Njang v. Whitestone Grp., Inc., 12-cv-0153 (KBJ)

• Decision Date: 18 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 12-cv-0153 (KBJ),12-cv-0153 (KBJ)
• Parties: Sebastian Njang, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The Whitestone Group, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

187 F.Supp.3d 172

Sebastian Njang, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.The Whitestone Group, Inc., Defendant.

No. 12-cv-0153 (KBJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed May 18, 2016

James L. Kestell, Kestell & Freiberger, Falls Church, VA, for Plaintiffs.

Steven Robert Becker, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Washington, DC, Daniel John Clark, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease LLP, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Sebastian Njang, Marco Washington, and Joyce Ejikunle were employed as security guards at a federal government office building in the District of Columbia in 2009, when the events at issue in this lawsuit took place. All three plaintiffs allege that the private security company that employed them—the Whitestone Group, Inc. ("Whitestone" or "Defendant")—took various actions that constituted illegal race discrimination against them, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (see Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 18 (Count II)), and Njang alone alleges that Whitestone also discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (see Compl. ¶ 17 (Count I)). Specifically, Njang and Washington assert that, out of discriminatory animus, their supervisor falsely reported that they had committed fraud, which resulted in their required suitability determinations being revoked, and eventually led to the termination of their employment. (See Pls.' Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pls.' Opp'n"), ECF No. 19, at 1.)¹ In addition, Ejikunle claims that her supervisor threatened her and reassigned her to a different position with fewer hours and lower pay because of her race, and that Whitestone ultimately terminated her after she refused to relocate. (See Compl. ¶ 15; Pls.' Opp'n at 11–12.)

Before this Court at present is Whitestone's motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 18, at 1.) Defendant's primary argument is that Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred. (See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. ("Def.'s Mem."), ECF No. 18-1, at 6–8.) Defendant also contends that, even if the complaint's claims are timely, the doctrine established in Department of Navy v. Egan , 484 U.S. 518, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988), precludes this Court's review of the discrimination claims filed by Njang and Washington (see id. at 8–9), and, in any event, none of the plaintiffs can establish prima facie cases of discrimination (see id. at 11–14).

As explained fully below, this Court concludes that Whitestone is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Section 1981 claims (Count II) because these claims are time-barred due to the six-month contractual limitations period in Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Njang's Title VII claim (Count I) is not time-barred, but neither party has addressed the particular theory of liability upon which Njang's Title VII claim appears to be based—specifically, the "cat's paw" theory that the Supreme Court articulated in Staub v. Proctor Hospital , 562 U.S. 411, 131 S.Ct. 1186, 179 L.Ed.2d 144 (2011) —nor have the parties briefed the critical issues of (1) whether and to what extent Egan preclusion applies to Title VII discrimination claims based upon a cat's paw theory, and (2) whether Njang has sufficiently demonstrated proximate cause to survive summary judgment under the analysis set forth in Staub . Accordingly, in its Order of March 31, 2016, this Court ruled that Defendant's motion for summary judgment was GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART . The instant Memorandum Opinion explains the Court's reasons for its prior ruling, and it also includes a separate order that requires the parties to provide additional briefing on the material, remaining legal issues discussed below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts²

In February of 2009, Whitestone, a private security contractor, was assigned a pre-existing contract to provide security guards for a federal government office building in Washington, D.C. (See Compl. ¶¶ 7–9.) Whitestone retained many of the guards the previous contractor had employed, including Plaintiffs Sebastian Njang, Marco Washington, and Joyce Ejikunle. (See id. ) Njang and Washington are both "black male[s,]" and Ejikunle is a "black female [.]" (Id. ) Njang was born in Cameroon and immigrated to the United States in 2000 (see id. ¶ 7); Washington and Ejikunle were both born in the United States, although Ejikunle was raised and educated in Nigeria, and returned to the United States in 2002 (see id. ¶¶ 8–9).

In connection with their retention as Whitestone employees, Plaintiffs each signed a written employment agreement with Whitestone. (See Def.'s Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute ("Def.'s SMF"), ECF No. 18-2, ¶ 7.) The agreement included a provision in which the employee agreed "to file all claims or lawsuits in any way relating to employment with the Company no more than six months after the date of the employment action that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit." (Id. ) The contract also required all of Whitestone's security guards to pass the "suitability determination" that the Federal Protective Services ("FPS"), a division of the Department of Homeland Security, conducts. (See id. ¶ 2.)

