Noakes v. Commonwealth Of Va.

Decision Date16 September 2010
Docket NumberRecord No. 091911.
Citation280 Va. 338,699 S.E.2d 284
PartiesElizabeth Pollard NOAKESv.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

James T. Maloney (Maloney & David, on brief), for appellant.

Joshua M. Didlake, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: HASSELL, C.J., KOONTZ, KINSER, GOODWYN, and MILLETTE, JJ., and CARRICO and RUSSELL, S.JJ Opinion by Justice CYNTHIA D. KINSER.

In this appeal, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for involuntary manslaughter, specifically contesting the findings that she was criminally negligent and that her acts were a proximate cause of a toddler's death. Because there is sufficient evidence to support both findings, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.

MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The relevant facts are undisputed. The defendant, Elizabeth Pollard Noakes, provided child care services in her home, and on the day in question, October 18, 2006, had in her care Noah Alexander Colassaco, a fifteen-month-old child, and two other children.1 Noakes had been caring for Noah for approximately three weeks and, throughout that time, had experienced difficulty in getting Noah to lie down and sleep during “nap time.” Instead, he usually would stand in the crib and cry. Noakes had tried “traditional means” to help Noah sleep, which included “rocking him to sleep” and “patting his back,” without success.

Around noon on the day in question, Noakes put Noah and another toddler she was caring for in their cribs for an afternoon nap.2 The cribs were located in an upstairs, “loft” bedroom that was partially visible from Noakes' bedroom. Only a half wall divided the two rooms, which were connected by a stairway. The cribs, however, were not visible from Noakes' bedroom. Noah's crib, as viewed from the loft's entrance, was positioned lengthwise against the back wall of the room, in the far right corner. The rectangular crib was abutted on the right by one wall, on the rear with another, and on the left by another crib, with only the front, lengthwise portion unobstructed. A third crib, in which Noakes placed the other toddler that day, was positioned a few feet from Noah's crib, nearer the entrance of the loft and also on the right wall. When Noakes left the loft, Noah was standing “facing the front of the crib” and crying.

At approximately 12:30 p.m., Noakes returned to the loft to “check on” Noah, who was still standing in the crib and crying. Knowing that when Noah stood in his crib, his chin was above the crib's sides, and also that Noah would fall asleep if he were lying or sitting in the crib instead of standing, Noakes decided to place a make-shift covering over the crib to prevent Noah from standing. After removing Noah from his crib, Noakes placed a thirty-three and one-quarter pound, collapsed “dog crate,” which ran the length of the crib but was substantially narrower, on top of the crib. Noakes reasoned that the crate's weight would prevent Noah from standing up in the crib.

Noakes tested the stability of her contraption by shaking the crib with the crate on top to determine if the crate could fall into the crib and injure Noah. Satisfied that the crate could not fall into the crib, Noakes removed the crate, put Noah back into the crib, and placed a fabric-covered piece of approximately one-inch thick cardboard on top of the crib. The cardboard was added, in part, to cushion the force of any impact between Noah's head and the crate if Noah attempted to stand. Although the cardboard would cover the entirety of the crib's top, Noakes positioned it so the cardboard extended out over the front of the crib, where Noah often stood, thus leaving a small “gap” in the rear between the crib's side and the cardboard. Noakes then placed the dog crate on top of the cardboard, towards the front side of the crib, where it covered a little more than one-half of the crib's width. Noakes examined the covering to ensure that Noah would not be able to reach into the dog crate and injure his fingers.

With Noah in his now-covered crib, Noakes remained in the loft for a short while to determine if the enclosure was causing any distress to Noah and if he was attempting to stand up in the crib despite the covering. Observing no problems, Noakes left the loft. Sometime before 1:00 p.m., Noakes, however, heard a noise from the loft and returned to find Noah sitting in his crib but not sleeping, with his face pressed against crib's front, mesh side. Concluding that Noah would not fall asleep if he were able to look for her, Noakes placed a toy in front of the crib to obstruct Noah's view “so that he would not be looking for [Noakes] but ... would just get bored and go ... to sleep.”

