Nnebe v. Daus

• Decision Date: 31 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 17-cv-7119 (RJS),No. 06-cv-4991 (RJS),06-cv-4991 (RJS)
• Citation: Nnebe v. Daus, 510 F.Supp.3d 179 (S.D. N.Y. 2020)
• Parties: Jonathan NNEBE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Matthew DAUS, et al., Defendants. Anthony Stallworth, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Meera Joshi et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

510 F.Supp.3d 179

Jonathan NNEBE, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Matthew DAUS, et al., Defendants.

Anthony Stallworth, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Meera Joshi et al., Defendants.

No. 06-cv-4991 (RJS)

No. 17-cv-7119 (RJS)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed December 31, 2020

Daniel Lee Ackman, Law Office of Daniel L. Ackman, Matthew D. Brinckerhoff, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff Abady Ward & Maazel LLP, New York, NY, Shannon Liss-Riordan, Lichten & Liss-Riordan PC, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Mary M. O'Sullivan, Amy J. Weinblatt, Edward Louis Murray, III, NYC Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:

This Opinion and Order marks the latest installment in a pair of long-running cases involving the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (the "TLC") and licensed taxi drivers who have been suspended after being charged with crimes. In the first case, Nnebe v. Daus , No. 06-cv-4991, Plaintiffs Jonathan Nnebe, Eduardo Avenaut, and Khairul Amin, together with the New York Taxi Workers Alliance, brought a putative class action against Defendants Matthew Daus, Charles Fraser, Joseph Eckstein, Elizabeth Bonina, the TLC, and the City of New York, alleging that the TLC's policy of summarily suspending taxi drivers upon notification of their arrest violates the United States Constitution, New York state law, and New York City municipal law. (Doc. No. 42.)¹ In the second case, Stallworth v. Joshi , No. 17-cv-7119, Plaintiffs Anthony Stallworth, Parichay Barman, Noor Tani, and the New York City Taxi Workers Alliance (together with the Nnebe Plaintiffs, "Plaintiffs") commenced an action against Defendants Meera Joshi, Chris Wilson, Stas Skarbo, and the City (together with the Nnebe Defendants, "Defendants"), similarly alleging that the TLC's policy of summarily suspending a taxi driver's license upon arrest for any felony charge or certain enumerated misdemeanor charges violates the United States Constitution and New York state law. (17-cv-7119, Doc. No. 1.)

Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for (1) a preliminary injunction barring Defendants from suspending drivers based on arrests during the COVID-19 pandemic or "unless and until this Court has ordered a constitutionally adequate pre-hearing notice and directed the implementation of a rule that will ensure a fair hearing process" (Doc. No. 453 at 4), and (2) a permanent injunction mandating specific reforms to the TLC's post-suspension hearing process. (Doc. No. 452; 17-cv-7119, Doc. No. 70.)²

For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED in its entirety. With respect to Plaintiffs’ request for permanent injunctive relief, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendants’ revised procedures fail to ensure timely resolution of TLC license-suspension proceedings; in all other respects, Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

These cases concern the TLC's authority to issue, revoke, and suspend taxi drivers’ licenses and the process that is due after such a suspension. Under § 19-512.1(a) of the New York City Administrative Code (the "Code"), the TLC may suspend a driver, "prior to giving notice and an opportunity for a hearing," "for good cause shown relating to a direct and substantial threat to the public health or safety." N.Y.C. Code § 19-512.1(a). That provision requires the TLC to notify drivers of a summary suspension within five days and to hold a hearing within ten days of a driver's request for a hearing, "unless the [TLC] ... determines that such hearing would be prejudicial to an ongoing criminal or civil investigation." Id.

The TLC has implemented its § 19-512.1-summary-suspension powers through a summary-suspension rule (the "Rule"), which has been amended and renumbered several times. The current version – enacted in 2014 and effective through January 8, 2021, when a new Rule is scheduled to go into effect (Doc. No. 479 at 1) – states that "[t]he Chairperson can summarily suspend a License based upon an arrest or citation if the Chairperson believes that the charges, if true, would demonstrate that continued licensure would constitute a direct and substantial threat to public health or safety." 35 R.C.N.Y. § 68-15(d)(1). The Rule lists all felonies and certain enumerated misdemeanors that will trigger a summary suspension, and provides that a hearing will determine "whether the charges underlying the Licensee's arrest, if true, demonstrate that the continuation of the License while awaiting a decision on the criminal charges would pose a direct and substantial threat to public health or safety." Id. § 68-15(d)(3).

