Nnebe v. Daus
| Decision Date | 19 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 18-866-cv (L),18-490-cv,18-1254-cv (XAP),August Term, 2018 |
| Citation | 931 F.3d 66 |
| Parties | Jonathan NNEBE, Khairul Amin, Eduardo Avenaut, New York Taxi Workers Alliance, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs - Appellants - Cross-Appellees, Alexander Karmansky, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Matthew DAUS, Joseph Eckstein, Elizabeth Bonina, the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, the City of New York, Charles Fraser, Defendants - Appellees - Cross-Appellants, Charles Frazier, Defendant. Anthony Stallworth, Parichay Barman, Noor Tani, the New York Taxi Workers Alliance, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. Meera Joshi, Chris Wilson, Stas Skarbo, the City of New York, Defendants - Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Daniel L. Ackman, Law Office of Daniel L. Ackman, New York, New York, David T. Goldberg, Donahue & Goldberg, LLP, New York, New York, for Plaintiffs - Appellants - Cross-Appellees in Nnebe, and Daniel L. Ackman, Law Office Of Daniel L. Ackman, New York, New York for Plaintiffs - Appellants in Stallworth.
Claude S. Platton, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Richard Dearing, Susan Paulson, on the brief), for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, New York, for Defendants - Appellees - Cross-Appellants in Nnebe, and Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, Claude S. Patton, Susan Paulson, and Scott Shorr, New York, New York, for Defendants - Appellees in Stallworth.
Runa Rajagopal, The Bronx Defenders, Bronx, New York, for amici curiae The Bronx Defenders, Community Service Society of New York, Legal Action Center, Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, Youth Represent, Urban Justice Center Mental Health Project, Brooklyn Defender Services, Legal Aid Society, and LatinoJustice PRLDEF.
Before: Katzmann, Chief Judge, and Hall and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
The Taxi and Limousine Commission of New York City (the "TLC") has the authority to issue, revoke, and suspend taxi drivers’ licenses. These tandem cases require us to examine the TLC’s suspension procedures under the Due Process Clause to determine whether the TLC provides meaningful hearings to drivers whose licenses have been suspended pending the outcome of criminal proceedings. We conclude that it does not.
We first determine that evidence of a driver’s ongoing danger to health and public safety is relevant under the statutory and regulatory scheme. We then conclude that, in light of the significant private interest at stake, the unacceptably high risk of erroneous deprivation, and the fact that additional safeguards can be provided with minimal burden on governmental resources, the TLC’s refusal to consider such evidence violates due process.
Accordingly, in Nnebe we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the judgment of the district court, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the judgment in Stallworth, and we REMAND both cases to the district court for further proceedings.
This appeal concerns what happens when taxi drivers are arrested on criminal charges and their licenses are summarily suspended. Though arrested drivers are entitled under the relevant regulation to a post-suspension hearing, the plaintiffs contend that the hearings the TLC provides are meaningless, and that no driver has ever had his or her license reinstated following such a hearing. They bring claims that sound in procedural due process, arguing that the post-suspension hearings are not the "meaningful" hearings that due process requires. See Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (citation omitted).
In the first of the tandem cases, Nnebe v. Daus , plaintiffs-appellants-cross-appellees are drivers whose licenses were suspended before 2007. They first brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in 2006; it has since wound its way through a complex procedural web which culminated in a bench trial, from the results of which plaintiffs now appeal (No. 18-866-cv). The defendants in that case — the TLC, the City of New York, and various employees of those entities — cross-appeal the single issue on which the district court found in plaintiffs’ favor: that the notice given to suspended drivers prior to December 2006 was constitutionally infirm (No. 18-1254-cv).
In the second case, Stallworth v. Joshi , the plaintiffs-appellants are drivers suspended in 2017 after being arrested for leaving the scene of an accident. Defendants — the City of New York, and various City and TLC employees — moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim in light of the district court’s rulings in Nnebe . The district court granted the motion; plaintiffs appeal (No. 18-490-cv).