Noakes again left the loft at about 1:00 p.m. and did not return until 3:15 p.m., when she came to wake the other toddler from his nap. Noakes testified, however, that she monitored the toddlers audibly from her bedroom during that time and heard no noise from either of them. Noakes testified that when she returned to wake the other child, she did not look at Noah's crib, which was several feet to the left of the other crib, but “within [her] peripheral vision of the room.” She believed, however, that Noah was asleep since she did not hear any sounds from him when she awakened the other toddler.

Shortly after 4:00 p.m., Noakes returned to the loft to wake Noah and found him unconscious. He was standing with his chin resting on the side of the crib, one or both of his hands gripping the crib's side, and his head and neck wedged between the cardboard and the crib. His lips were blue and his skin was cold to Noakes' touch. Noakes surmised that Noah had attempted to stand, had pushed up against the cardboard causing the dog crate to slide a few inches thereby creating a space between the covering on top of the crib and the crib's wall. Noah then had moved his head toward the crib's center, where he normally stood, trapping himself in a space between the side of the crib and the cardboard, which was held in place by the weight of the dog crate. Despite Noakes' efforts to revive Noah and the intervention of emergency medical personnel, Noah was pronounced dead at Noakes' home.

An autopsy of Noah's body revealed that the cause of death was [a]sphyxia due to mechanical compression of neck.” The medical examiner who performed the autopsy found “a pressure mark at the neck [and] little broken blood vessels on the face,” with “reddish coloring above and below the pressure mark.” According to the medical examiner, her findings were consistent with Noakes' explanation regarding the events leading to Noah's death.3 The examiner also testified that a restriction of the oxygen supply to the brain, such as would be caused by the circumstances Noakes described, would cause unconsciousness “within a minute” and death within “minutes and not hours.”

Noakes was subsequently convicted in a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the County of Chesterfield of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Code § 18.2-36. The trial court found Noakes' conduct to be “arrogantly reckless, merciless and inhumane,” and concluded that she had “recklessly disregard[ed] Noah's safety [and the] consequences of her actions, being indifferent as to whether the harm would result.” The trial court sentenced Noakes to five years of incarceration, with four years suspended on the condition that she “be of good behavior upon [her] release from confinement” for a period of twenty years.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, a divided panel affirmed the trial court's judgment. Noakes v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0295-08-2, 2009 WL 62852 (Jan. 13, 2009) (unpublished). Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court could reasonably have concluded that [Noakes] recklessly disregarded Noah's safety by proceeding with her plan to prevent Noah from standing up by placing the dog crate on his crib.” Noakes v. Commonwealth, 54 Va.App. 577, 589-90, 681 S.E.2d 48, 54 (2009). The Court of Appeals concluded that Noakes “could have foreseen the harm that could and did befall Noah from putting a thirty-three-pound collapsed dog crate on top of his crib.” Id. at 590, 681 S.E.2d at 54. Accordingly, having found “sufficient[,] credible evidence to support a rational factfinder's decision that [Noakes] was criminally negligent and, therefore, was guilty of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt,” the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Id. at 593-94, 681 S.E.2d at 56.

Noakes now appeals to this Court. In a single assignment of error, she asserts the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain her conviction, claiming that “her acts did not rise to the level of criminal negligence nor could she have anticipated the unforeseeable acts that would be performed by the child while inside the crib.”

ANALYSIS

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we review “the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the [trial] court” and “accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 523, 527, 685 S.E.2d 43, 45 (2009); accord Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 524, 659 S.E.2d 311, 319 (2008); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). We give the trial court's judgment sitting as the factfinder “the same weight as a jury verdict,” Brown, 278 Va. at 527, 685 S.E.2d at 45, and we will affirm that judgment unless it “is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Code § 8.01-680; accord Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 467, 536 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2000).

We have defined the common law crime of involuntary manslaughter as “the killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, in the prosecution of some unlawful, but not...

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