At all times relevant to this litigation, if a driver requested a hearing, the TLC scheduled it and notified the driver by letter of the hearing's time, date, and location. Nnebe v. Daus , No. 06-cv-4991 (RJS), 2014 WL 3891343, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2014). At the hearing, the driver and a TLC attorney were free to present evidence and argue before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who subsequently issued a non-binding recommendation to the TLC Chairperson (the "Chairperson" or "Chair") that the suspension either be continued or lifted. Id.

Before November 2007, suspension hearings were held before ALJs employed by the TLC. Id. At those hearings, the ALJs determined only (1) whether the suspended driver had been charged with a crime, (2) whether the charge was still pending, and (3) whether there was a "nexus" between the charged crime and public health or safety. Id. at *8. The ALJs would find a nexus between the charged crime and public health or safety if there was a rational basis to conclude that the continued licensure of a driver who had actually committed that crime would threaten public health or safety. Id. In other words, the ALJs considered whether the alleged crime, which was presumed to be true, demonstrated a risk to public safety, not whether that particular suspended driver would pose such a risk. Id. TLC ALJs did not tell drivers about the applicable standard, and in any event, nearly all TLC ALJs recommended that the suspensions be continued. Id. at *8–9.

After November 2007, all hearings involving suspended drivers were conducted by ALJs employed by the City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings ("OATH"). Id. at *7. Like their TLC counterparts, OATH ALJs assumed that the criminal charges were true. Id. at *9. But unlike TLC ALJs, OATH ALJs considered evidence beyond the charge to determine whether the particular suspended driver, in fact, posed a direct and substantial threat to public health or safety. Id. Under this individualized standard, although the number of recommendations to lift a suspension remained low, drivers were more likely to receive a favorable recommendation. Id.

After the ALJ made its recommendation, the TLC mailed the driver a copy of the recommendation and notified the driver that he or she could submit to the Chairperson a written response to the recommendation, which could not include any additional evidence outside of the record. Id. at *10. But while the Chair reviewed all materials submitted by a driver, the Chair – like the TLC ALJs prior to 2007 – considered only the nexus between the charged crime and public health or safety as an abstract matter, without reference to the individualized characteristics of the suspended driver. Id.

A. Procedural History

This long-running case has seen its share of twists and turns, which are familiar enough to the parties and only briefly discussed here. In 2009, the Court granted the Nnebe Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that (1) the TLC did not violate procedural due process by summarily suspending a license without first affording the driver a hearing, (2) the agency's post-suspension hearing also satisfied procedural due process, and (3) Plaintiffs had fair and adequate notice that they faced suspension if arrested for certain crimes. Nnebe v. Daus , 665 F. Supp. 2d 311, 325–26, 330–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the Court's finding that the Due Process Clause does not require a pre-suspension hearing. Nnebe v. Daus , 644 F.3d 147, 163 (2d Cir. 2011). But because the City's representations at oral argument left the panel uncertain about what standard actually applied to suspension decisions, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded for the Court "to conduct additional fact-finding ... to determine whether the post-suspension hearing the City affords does indeed provide an opportunity for a taxi driver to assert that, even if the criminal charges are true, continued licensure does not pose any safety concerns." Id. at 161, 163.

In light of the Second Circuit's remand, this Court held a bench trial between January 13 and 21, 2014 to identify the standard applied at post-suspension hearings. Nnebe v. Daus , 184 F. Supp. 3d 54, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Consistent with its decision in 2009, the Court found that the TLC Chair – who retained final decision-making authority over suspensions – considered "only whether (a) the suspended driver has been charged with a crime, (b) the charge is still pending, and (c) there is a nexus between the charged crime, as defined by its statutory elements, and public health or safety." Nnebe , 2014 WL 3891343, at *1. Put differently, the Court found that the TLC Chair consistently applied a bright-line rule, deciding suspension cases based on the nature of the criminal offense as opposed to the characteristics of a particular driver.

The Court concluded that this bright-line test did not offend either substantive due process or procedural due process. As to substantive due process, the Court found that the Rule did not infringe a fundamental right, and "that there [wa]s a ‘reasonable fit’ between the governmental purpose behind the TLC's Rule – that is, protecting...