NLRB v. Rish Equipment Company
Decision Date | 07 March 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 12445.,12445. |
Citation | 407 F.2d 1098 |
Parties | NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. RISH EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Leon M. Kestenbaum, Atty., N.L.R.B. (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Paul J. Spielberg, Atty., N.L.R. B., on brief) for petitioner.
George V. Gardner, Washington, D. C. (Asa Ambrister on brief) for respondent.
Before BOREMAN, WINTER and CRAVEN, Circuit Judges.
The National Labor Relations Board seeks enforcement of its order1 issued against Rish Equipment Company (hereafter "Company"). The matters herein involve only the company plant at Bluefield, West Virginia. In its brief and in oral argument the Company admits that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the Company violated section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,2 by engaging in and creating the impression that it was engaged in surveillance of a union meeting attended by company employees. The sole question remaining is whether there is substantial evidence on the whole record to support the Board's finding that the Company violated section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union.
At a representation election conducted by the Board on August 30, 1963, a majority of the employees apparently voted for the Union. Subsequently, one challenged ballot was ordered counted which increased the union majority and on February 10, 1965, the Union was certified as the representative of the Company's unit employees. The Union requested bargaining by letter to the Company of February 28, 1965, which request was completely ignored. However, prior thereto there had been litigation before the Board on the Union's charges of unfair labor practices which had resulted in a Board Decision and Order on January 22, 1965, remanding the case for action by the Regional Director on disputed ballots, and finding that the Company had violated section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act. Upon review by this court enforcement of the Board's order was granted.3 Thereafter in June 1966 the Company advised the Regional Director that it had complied with this court's decree and the Board's order.
In the instant case the Trial Examiner, in his decision, which was approved and adopted by the Board, stated:
It appears to be well established that an employer must bargain with the certified representative of his employees for a period of one year from the date of the Board's certification even if the Union loses its majority status through no fault of the employer.4 After that time, while the certification loses its absolute force, it creates a rebuttable presumption that the Union continues to enjoy majority support.5 Accordingly, where a certification is a year or more old, an employer may refuse to bargain without violating the Act "if, but only if, he in good faith has a reasonable doubt of the Union's continuing majority."6
In the case of a certified union the presumption that its majority status continues places the burden on the employer to prove that it had a good faith doubt of the union's continuing majority.7 To meet this burden "requires more than an employer's mere mention of its good faith doubt and more than proof of the employer's subjective frame of mind."8 What is required is a "rational basis in fact."9
In the case here under review the Company first failed to respond to the Union's request for bargaining in February 1965, immediately after the certification. The Union filed no unfair labor practice charge for refusal to bargain at that time, apparently because it decided to defer bargaining until the Company's preelection misconduct had been remedied. Following this court's decision in the related unfair labor practice case and the Company's subsequent compliance with the Board's 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) order the Union again requested bargaining in February 1967, but received no response. The Union then collected authorization cards from eighteen of thirty employees in the unit in order to demonstrate its continued majority support. In April 1967, the Union made a final request for recognition and bargaining, offering its cards to prove that its majority remained intact. Again the Union's requests were completely ignored.
At the hearing the Company's sole evidence relative to its alleged good faith doubt is the testimony of Supervisor Stanton, in charge of the Company's labor...
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