NLRB v. LOCAL 19, INTERNAT'L BRO. OF LONGSHOREMEN
| Decision Date | 28 February 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 12979.,12979. |
| Citation | 286 F.2d 661 |
| Parties | NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. LOCAL 19, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF LONGSHOREMEN, AFL-CIO, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Paul J. Spielberg, Atty., Stuart Rothman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Frederick U. Reel, Atty., National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., for petitioner.
Irving M. Friedman, Harold A. Katz, Jerome Schur, Arthur Brody, Oscar D'Angelo, Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
Before HASTINGS, Chief Judge, and SCHNACKENBERG and KNOCH, Circuit Judges.
The National Labor Relations Board is here seeking enforcement of its order issued November 12, 1959, against respondent, to cease and desist from unlawful refusal to bargain.
The order directed respondent to:
The Board found that, for more than 20 years, collective bargaining in the Chicago longshore operations had been conducted on a group basis. The practice had been that as the contract expiration date approached, respondent would ask all stevedore-employing companies to set a date to discuss a new contract. The employers would meet to draft a joint proposal which would be submitted to respondent at the first meeting, at which time each employer would receive a copy of respondent's proposals. The employers, meeting together, would determine their position by majority vote. At later meetings, with respondent, one employer-representative would be the principal spokesman for the employer group. In recent years, Frederick W. Turner, Jr., appears to have performed this function, although other employer-representatives, occasionally, discussed particular phases of the contract with respondent. The signing of a memorandum of agreement by representatives of respondent and of the employers was followed by execution of individual contracts with the individual employers. For some years, now, these individual contracts have been identical. Respondent contends that the employers never constituted an "association". There was some conflicting testimony on this point, but the record shows ample evidence to support the Board's finding.
The Board found that no member company ever refused to execute an individual contract after the memorandum of agreement had been signed, or ever broke away from the negotiations to bargain independently. Whenever a new stevedoring company entered the field, the newcomer would be offered the contract currently in effect with the others. A single exception shown was that of Seaway Stevedoring Co., which in 1956 was given a contract running to 1959. However, that contract was to incorporate changes resulting from negotiations in 1957, and Seaway was represented at the 1957 talks.
The disputed work concerns only one segment of the merchandise handled by Wacker Warehouse Company, which operates a storage warehouse: i. e. merchandise which arrives by boat or barge and is moved into storage. From 1951 to 1953, all unloading of marine merchandise was carried on, for Wacker, by Illinois Warehouse Co., an independent concern, which had a contract with respondent and which used respondent's longshoremen to unload cargo and to move it into storage, or to load it directly onto trucks or freight cars. All merchandise, marine and nonmarine, which was removed from storage to trucks or trains was handled by Wacker's own employees under Wacker's contract with Miscellaneous Warehousemen's Union, Local 781. In 1953, Wacker undertook the work previously performed for it by Illinois Warehouse and also assumed the contract with respondent. When the time came to remove marine merchandise from storage to trucks and trains, respondent demanded this work for its members. However, this work of removing all merchandise from storage was guaranteed to Wacker's employees under their aforesaid contract with Wacker. The Board found that after a discussion of the demands, respondent had acquiesced in the then division of work whereby marine cargo which had gone into storage would subsequently be taken from storage and loaded onto trains or trucks by Local 781 Warehousemen only. In May, 1954, Wacker and respondent entered into the standard industry contract to run until May, 1955. This standard contract provided that respondent's members would have jurisdiction of:
"All work from the hold of vessel, through house to car, truck or upper floors, in warehouse, to its final resting place in said warehouse, or in removing cargo from the warehouse, up to, on and into the hold of the vessel, truck or car, or vice versa." Emphasis added.
The Board found that as the emphasized wording was inconsistent with the previous understanding between Wacker and respondent, respondent agreed that the emphasized words would not apply to Wacker. General Counsel's Exhibit No. 15, shows an asterisk inserted prior to the words "truck or car, or vice versa," and a footnote "per letter attached," but the Board notes in its decision that no letter was attached. Wacker did write respondent twice asking for written confirmation of this exception, but respondent made no reply. The Board found, however, that the Local 781 warehousemen continued to handle marine merchandise after it had been in storage and was being loaded onto trucks or trains. Here too, there is a conflict in testimony, but sufficient support exists in the record for the Board's finding.
The new contract in May, 1955, contained the same provision. Respondent staged a work stoppage in support of its demand for conformity with the exact wording of the provision. Wacker still had its contract with its warehousemen employees which gave them the disputed work. Wacker then abandoned the business of receiving marine merchandise for storage.
In March, 1957, Wacker joined with the other employers in negotiating a new contract with respondent. When preliminary discussions indicated that respondent intended to insist...
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