No Casino in Plymouth v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n
| Decision Date | 10 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-cv-01398-TLN-CKD |
| Parties | NO CASINO IN PLYMOUTH, DUEWARD W. CRANFORD II, DR. ELIDA A. MALICK, JON COLBURN, DAVID LOGAN, WILLIAM BRAUN, AND CATHERINE COULTER, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION, JONODEV CHAUDHURI, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, RYAN ZINKE, DAVID BERNHARDT, DONALD E. LAVERDURE, AND AMY DUTSCHKE, Defendants, v. IONE BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS, Proposed Defendant Intervenor. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants National Indian Gaming Commission (“NIGC”), E. Seqouyah Simermeyer, David Bernhardt, Kate MacGregor, and Tara Sweeney's (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c).[1] (ECF No. 41.) Plaintiffs No Casino in Plymouth, Dueward W. Cranford II, Dr Elida A. Malick, Jon Colburn, David Logan, William Braun, and Cathern Coulter (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion. (ECF No. 44.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 52-1.) Also before the Court is the Ione Band of Miwok Indians' (“Proposed Defendant Intervenor”) Motion to Intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) and Request for Judicial Notice. (ECF Nos. 62, 66.) Defendants filed a response. (ECF No. 63.) Plaintiffs filed an opposition to both the motion and request. (ECF Nos. 63 68.) Proposed Defendant Intervenor filed a reply. (ECF No 67.)
Having carefully considered the briefing filed by both parties, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings without leave to amend and GRANTS Proposed Defendant Intervenor's Motion to Intervene and Request for Judicial Notice. (ECF Nos. 41, 62, 66.)
On May 22, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs assert seven causes of action against Defendants.[2] (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-7.) This lawsuit primarily presents a challenge to the Department of the Interior's (“DOI”) Record of Decision (“ROD”)[3] and approval of the Ione Band of Miwok Indians' (“Tribe” or “Band”) gaming ordinance.[4] (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) On May 24, 2012, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Donald Laverdure (“Laverdure”) issued the ROD at issue that announced the DOI's taking of 228.04 acres of land in Amador County into trust for the Band. (Id.) The ROD also allowed the Band to construct a casino complex and conduct gaming once the land was taken into trust. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Pursuant to IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1), NIGC Chairman Jonodev Chaudhuri approved the Tribe's gaming ordinance on March 6, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 91.)
Plaintiffs' claims challenge various determinations as follows: (1) the Tribe's gaming ordinance (id. at ¶ 107); (2) Laverdure's authority to approve the ROD under the Appointment Clause of the U.S. Constitution (id. at ¶ 118); (3) the Tribe's federally recognized status under the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) (id. at ¶ 127); (4) the Tribe's federal recognition under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 (id. at ¶ 136); (5) Defendants' violation of Plaintiffs' Equal Protection rights by favoring the Tribe, a race-based group, through approval of the ROD and gaming ordinance (id. at ¶¶ 141-43); and (6) Defendants' violation of federalism protections (id. at ¶ 150-51).
On June 25, 2020, Defendants filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 41.) On July 23, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion (ECF No. 44), and on August 20, 2020, Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 52-1).
On December 9, 2021, Proposed Defendant Intervenor, the Tribe, filed the motion to intervene. (ECF No. 62.) Proposed Defendant Intervenor seeks to intervene for the purpose of moving to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7). (ECF No. 62-1 at 6.) The property and transactions that are the subject of this litigation challenge the “Tribe's land, the Tribe's status as a federally recognized tribe, and the validity of the Tribe's Gaming Ordinance.” (Id. at 8.) On January 13, 2022, Defendants filed a response and Plaintiffs separately filed an opposition. (ECF Nos. 63, 64.) Proposed Defendant Intervenor filed a reply on January 20, 2022. (ECF No. 67.) On January 20, 2022, Proposed Defendant Intervenor filed a Request for Judicial Notice. (ECF No. 66.) On January 25, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. (ECF No. 68.)
Rule 12(c) provides that, “[after the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The issue presented by a Rule 12(c) motion is substantially the same as that posed in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion - whether the factual allegations of the complaint, together with all reasonable inferences, state a plausible claim for relief. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ).
In analyzing a 12(c) motion, the district court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). However, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose (Chunie), 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). “A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party's pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
If the Court “goes beyond the pleadings to resolve an issue, ” a judgment on the pleadings is not appropriate and “such a proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. RichardFeiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). A district court may, however, “consider certain materials - documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice - without converting the motion to dismiss [or motion for judgment on the pleadings] into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Plaintiffs cannot challenge the federal agency action because: (1) the Ninth Circuit has affirmed both the Tribe's status as federally recognized and Laverdure's authority to issue the 2012 ROD as Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs; and (2) the Complaint fails to state claims for which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 41-1 at 7-9, 11-13.) The Court will address each argument in turn.
Defendants argue the Ninth Circuit in County of Amador issued dispositive rulings on Claims One through Four[5] in the instant matter, including: (1) the Tribe's gaming ordinance; (2) Laverdure's authority to issue the ROD; (3) the Tribe's federally recognized status[6] . (ECF No. 41-1 at 8-9 (citing Cnty. of Amador, 872 F.3d at 1015-20).) In opposition, Plaintiffs argue the 2018 gaming ordinance was not at issue in County of Amador, and the court did not conclusively decide Laverdure had authority to take land into trust for the Tribe. (ECF No. 44 at 8-11.) Plaintiffs also contend the Tribe lacks Part 83[7] recognition to be eligible for IRA and IGRA benefits.[8] (Id. at 12-14.) Plaintiffs argue the Tribe's inclusion on the administrative list of “Indian Entities” eligible to receive service for the Bureau of Indian Affairs does not mean the Tribe is federally recognized. (Id. at 14-15.)
In County of Amador, the Ninth Circuit considered two challenges to the same 2012 ROD at issue in the present case, based on whether: (1) the Tribe qualified to have land taken into trust for its benefit under the IRA; and (2) the Tribe may conduct gaming on the parcels pursuant to IGRA. 872 F.3d at 1020. As a preliminary matter, the court affirmed Laverdure “was empowered to take the Plymouth Parcels into trust” and therefore had the authority to approve the ROD. Id. at 1019 n.5. Then, the Ninth Circuit held “the Band is a recognized Indian tribe that was ‘under Federal jurisdiction' in 1934, and [DOI] did not err in concluding that the Band is eligible to have land taken into trust on its behalf under 25 U.S.C. § 5108.” Id. at 1028. With respect to recognition under 25 C.F.R. Part 83, the court stated, “the Band was effectively recognized without having to go through the Part 83 process” because “a tribe could be ‘restored' to Federal recognition outside the Part 83 process.” Id. at 1028-31. Thus, as a federally recognized Tribe, the court held DOI “did not err in allowing the Band to conduct gaming operations on the Plymouth Parcels” in accordance with IGRA. Id. at 1031.
The Ninth Circuit resolved issues identical to those in the present case. Id. at 1015-20. The “law of the circuit doctrine” mandates that “a published decision of court constitutes binding authority which must be followed unless and until overruled by a body competent to do so.” In re Zermeno-Gomez, 868 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision on the Tribe's federally recognized status and the Tribe's status in 1934 under the IRA are binding on ...
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