Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission

• Decision Date: 29 January 2002
• Docket Number: (SC 16239)
• Citation: 259 Conn. 131,788 A.2d 1158
• Parties: MAURICE NIZZARDO v. STATE TRAFFIC COMMISSION ET AL.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

259 Conn. 131

788 A.2d 1158

MAURICE NIZZARDO v. STATE TRAFFIC COMMISSION ET AL.

(SC 16239)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 19, 2000.

Officially released January 29, 2002.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Palmer, Vertefeuille, Zarella and Ronan, JS.¹ Steven R. Smart, with whom was Dominick M. Uva, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert D. Snook, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Karen K Clark, with whom was Gordon R. Paterson, for the appellee (defendant First Stamford Corporation).

Karyl Lee Hall filed a brief for the Connecticut Fund for the Environment as amicus curiae.

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The issues in this certified appeal are whether: (1) the denial of a notice of intervention filed in an administrative proceeding pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-19,² is a "final decision," within the meaning of General Statutes § 4-183 (a),³ for purposes of filing an administrative appeal to the Superior Court; and (2) the plaintiff in this case had standing, pursuant to § 22a-19, to intervene in the administrative proceeding in question to raise environmental issues. Following our grant of certification to appeal,⁴ the plaintiff, Maurice Nizzardo, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment denying him intervenor status. We conclude that: (1) the denial by the named defendant, the state traffic commission (commission),⁵ of the plaintiffs request to intervene was not a final decision requiring an appeal within forty-five days pursuant to § 4-183 (c); (2) our decisions in Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. Stamford, 192 Conn. 247, 250, 470 A.2d 1214 (1984), and Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., 192 Conn. 591, 597, 473 A.2d 787 (1984), that § 22a-19 does not expand the jurisdictional authority of an administrative agency accurately interpreted that statute; and (3) the plaintiff lacked standing to intervene in the administrative proceeding in question because the commission lacks jurisdiction to consider any of the environmental issues that can be raised under § 22a-19. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following procedural history is relevant to the appeal before us. The defendant First Stamford Corporation (First Stamford) sought a certificate of operation from the commission pursuant to General Statutes § 14-311⁶ in connection with a proposed commercial development project. The plaintiff, who owned property in the vicinity of the proposed project, filed a request to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19, which the commission denied. Following the commission's grant of the certificate of operation to First Stamford, the plaintiff appealed to the trial court pursuant to § 4-183. See footnote 3 of this opinion. The trial court granted, in part, First Stamford's motion to dismiss the appeal and, following a trial to the court, dismissed the remainder of the appeal. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment; Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 55 Conn. App. 679, 739 A.2d 744 (1999); and this appeal followed. See footnote 4 of this opinion.

The following additional facts and procedural history are undisputed. In April, 1996, First Stamford filed an application for a certificate of operation with the commission in connection with a shopping center that First Stamford proposed to erect in Stamford near the Greenwich-Stamford town line. On November 27, 1996, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 22a-19, filed with the commission a verified "Notice of Intervention." The plaintiff's notice specifically referred to First Stamford's application, asserted that the application concerned "an administrative proceeding which involves conduct which is reasonably likely to have the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water, wildlife or other natural resources of the State," and requested "status as [an] intervening party for participation in the administrative proceeding before the [commission]." On December 2, 1996, the commission denied the plaintiff's request for intervenor status pursuant to § 22a-19. The commission gave two independent reasons for its actions: (1) the petition was "inadequate" because it "fail[ed] to articulate how and in what manner the issuance of a [certificate of operation] would unreasonably pollute, impair or destroy any natural resource of the State within the contemplation of [§] 22a-19 (a)"; and (2) the commission "has no jurisdiction over environmental issues and, therefore, has no authority to address such issues."⁷ The commission also noted, however, that the plaintiff would be given notice of when the commission would meet to consider the application, and that the plaintiff would be permitted to present his position on the application, limited, however, "to those issues which fall under the jurisdiction of the [commission]—that is, traffic operations and highway safety."⁸

On January 17, 1998, the commission granted First Stamford's application for a certificate of operation. Thereafter, within forty-five days of that action, the plaintiff filed this administrative appeal in the trial court pursuant to § 4-183 (c). The plaintiff claimed two bases for aggrievement: (1) that the commission improperly had denied him environmental intervenor status pursuant to § 22a-19; and (2) that he was classically aggrieved, on the basis of which he challenged the merits of the commission's grant of the certificate.

First Stamford moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiffs appeal based on aggrievement under § 22a-19 was untimely because it had not been filed within forty-five days of the denial by the commission of his request to intervene,⁹ and that the plaintiff was not classically aggrieved. The trial court dismissed the appeal with respect to the denial of the plaintiffs request to intervene, reasoning that the denial constituted a final decision from which he had been required to appeal within forty-five days, and denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs challenge to the merits of the commission's action, subject to the plaintiffs later proof of classical aggrievement. After the hearing on the merits of the appeal, the trial court found that the plaintiff was not classically aggrieved, and rendered judgment dismissing the appeal.

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court held that the plaintiff had not timely filed his appeal from the commission's denial of his request for intervenor status and that the trial court's factual determination that he was not classically aggrieved was supportedby the evidence. Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, supra, 55 Conn. App. 685-86. This certified appeal followed.¹⁰

I

The plaintiff first claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the commission's denial of his request for intervention pursuant to § 22a-19 was a final decision within the meaning of § 4-183, and that, therefore, contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion, he was not required to file his appeal challenging that denial within forty-five days thereafter. We agree.¹¹ Section 4-183 (a) provides: "A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section. The filing of a petition for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to the filing of such an appeal." (Emphasis added.) Section 4-183 (c) requires that such an appeal be filed within forty-five days of the final decision. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Whether the denial of a request to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19 is a final decision within the meaning of § 4-183 presents a question of statutory interpretation.

"The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... Id.; Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 231 Conn. 355, 362, 650 A.2d 147 (1994); United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755-56, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992).... Bortner v. Woodbridge, 250 Conn. 241, 258-59, 736 A.2d 104 (1999)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burke v. Fleet National Bank, 252 Conn. 1, 11, 742 A.2d 293 (1999).

We begin with the language of the relevant statutes. As used in the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA); see footnote 11 of this opinion; and at issue in this case, "`[f]inal decision' means (A) the agency determination in a contested case .... The term does not include a preliminary or intermediate ruling or order of an agency...." General Statutes § 4-166 (3).<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, and as relevant to this case, a "`[c]ontested case' means a proceeding, including but not restricted to rate-making, price fixing and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing or in which a hearing is in fact held...." General Statutes § 4-166 (2).¹³ In addition, "`[p]arty' means each person (A) whose legal rights, duties or privileges are required by statute to be determined by an...