NJM Ins. Co. v. Crete Carrier Corp., Case No. 3:19-cv-4587-BRM-LHG

CourtUnited States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey
Writing for the CourtMARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE
PartiesNJM INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff, v. CRETE CARRIER CORP., Defendant.
Docket NumberCase No. 3:19-cv-4587-BRM-LHG
Decision Date29 January 2020

NJM INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff,
v.
CRETE CARRIER CORP., Defendant.

Case No. 3:19-cv-4587-BRM-LHG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

January 29, 2020


NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is Plaintiff NJM Insurance Co.'s ("NJM") Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 7) and Defendant Crete Carrier Corp.'s ("Crete") Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10). The parties oppose each other's motions. (ECF Nos. 10 & 13.) Having reviewed the parties' submissions filed in connection with the motions and having declined to hear oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause having been shown, NJM's motion is GRANTED, and the parties must SUBMIT this matter to arbitration. This case is STAYED pending the outcome of arbitration. Crete's motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with leave to refile in arbitration.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On or about January 19, 2014, Crete's commercial vehicle struck a vehicle owned and driven by non-party Rosalind Y. Stewart ("Ms. Stewart"). (ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 1; ECF No. 10-4 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Ms. Stewart and her passenger, non-party Wilbur Stewart ("Mr. Stewart"), suffered injuries in the collision. (ECF No. 10-4 ¶ 2.) Both Ms. Stewart and Mr. Stewart incurred medical

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expenses for the treatment of their injuries: $21,088.67 for Ms. Stewart and $224,699.48 for Mr. Stewart. (ECF No. 10-4 ¶¶ 5-7.)

NJM insures both Ms. Stewart and Mr. Stewart, and reimbursed both for the full cost of their medical care. (ECF No. 10-4 ¶¶ 6-7, 10-15.) Crete is self-insured and is not required to carry personal injury protection. (ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 2.) NJM requested Crete reimburse NJM for the cost of the benefits it paid to Ms. Stewart and Mr. Stewart. (ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 3; ECF No. 10-4 ¶ 23.) Crete responded that it would address the claim for reimbursement once all the underlying personal injury claims were resolved. (ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 5; ECF No. 10-4 ¶ 24.) Crete eventually reimbursed or agreed to reimburse NJM for some of the requested benefits NJM paid to its insureds. (ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 6; ECF No. 10-4 ¶¶ 8-9.) The parties disputed the remainder Crete owed to NJM. (ECF No. 7-2 ¶ 8; ECF No. 10-4 ¶ 27.)

NJM filed this action against Crete in Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, seeking reimbursement for the cost of benefits NJM paid to Ms. Stewart and Mr. Stewart as well as a declaratory judgment that NJM and Crete were required to arbitrate their dispute. (ECF No. 7-13 ¶ 2.) Crete removed this case to this Court. (ECF No. 7-13 ¶ 13.) NJM moved in this Court to compel arbitration. (ECF No. 7.) Crete moved for summary judgment on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations bars this action. (ECF No. 10.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine only if there is "a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party," and it is

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material only if it has the ability to "affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. See id. at 248. "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence 'is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, (1986); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002). "Summary judgment may not be granted . . . if there is a disagreement over what inferences can be reasonably drawn from the facts even if the facts are undisputed." Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3rd Cir. 1991) (citing Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir.)); Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 90 F.3d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1996).

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of...

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