NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Service, Inc., 17764.

• Decision Date: 29 December 1959
• Docket Number: No. 17764.,17764.
• Parties: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellant, v. ALAMO WHITE TRUCK SERVICE, INC., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

273 F.2d 238 (1959)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellant, v. ALAMO WHITE TRUCK SERVICE, INC., Appellee.

No. 17764.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

December 29, 1959.

Allison W. Brown, Jr., Atty., Thomas J. McDermott, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Stuart Rothman, Gen. Counsel, Frederick U. Reel, Atty., N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Theo. F. Weiss, Clemens, Knight, Weiss & Spencer, San Antonio, Tex., for respondent.

Before HUTCHESON, JONES and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge.

The question for decision is whether the respondent is a successor employer, for the purpose of an unfair labor practice proceeding, and as such bound to honor NLRB certification of unions certified as the bargaining representatives of the predecessor employer.

The complaint charged Alamo White Truck Service, Inc. of San Antonio, Texas, with violating Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (3, 5). The trial examiner recommended dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. The National Labor Relations Board sustained the trial examiner as to the 8(a) (3) charge¹ but found that Alamo had violated Section 8(a) (5) in refusing to bargain with the Teamsters and Machinists Unions,² certified, according to the Board, as the exclusive bargaining representatives of Alamo's employees. Alamo admits that it refused to bargain with the unions, basing its refusal on the fact that the unions were certified as the bargaining representatives of the San Antonio branch of the White Motor Company of Cleveland, Ohio. White, Alamo contends, was an entirely different company and an essentially different employment enterprise. The Board held that Alamo "had taken over substantially intact the business formerly operated by White, and as a successor employer" is obligated to honor the certification. 122 N.L.R.B. No. 139. The Board now petitions this Court for enforcement of an order requiring Alamo to cease and desist from refusing to bargain with the unions.³

We hold that there is no substantial evidence to support the finding of the Board, and deny enforcement of the order.

It has been held that a mere change in ownership is not so unusual a circumstance as to affect certification. Where "the employment enterprise remains essentially the same, the obligation to bargain of a prior employer devolves upon his successor in title". Cruse Motors, Inc., 1953, 105 N.L.R.B. 242, 247. See N.L.R.B. v. Armato, 7 Cir., 1952, 199 F.2d 800, 803; N.L.R.B. v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 1 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 284, 285-287; N.L.R.B. v. Hoppes Mfg. Co., 6 Cir., 1948, 170 F.2d 962, 964; N.L.R.B. v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 4 Cir., 1945, 152 F. 2d 25. These are the cases the Board relies on.⁴ The rationale underlying these holdings is stated in N.L.R.B. v. Colten, 6 Cir., 1939, 105 F.2d 179, 183: "It is the employing industry that is sought to be regulated and brought within the corrective and remedial provisions of the Act in the interests of industrial peace. * * * It needs no demonstration that the strife which is sought to be averted is no less an object of legislative solicitude when contract, death, or operation of law brings about change of ownership in the employing agency."

It is not necessary to discuss the correctness of this principle. The bona fide purchaser of a business, however, is not ipso facto a successor employer bound by an unsuspected transferee obligation to remedy the seller's unfair labor practices and to honor a union certification binding the seller. Where "the nature or extent of the employing enterprise, or the work of the employees, is substantially changed, the transfer of a part, or even all, of the physical assets does not carry along with it to the purchaser the duty of the former owner to continue bargaining with the former exclusive representative". Cruse Motors, Inc., 1953, 105 N.L.R.B. 242, 247. See Juneau Spruce Corp., 1949, 82 N.L.R.B. 650; Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 1955, 112 N.L.R.B. 1014; Herman Lowenstein, 1947, 75 N.L.R.B. 377; Sewell Mfg. Co., 1947, 72 N.L.R.B. 85; Tampa Transit Lines, 1946, 71 N.L.R.B. 742. See also N.L.R.B. v. Parran, 4 Cir., 1956, 237 F.2d 373.