A few months after Whitestone took over the security contract, it hired Chris Ackerman, a white man, to serve as the project manager for the site. (See Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs allege that Ackerman made a number of discriminatory remarks, including telling Njang that his accent made him sound "like a monkey from Africa[.]" (See Decl. of Pl. Sebastian Njang ("Njang Decl."), Ex. 3 to Pls.' Opp'n, ECF No. 19-4, ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs assert that Ackerman also referred to an R&B song as "monkey music" (id. ¶ 9), and that he complained that "there were too many Africans and African Americans at the site" (id. ¶ 11).³

On September 22, 2009, Ackerman asked Washington to come to his office; when Washington arrived, three FPS agents were waiting there for him. (See Dep. of Marco V. Washington, Ex. 5 to Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 18-5, at 10.) Ackerman informed Washington that his suitability determination had been revoked. (See id. ) Washington was required to turn over his credentials and was immediately escorted out of the building. (See id. at 11.) The next day, the same sequence of events allegedly happened to Njang. (See Dep. of Sebastian Njang ("Njang Dep."), Ex. 4 to Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 18-4, at 9.)

Whitestone says that it determined that several of its employees were fraudulently claiming to have worked additional hours, and that it reported these violations to FPS. (See Memorandum, ECF No. 8, at 2; FPS Investigation Summary, Ex. A to Memorandum, ECF No. 8-1, at 1.) The FPS conducted an investigation in which "four suspects were determined to be involved in fraudulent time card documentation[,]" including Njang and Washington. (FPS Investigation Summary at 1.) These negative suitability determinations led to the revocation of Njang's and Washington's security clearances, and their subsequent termination. (See Compl. ¶ 13; Pls.' Separate Listing of Material Facts That Are Genuinely In Dispute ("Pls.' SMF"), ECF No. 19 at 4–6, ¶ 1.) However, Njang and Washington have consistently denied committing any fraud. (See Njang Decl. ¶¶ 17–19; see also Compl. ¶¶ 17–18).

A week after Njang and Washington were removed, Jose Guadarrama, Njang's replacement, approached Ejikunle—the third plaintiff. (See Decl. of Pl. Joyce Ejikunle ("Ejikunle Decl."), Ex. 5 to Pls.' Opp'n, ECF No. 19-6, ¶ 13.) Ejikunle claims that Guadarrama told her that if she did not start showing support for Ackerman and him, "they would look for some reason to remove [her] from the site, just as they had done with Mr. Njang and Mr. Washington." (Id. )⁴ Ejikunle asserts that this conversation led her to file a race discrimination complaint with the EEOC on October 5, 2009; in that complaint, she alleged that she had been subjected to hostile and threatening treatment on the basis of her race. (See id. ¶ 14; Compl. ¶ 15.)

On October 9, 2009, Guadarrama allegedly told Ejikunle that she was being relocated to another location. (See Ejikunle Decl. ¶ 15.) According to Ejikunle, she protested this reassignment, which she says would have resulted in reduced hourly pay and fewer hours. (See id. ) Whitestone claims that Ejikunle did not show up to work at the new location and failed to contact her new supervisor about her new schedule, and as a result, Whitestone treated her as having resigned. (See Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 34–37.) Ejikunle maintains that she never intended to resign and that her termination was involuntary. (See Ejikunle Decl. ¶ 17.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed the instant employment discrimination lawsuit on January 30, 2012. The two-count complaint alleges that Whitestone violated Title VII in its treatment of Njang (Count I) and that it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in its treatment of all three Plaintiffs (Count II).

In its motion for summary judgment, which was filed on August 30, 2013, Whitestone contends that judgment should be granted in its favor on both counts. The motion argues that Count I cannot withstand summary judgment on three grounds: first, because Njang's Title VII claim is time-barred; second, because even if the claim is timely, Njang's attempt to challenge the revocation of his suitability is not justiciable under Department of Navy v. Egan , 484 U.S. 518, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) ; and, third, because Njang's allegations fail to state a claim of discrimination under Title VII. (See Def.'s Mem. at 6–18.) Defendant argues that Count II cannot proceed to trial for these same reasons. (See generally Def.'s Mem.) Defendant's motion has been fully briefed (see Pls.' Opp'n; Def.'s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. ("Def.'s Reply"), ECF No. 20), and is now ripe for ...