippi, law enforcement agents seized an airplane carrying marijuana at the Hattiesburg Municipal Airport.2 Drew Fairchild, the son of Wiley Fairchild, was one of the managers of the airport and was an active participant in the marijuana smuggling conspiracy. On August 19, 1980, a federal grand jury returned indictments against three of the marijuana smugglers, but not against Drew Fairchild. Drew and his attorney, Bill Porter, approached Forrest County District Attorney Paul H. "Bud" Holmes to discuss Drew's situation. Holmes referred Drew and Porter to George Phillips, the U.S. Attorney prosecuting the three other marijuana smugglers. On November 19, 1980, Drew and Phillips entered into a written "Memorandum of Understanding" wherein they agreed that Drew would cooperate with the federal government in its prosecution of the other marijuana smugglers, would plead guilty to felony charges, would pay a $15,000 fine, and would be sentenced to five years probation.
3) In early 1981, Wiley Fairchild's...
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Phelps v. Hamilton, 93-4148-SAC.
... ... 693 F.2d at 369-70; see Nixon v. United States, 703 F.Supp. 538, 570 (S.D.Miss.1988), aff'd, 881 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1989) ... The Eighth Circuit in ... ...
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... ... This perjury trap theory is founded on the due process prohibition against outrageous government conduct. Nixon v. United States, 703 F.Supp. 538, 564 (S.D.Miss.1988), aff'd on other grounds, 881 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.1989). In order to prevail on this theory, ... ...
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... ... Moore v. State, 508 So.2d 666, 668-69 (Miss.1987); see Nixon v. U.S., 703 F.Supp. 538 (S.D.Miss.1988), aff'd, 881 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.1989). In Moore, where the defendant was convicted of manufacturing ... ...
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...States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting prosecutor's purpose must be to obtain truth); Nixon v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (disallowing perjury trap defense when petitioner did not establish that his testimony had no tendency to support any poss......
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...defense in Second Circuit (quoting United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1991))). See generally Nixon v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (discussing perjury trap defense). But see United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 837-38 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that ......
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Perjury.
...States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting prosecutor's purpose must be to obtain truth); Nixon v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (disallowing perjury trap defense when petitioner did not establish that his testimony had no tendency to support any poss......
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Perjury.
...was to induce perjury, and that showing that the testimony was redundant is not dispositive of any misconduct); Nixon v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 538, 564 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (disallowing perjury trap defense when petitioner did not establish that his testimony had no tendency to support a......