The question before us therefore, within the scope of our reviewing authority, is not whether Alamo, actually or in effect, purchased the White business in San Antonio, all or a large part of it. This is but one element. It must be weighed along with other elements in determining the critical question: is the employing enterprise substantially the same under Alamo as it was under White? To supply the answer it is necessary to take a close look at the record.

The White Motor Company is a wellknown, large, and successful manufacturer of trucks. Its head office is in Cleveland, Ohio. For several years White maintained a retail branch in San Antonio, Texas. In December, 1956, the company decided to close its San Antonio branch, after having considered closing it as far back as October, 1956. The decision was admittedly for business reasons and had nothing to do with any union activity.⁵ On June 28, 1957, White closed the branch and announced this fact in advertisements in the San Antonio newspapers.

In the spring of 1957 the Teamsters and Machinists began a joint organizational drive at the San Antonio branch, the Teamsters to represent the men in the parts department and the Machinists to represent the mechanics and shop employees. Strong feeling developed between the advocates and the opponents of the unions. A representation election was held in a tense atmosphere. The unions won the election by a vote of eight to seven. June 20, 1957, the Board certified the unions as the exclusive bargaining agents of the White employees at San Antonio. June 24, 1957, the unions requested the San Antonio branch to bargain with the unions. The next day White, through its head office in Cleveland, notified the unions that the branch was terminated and that employment of all employees was ended as of June 30, 1957. The unions then requested that Alamo recognize them as the bargaining representatives of Alamo's employees. Alamo refused to do so.

The Board makes no contention that the closing of the branch had anything to do with union activity. It makes no contention that the organization of Alamo as a completely independent business was not bona fide.

When it had become apparent that White intended closing the San Antonio branch, Lloyd Cregor, the branch manager, and Willard Boone, the principal salesman, decided to set up an independent business to service and sell trucks, particularly White trucks. They raised $50,000, using their savings and borrowing on their life insurance, and on June 19, 1957, Alamo was incorporated with Cregor as president and general manager and with Boone as vice-president and treasurer. White, of course, had been looking for a local dealer and shortly before July 1 entered into the usual local retail dealership agreement with Alamo.

Alamo bought from White the initial inventory of parts, tools, shop equipment, and office equipment. There was however a complete severance with White. Thus, Alamo did not purchase the accounts receivable. It did not assume any of the indebtedness or obligations of the old factory branch. It did not acquire any of White's books and records. A new system of bookkeeping was installed. White cancelled all of its liability insurance and other insurance; Alamo arranged for its own insurance with companies which were not the same as those that had carried White's insurance, and Alamo was not permitted to claim credit for the Workmen's Compensation experience of the factory branch. Alamo obtained a new Texas business license. Alamo employed a different method of financing the sale of automotive equipment.

White owned the building in which its factory branch was located. It put up the property for sale, giving Alamo only a one-year lease on part of the building, with no option to renew.

Alamo opened for business with a work force of seven mechanics. There was no parts department and no employees charged with selling parts.⁶ White had employed twelve mechanics. The five former employees of White not employed by Alamo were the only White mechanics who had joined the union and, presumably, voted for the union at the election (the other three votes in favor of the unions came from the parts department). Accordingly, and as the record tends to show, none of Alamo's employees belonged to either of the unions or had ever belonged to either of the unions and, presumably, none of the Alamo employees voted for representation by these unions at the election at the San Antonio branch of White Motor Company.⁷

As the trial examiner pointed out, "not only the business but the functions changed". The branch was controlled entirely from Cleveland, Ohio. All policies were determined at the home office of the White Motor Company in Cleveland and centered around the fact that the company was engaged in manufacturing trucks and selling trucks on a nation-wide scale. The policies were transmitted to the branch manager through a White vice-president and the regional director. On the other hand, with Alamo, control of policy is vested in the...