Nobes v. Mich. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 04 March 1946
• Docket Number: No. 40.,40.
• Citation: 21 N.W.2d 820,313 Mich. 472
• Parties: NOBES et al. v. MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

313 Mich. 472

21 N.W.2d 820

NOBES et al.

v.MICHIGAN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 40.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 4, 1946.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE Appeal from Circuit Court, Muskegon County; Joseph S. sanford, judge.

Proceeding under the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act by Leon D. Nobes and others, employees, opposed by the Shaw-Walker Company, employer. From a judgment affirming the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission's denial of unemployment compensation claims, the employees appeal.

Affirmed.

Before the Entire Bench.

Robert A. Carr and George H. Cross, both of Muskegon, for appellants.

C. N. Sessions, of Muskegon, for appellee Shaw-Walker Co.

John R. Dethmers, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and Daniel J. O'Hara, A. W. Brown, and Florence Clement Booth, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee Commission.

NORTH, Justice.

Plaintiff and numerous other employees of the Shaw-Walker Company of Muskegon sought unemployment compensation for a period from September 10 to November 3, 1941, during which time there was a stoppage of work in the Shaw-Walker Company's plant. Their claims of unemployment compensation were denied by the defendant commission. On hearing before a referee there was denial of these claims, and again on appeal taken by claimants to the appeal board their claims were denied. Thereafter on certiorari to the circuit court of Muskegon county denial of the claims was affirmed. This appeal is from the judgment entered in the circuit court.

For convenience and brevity we herein refer to Leon D. Nobes as plaintiff, to the Shaw-Walker Company as employer, and to the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission as the commission. Denial of unemployment compensation to plaintiff (and other claimants) was on the grounds that the stoppage of work during the period for which plaintiff was unemployed was due to a labor dispute in the employer's establishment within the meaning of section 29(c) of the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Act, and that plaintiff, and each of the other claimants, were directly interested in such labor dispute within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act. Plaintiff and appellant contends that each of the above holdings is erroneous.

Whether under the facts and circumstances of this case plaintiff was disqualified for benefits under the unemployment compensation act must be determined in the light of section 29(c) in which it is provided that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

‘(c) For any week with respect to which his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work existing because of a labor dispute in the establishment in which he is or was last employed: Provided, however, That no individual shall be disqualified under this section if he shall establish that he is not directly involved in such dispute. For the purpose of this section, no individuals shall be deemed to be directly involved in a labor dispute, unless it is established: * * *

‘(2) That he is participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work: Provided, however, That the payment of regular union dues shall not be construed as financing a labor dispute within the meaning of this subsection * * *.’ Act No. 1, § 29(c), Pub.Acts 1936 (Ex.Sess.) as amended, Pub.Acts, No. 364; Stat.Ann. § 17.531.

The factual background to which the law must be applied in the instant case is substantially as follows. In 1941, June 3rd, the United Furniture Workers of America, Local No. 416, affiliated with the CIO, made an unsuccessful effort in an election among the employees of the defendant employer to have the union recognized as sole bargaining agent for the employees of the Shaw-Walker Company. Notwithstanding the unsuccessful results of their efforts in the election, the union employees of defendant company renewed their demand for recognition of the union as the sole bargaining agency for all the company's production and maintenance employees, and also demanded that the company establish the steward system for presentation of grievances and that the company adopt and publish seniority lists. However, on September 8, 1941, just prior to the strike becoming effective, the union modified its demand as to exclusive bargaining rights for all employees, and advised the company that it only demanded the right to be the sole bargaining agency for the employees who were members of the union. The company refused the union's demands, and on September 10, the strike became effective, a picket line was established at the plant which barred all workers and resulted in complete cessation of work in the plant for both union and nonunion employees which continued until November 3, 1941.

Leon D. Nobes and the other appellants herein were not union members; and it is a fair inference from the record that they were opposed to recognition of the union in the employer's establishment. On this appeal they take the position that the stoppage of work which caused their unemployment was not ‘due to a labor dispute actively in progress in the Shaw-Walker Company's plant within the meaning of the Michigan Unemployment Act.’ We think it is too clear for argument that appellants' contention in this particular is not tenable.

On this phase of their appeal appellants point out, as the record discloses, that at the outset the union demanded collective bargainingrights for all of the employees of the defendant employer, but just prior to calling the strike the union advised the employer it would be satisfied in this particular if granted the collective bargaining rights for only such of the employees as were members of the union; and, after the strike was in progress, the union reverted to its original demand-that it should be the bargaining agent for all of the employees. Appellants' position is thus stated in their brief:

‘It is the contention of plaintiffs and appellants that the original demand of the union for recognition as the sole bargaining agent of its members, was the dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and that such demand is not a labor dispute within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act * * *.

‘It is the dispute which causes the stoppage of work that determines the rights of the claimants, and any dispute that may subsequently develop, by the union increasing its demands, or making new demands upon the employer, cannot be considered in determining the rights of employees to unemployment compensation, as such subsequent...