Noble v. Fisher

• Decision Date: 17 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. 20745,20745
• Citation: Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 894 P.2d 118 (Idaho 1995)
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: , 100 Ed. Law Rep. 325 Ritchard S. NOBLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary Hudson FISHER, Defendant-Respondent. Boise, February 1994 Term

Page 118

894 P.2d 118

126 Idaho 885, 100 Ed. Law Rep. 325

Ritchard S. NOBLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mary Hudson FISHER, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 20745.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise, February 1994 Term.

April 17, 1995.

[126 Idaho 886] Ritchard S. Noble, Boise, pro se.

Wilson, Carnahan & McColl, Boise, for respondent. Debrha Jo Carnahan, argued.

SILAK, Justice.

In this appeal, Ritchard S. Noble challenges the magistrate's decision to increase his child support obligation. Noble contends that the magistrate should not have considered the additional income he was receiving from a second job which he began working after the divorce decree was entered in calculating his child support obligation under the Idaho Child Support Guidelines. Also at issue is whether a provision of the parties' Child Custody and Property Settlement Agreement, which provided that Noble would pay one-half the education expenses if his two daughters chose to attend college, is valid and enforceable by the court in this proceeding to modify the divorce decree. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the magistrate's order increasing Noble's child support obligation, and we reverse the magistrate's judgment declaring Noble's agreement to pay his children's college expenses void, but affirm that portion of the judgment which held that the agreement could not be enforced through an action on the divorce decree.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Ritchard S. Noble and Mary Hudson Fisher were married in 1975. Two daughters were born of the marriage: Angela in 1976, and Amy in 1978. During and after the marriage, Noble was employed full-time as a police officer. The couple divorced in 1989. At the time of their divorce, Noble and Fisher entered into a Child Custody and Property Settlement Agreement (Settlement Agreement). The decree of divorce incorporated the terms of the Settlement Agreement as follows:

[T]he Property Settlement Agreement between the parties, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", is hereby approved, ratified, confirmed, merged, and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein in full and each party is hereby ordered to comply with the terms hereof.

The divorce decree ordered Noble to pay child support in the amount of $250.00 per month per child until such time as the child reaches the age of majority or is emancipated, as provided by the Settlement Agreement. The "Child Support" section of the Settlement Agreement also contained a provision by which Noble agreed to pay one-half of the college education expenses of his two daughters should either or both daughters choose to attend college immediately after high school.

While married to Mary Hudson, Noble obtained a law degree. In 1991, following the divorce, Noble began working part-time as an attorney in addition to his full-time job as a police officer.

In April 1992, Fisher moved the magistrate court to increase Noble's child support obligation. At the evidentiary hearing on Fisher's motion, Noble moved the court to declare that the provision of the Settlement Agreement by which he agreed to pay for one-half of his children's college education was void and unenforceable because it required him to provide "child support" for his children after they reached majority. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the magistrate determined that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred since the original decree was entered which justified increasing Noble's child support obligation. The magistrate found these changes consisted of: (1) a significant increase in Noble's income since the divorce due to a salary increase in his primary job as a police officer, and his beginning the practice of law as a part-time second job; (2) increased costs of raising the children; and (3) adoption of the Idaho Child Support Guidelines (Guidelines) since the time of the divorce.

In determining Noble's child support obligation under the Guidelines, the magistrate considered Noble's income from his second job to be part of his gross income, and increased his child support payments from $500.00 to $752.00 per month. The magistrate also determined that the provision of the parties' Settlement Agreement wherein Noble agreed to pay for half of his daughters' college educations was void, and ordered that Noble was not required to pay any support for the children once they either graduated from high school or turned nineteen, whichever occurred sooner. The magistrate determined that Fisher was the prevailing party, and awarded her attorney fees. After Noble filed a Motion for Clarification, Reconsideration, and Amendment, the magistrate reduced the monthly child support payments to $745.00 to rectify a mathematical error.

Noble subsequently appealed to the district court asserting that the income from his second job should not have been considered in calculating his child support obligation, absent compelling reasons related to the needs of the children. Noble also appealed the magistrate's award of attorney fees to Fisher. Fisher cross appealed from that portion of the magistrate's decision which determined that the college education provision in the Settlement Agreement was void. The district court affirmed the magistrate's consideration of Noble's second-job income in calculating his child support obligation, as well as the award of attorney fees to Fisher, but reversed the magistrate's determination that the college education provision was void. Noble then appealed to this Court.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether it was proper, under the Guidelines, for the magistrate to consider income from Noble's second job in calculating his child support obligation.

2. Whether Noble can be required to pay for his children's college expenses beyond the age of nineteen.

3. Whether Fisher was properly awarded her attorney fees in the lower court proceedings.

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE MAGISTRATE CORRECTLY CONSIDERED THE INCOME FROM NOBLE'S SECOND JOB IN COMPUTING HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION.

We first note our standard of review. Where, as here, the issues presented were first decided in the magistrate division and then presented to the district court on appeal, we review the magistrate's decision independent of, but with due regard for, the district court's appellate decision. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 957-58, 855 P.2d 40, 42-3 (1993). An order of child support may be modified "only upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances." I.C. § 32-709; Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho at 959, 855 P.2d at 42-43. The decision whether to modify an order of child support because of a substantial and material change of circumstances is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Id. Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the sequence of our inquiry is:

(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Noble has not challenged any of the factual findings underlying the magistrate's decision. Rather, he contends that the trial court failed to correctly apply the legal standards applicable to the determination of his child support obligation. Noble contends that under the Guidelines, the trial court should not have considered his part-time second job in calculating his child support obligation, absent compelling reasons related to the needs of his children. We disagree.

The Guidelines are premised on the basic principle that both parents should share legal responsibility for supporting their child or children "in proportion to their Guidelines Income." I.R.C.P. 6(c)(6) § 4(a). The Guidelines define the term "Guidelines Income" as the gross income of the parents and, if applicable, in-kind benefits and/or potential income, less certain adjustments. The existence of in-kind benefits and potential income, as well as the applicability of the various adjustments, are not at issue in this appeal. What is at issue is whether Noble's income from his second job should be included in his gross income for the purpose of determining the amount of his proportionate child support obligation.

The Guidelines define "gross income" as follows:

(a) Gross Income Defined. (1) Gross income. Gross income includes income from any source, and includes, but is not limited to, income from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, dividends, pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, alimony, maintenance, any veteran's benefits received, education grants, scholarships, and other financial aid. The court may consider when and for what duration the receipt of funds from gifts, prizes, net proceeds from property sales, severance pay, and judgments will be considered as available for child support. Benefits received from public assistance programs for the parent shall be included except in cases of extraordinary hardship.

I.C.S.G. § 6(a)(1) (emphasis added). We hold that income from a second job is within the scope of "gross income" as defined by this section. The definition unambiguously states the general rule that gross income, for the purpose of determining income available to a parent to satisfy his or her child support obligation, "includes income from any source." To illustrate the expansive scope of the term gross income, the section provides an extensive, although not necessarily exhaustive, list of income types considered to be gross income. The last two sentences of this subsection, as...