The New York City Charter grants broad authority to the TLC to promulgate and implement a regulatory program for the taxi industry. See N.Y.C. Charter § 2303(b)(5) (). New York City Administrative Code § 19-512.1(a) (the "Ordinance") governs the revocation of taxicab licenses and reads as follows: "The commission ... may, for good cause shown relating to a direct and substantial threat to the public health or safety and prior to giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing, suspend a taxicab ... license ...." The Ordinance further requires notice to be given within five calendar days of any such suspension, and "an opportunity to request a hearing ... within ten calendar days" of such notification. Id. In passing the Ordinance, the City Council noted "the strong need for aggressive regulation of the taxicab ... industry and those directly responsible for the safety of the riding public" but found that certain TLC rules modifying disciplinary measures against drivers were overly "onerous." Id. n.1. The Council determined that the new ordinance, with its requirements of good cause related to a direct and substantial threat to public safety and of a prompt hearing process, "establishes a superior balancing of the concern for safe and high quality service with the need for fair treatment of an industry important to New York City." Id.
Under this authority, the TLC has promulgated a number of regulations over the years dealing with arrest-related license suspensions and revocations. In 1999, the first version of the Rule, 35 R.C.N.Y. § 8-16(a) (1999), allowed the TLC Chairperson to order a summary suspension of a license, pending revocation proceedings, if he or she "finds that emergency action is required to insure public health, safety or welfare." The 1999 Rule further required notification of the summary suspension within five days, and an opportunity to request a prompt post-deprivation hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") "who shall consider relevant evidence and testimony" under oath. Id. § 8-16(c),(d). The ALJ was then required to issue a written recommendation to the TLC Chair, who could "accept, reject or modify the recommendation." Id § 8-16(e).
In 2006, the Rule was amended; notably, the amended Rule specified that the TLC Chair could summarily suspend a license "based upon an arrest on criminal charges that the Chairperson determines is relevant to the licensee’s qualifications for continued licensure." R.C.N.Y. § 8-16 (c) (2006). It then laid out the issue to be determined at the hearing: "whether the charges underlying the licensee’s arrest, if true, demonstrate that the licensee’s continued licensure during the pendency of the criminal charges would pose a threat to the health or safety of the public." Id. The TLC Chair retained the authority to accept, reject, or modify the finding of the ALJ. Id. § 8-16(f).
The most recent version of the Rule, as amended in 2014, provides as follows: "The Chairperson can summarily suspend a License based upon an arrest or citation if the Chairperson believes that the charges, if true, would demonstrate that continued licensure would constitute a direct and substantial threat to public health or safety." R.C.N.Y. § 68-15(d)(1). The Rule then proceeds to state that all felonies and certain enumerated misdemeanors will trigger a summary suspension. Id. This latest version of the Rule provides for a hearing at which the issue to be determined is "whether the charges underlying the Licensee’s arrest, if true, demonstrate that the continuation of the License while awaiting a decision on the criminal charges would pose a direct and substantial threat to public health or safety." Id. § 68-15(d)(3).1
While the text of the Rule has gone through several iterations, in practice the summary suspension process has been essentially the same since its adoption. As the district court pointed out, "[e]ven the most significant change to the Rule — the addition of the substantive standard in 2006 — merely reflected and restated pre-existing practice." J. App’x 65.3
When a licensed taxi driver is arrested, the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services ("DCJS") sends the TLC an arrest notification. A TLC employee then confirms that the arrested person is in fact a licensed TLC driver and checks the charged offense against a list of offenses that the TLC considers sufficiently serious to warrant suspension.4 The listed offenses include all felonies, and misdemeanors involving violence, driving, or sexual misconduct.5
The TLC then notifies the driver in a letter that it has learned of his or her arrest, that the driver’s license has been suspended, and that the driver can schedule a hearing to contest the suspension. The driver is not informed of any standard that will be applied at the hearing, but the letter does direct the driver to the version of the Rule in force at time of the letter’s issuance. The letter also makes clear that the TLC may lift...
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