Noble v. Nugent

• Decision Date: 30 September 1878
• Citation: 89 Ill. 522,1878 WL 10074
• Parties: MAJOR NOBLEv.CATHARINE NUGENT et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

89 Ill. 522

1878 WL 10074 (Ill.)

MAJOR NOBLE

v.CATHARINE NUGENT et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1878.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. W. FARWELL, Judge, presiding.

Mr. H. C. IRISH, for the appellant.

Mr. F. H. DICKEY, and Mr. JOHN JOHNSON, Jr., for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

The question here arises upon bill filed to foreclose a deed of trust executed by appellee Catharine Nugent, whilst sole and unmarried, to one Runyan, as trustee, to secure the payment of certain notes executed by her to appellant, and cross-bill by appellees against appellant, to have the notes declared paid and the deed of trust and notes canceled, etc. The decree below was in favor of appellees upon the cross-bill, denying the foreclosure prayed by appellant.

The proofs show that the notes secured by the deed of trust were paid by appellee Catharine long before the filing of the bill to foreclose, to Runyan, though not surrendered up or canceled, and that Runyan, thereupon, executed to her a formal release of the deed of trust.

The only question is, whether Runyan was authorized to receive the payment of the notes.

The general principles of the law applicable to the question are well settled.

Payments made to an agent are good and obligatory upon the principal, in all cases where the agent is authorized to receive payment, either by express authority, or by that resulting from the usage of trade, or from the particular dealings between the parties. Story on Agency, § 429. The authority of an agent being limited to a particular business, does not make it special; it may be as general in regard to that as if its range was unlimited. Anderson v. Coonley, 21 Wendell, 279. The acts of a general agent, or one whom a man puts in his place to transact all his business of a particular kind, will bind the principal so long as the agent keeps within the scope of his authority, though he may act contrary to his private instructions. The United States Life Insurance Co. v. The Advance Co. 80 Ill. 549; Harris v. Simmerman et al. 81 Id. 413.

It was said in Doan et al. v. Duncan, 17 Ill. 274, “We should not confound the extent of the agent's authority, whether limited or unlimited, with the nature of the agency, whether general or special. * * * Either, acting within the general scope of the authority held out to the world by the principal, will bind him. And this may be shown by the usual acts of such agent in his principal's business, or by permitting and acquiescing in such acts when known to him, as well as by express authority and direction. The policy and reason of the rule is for the protection of the innocent, who deal upon the faith of such authority as the principal holds out or permits as being authorized and sanctioned by him. If an innocent party is to suffer, it shall fall upon him who enables the supposed agent, under his authority, to impose on others. See also, Story on Agency, § 127; 2 Kent's Com. (8 ed.) 798-9, side 614.

There were three notes secured by the deed of trust, one for $500, and the other two for $25 each. Appellee Catharine Nugent, then being unmarried and bearing the name of Catharine Myers, borrowed $500, and the note for that amount was given for the principal, and the other two for interest to accrue on the loan. She testifies that she went to Runyan's office and applied to him to borrow the money; that Runyan informed her there was a gentleman in the country from whom he could obtain it; that on the day she got the money she again went to Runyan's office, signed the papers he prepared for her to sign, and got the money; that she did not meet appellant, or even know the name of the man from whom the money had been obtained. She says that she did not know the nature of the papers she signed; that her brother-in-law had told her whatever Runyan did would be right, and she, therefore, trusted entirely in him; and that Runyan told her when she came in and paid money, he would give her a receipt. She made payments, from time to time, taking Runyan's receipts, until she completed the payment of all that was due on the notes. When she made final payment she asked for the $500 note, and Runyan said he was busy, just then; that there was a gentleman in the country had got it that was away traveling, and he had not time to get it for her. She says he then gave her the release of the trust deed. She denies that she ever knew that the appellant owned the money, or claimed to own it, until shortly before he filed his bill. Runyan testifies, corroborating her fully as to the fact and mode of payment, his giving her receipts and the release of the deed of trust, etc. He says, further, that he loaned the money to appellee Catharine as appellant's agent, and...