NLRB v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company
| Decision Date | 04 March 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 16621.,16621. |
| Parties | NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. The WESTERN AND SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Warren M. Davison, N. L. R. B., Washington, D. C. (Arnold Ordman, Gen. Counsel, Dominick L. Manoli, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Linda Sher, Attorney, N. L. R. B., on the brief), for petitioner.
John G. Wayman, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa. (W. D. Armour, Pittsburgh, Pa., Ithamar D. Weed, Cincinatti, Ohio, on the brief), for respondent.
Before STALEY, Chief Judge, and MARIS and VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judges.
This is a petition by the National Labor Relations Board for enforcement of its order requiring the Western and Southern Life Insurance Company (hereinafter "Company") to bargain with the certified bargaining representatives of the Company's debit insurance agents employed at two separate district offices. The Company's principal contention in refusing to bargain is that the Board's finding that the individual district offices are appropriate bargaining units is arbitrary and without substantial evidence, and is, in fact, based upon the extent of organization of the unit employees in violation of § 9(c) (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1964). We have thoroughly reviewed the entire record in this case, and we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion; its decision was not controlled by the extent of organization, but was based on permissible criteria, and it established the appropriateness of the units.
This is the second time that this case has been before us. In January, 1962, the Insurance Workers International Union filed separate petitions for the Company's McKeesport and Wilkinsburg district offices in Western Pennsylvania. The cases were consolidated for hearing and the Board, two members dissenting, directed separate elections for each office. 138 NLRB 538 (1962). After the Union won the elections, the Company refused to bargain on the basis that the Board's unit determinations were invalid; but in the ensuing unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board ordered the Company to bargain with the Union. 142 N.L.R.B. 28 (1963). We granted enforcement of the Board's order in a per curiam opinion, 328 F.2d 891 (C.A.3, 1964), on the basis of our opinion in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 328 F.2d 820 (C.A.3, 1964). Thereafter, certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court which remanded the case to this court, 380 U.S. 523, 85 S.Ct. 1325, 14 L.Ed.2d 265 (1965), with instructions to remand to the Board for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in N.L. R.B. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (Woonsocket), 380 U.S. 438, 85 S.Ct. 1061, 13 L.Ed.2d 951 (1965).
On remand, the Board ordered the parties to file briefs directed to the unit issues of the case in the light of the Supreme Court's opinion in the Metropolitan (Woonsocket) case and the Board's supplemental decision issued on remand therein. There the Board held that it was not necessary to reopen the record since it could articulate its reasons for the unit determination in the unfair labor practice proceeding as well as it could in the representation proceeding. Similarly, the Board did not reopen the underlying representation proceeding in this case. The Company argues that the Board's refusal to reopen denied it due process and was contrary to the Supreme Court's order.
The controlling mandate in Metropolitan (Woonsocket) does not support the Company's position. There, the Supreme Court, emphasizing that the Board "* * must `disclose the basis of its order' and `give clear indication that it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it,'" noted:
"Of course, the Board may articulate the basis of its order by reference to other decisions or its general policies laid down in its rules and its annual reports, reflecting its `cumulative experience\' * * * so long as the basis of the Board\'s action, in whatever manner the Board chooses to formulate it, meets the criteria for judicial review." 380 U.S. at 443, note 6, 85 S.Ct. at 1064. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Board's detailed decision in this case certainly "meets the criteria for judicial review." Moreover, the Supreme Court's language in the above-quoted note indicates to us that the Court did not view it necessary for the Board to reopen the representation proceeding, but merely required the Board to provide the courts with a complete presentation of the Board's rationale and supporting evidence in making these unit determinations. Here the Board has made such a presentation.
Moreover, it is difficult to perceive how the Company was prejudiced by the Board's refusal to reopen the representation proceeding. The Company presented a most complete and competent case at the original representation hearing, and its position there, i. e., that the district offices were not individually appropriate bargaining units, and that the appropriate unit would have been all the district offices in the Company's "Division E," or in Western Pennsylvania, or in the Pittsburgh Metropolitan Area, is precisely that advanced in its briefs to the Board on remand, and again in the appeal to this court. It is true that in the § 8(a) (5) proceeding, the Company offered proofs to show that the Board's unit determinations were based on the Union's "extent of organization" by showing that the Union solicited employees at other district offices in the Pittsburgh area prior to the time the Union petitioned for elections at the two offices certified by the Board. However, in reaching its Supplemental Decision, the Board considered the offers of proof as if they had been established, and still concluded that acceptance of this evidence would not have overturned the original unit determinations. We have done likewise. Thus there can be no prejudice on this basis, for the Company is availed of whatever benefit it would have obtained by proving the substance of its offers, without having had to produce the evidence.
Finding then that there is no defect in the procedure employed by the Board, we shall proceed to the central inquiry whether these unit determinations were proper. In our view, the issues whether the Board's decisions are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Board improperly allowed the "extent of organization" to control its decision are not...
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