Noble v. Sigler, 17902.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1965
• Docket Number: No. 17902.,17902.
• Citation: 351 F.2d 673
• Parties: Harlan Lynn NOBLE, Appellant, v. Maurice SIGLER, Warden, Nebraska State Penitentiary, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

351 F.2d 673 (1965)

Harlan Lynn NOBLE, Appellant, v. Maurice SIGLER, Warden, Nebraska State Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 17902.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

November 8, 1965.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Allen L. Overcash, of Woods, Aitken & Aitken, Lincoln, Neb., filed typewritten brief for appellant.

Richard H. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lincoln, Neb., filed typewritten brief for appellee.

Before MATTHES, RIDGE and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, Harlan Lynn Noble, collaterally seeks relief from a life sentence assessed by the District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, upon his plea of guilty to kidnapping, sodomy, and being an habitual criminal. Prior to the present conviction petitioner had been convicted of kidnapping, rape, sodomy and being an habitual criminal by a Kansas District Court in 1952 and was then sentenced to life imprisonment. The court files disclose, "He has a long standing criminal record for various charges and is an habitual on forcible rape". In 1956 while serving said life term petitioner was adjudged incompetent by the Probate Court of Leavenworth, Kansas, and was transferred to the Larned State Hospital, at Larned, Kansas.

While under confinement in the mental hospital, petitioner escaped about June 2, 1959 and was arrested shortly thereafter on charges of kidnapping, and sodomy of a six-year old girl, and being an habitual criminal. The arrest was made in Wisconsin in September 1959, and petitioner was returned to Nebraska for trial. The crimes charged against petitioner were committed about August 1, 1959. After advising with court-appointed counsel, the petitioner pled guilty to the charges on which he is now confined.

Neither petitioner, his counsel or the state raised any issue with respect to petitioner's mental competency at the time of his trial in the Nebraska District Court, although his past adjudication of incompetency was known to the state and to the Court.

Since his confinement petitioner has initiated two habeas corpus proceedings in the Nebraska Court, one of which was appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. These applications were allowed in forma pauperis but no counsel was appointed for petitioner either in the District Court applications or on the appeal, the appeal being dismissed for failure to file a printed brief pursuant to court rules.

Petitioner complains of being denied the equal protection of the laws and due process on the basis:

1. That he "was insane at the time of his trial and did not have the mental capacity or competence to understand the proceedings against him or to properly prepare a rational defense thereto or to properly appraise his own guilt or innocence or assist or advise his counsel";

2. The dismissal of his appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court for failure to file printed briefs; and

3. The failure of the Nebraska courts in the collateral proceedings to appoint counsel.

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska accepted jurisdiction finding that petitioner had either exhausted his state remedies or that the state remedies were inadequate, held a hearing and found that petitioner was mentally competent to stand trial in the original Nebraska proceedings.

In this appeal, petitioner points out that he was committed to a Kansas state mental institution and was still under court declaration of insanity when he escaped and committed the crime for which he was incarcerated in Nebraska. The Nebraska Court was aware of this declaration of insanity, yet proceeded to convict and sentence him. Petitioner argues that he has the benefit of a presumption of continuing insanity and that for the state court to continue without a sanity determination in the face of this presumption renders the subsequent proceedings void.

There is no doubt but that the common law rule declaring that an "insane" person cannot be validly tried or convicted of a crime is enforceable against the state by way of the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. Massey v. Moore, 348 U. S. 105, 75 S.Ct. 145, 99 L.Ed. 135 (1954); Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934 (4 Cir. 1963). As clear as this mandate is, however, it does not declare that a defendant is denied due process by the sole fact of his being allowed to plead guilty without there first being a formal adjudication of his sanity. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 73 S.Ct. 391, 97 L.Ed. 549 (1953).

It is the opinion of this Court that the state has no Constitutional duty, even when aware of a defendant's history of mental difficulty, to order on its own motion a pretrial sanity hearing. The petitioner was represented by counsel, yet made no request for a sanity determination. So, even assuming as did the parties, that there was a presumption of insanity flowing from a past commitment,¹ the Constitution does not require the state court itself to initiate such a hearing.

Apparently petitioner's conduct during the original proceeding indicated to all persons concerned, including the court, that he was capable of advising and assisting counsel and was aware of the nature of the charges filed against him.

The failure of the state court to reach the issue of competency, however, does not preclude the defendant from seeking collateral relief in the Federal courts. The District Court, when presented with the issue of petitioner's sanity at the time of the state court proceedings should proceed as with any other alleged Constitutional violation. It should hear the evidence and make a determination on the merits of petitioner's contention. Frame v. Hudspeth, 309 U.S. 632, 60 S.Ct. 712, 84 L.Ed. 989 (1940); Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F.2d 318 (8 Cir. 1945); Byrd v. Pescor, 163 F.2d 775 (8 Cir. 1947); Owsley v. Cunningham, 190 F.Supp. 608 (E.D.Va.1961).

If the District Court determines that the defendant was incompetent at the time of the state court proceedings, the Constitution demands the conviction be set aside. However, if the District Court finds that the defendant was mentally competent during the state proceedings, this is tantamount to a finding of no Constitutional violation, and therefore the state conviction should be upheld. In short, the Federal court at this late date is free to make a factual determination of petitioner's competency at the time he appeared before the state trial court.

Although the law properly holds that an "insane" person may not be Constitutionally tried or convicted of crime, an additional problem presents itself. What definition of "insane" should be applied by the District Court when assessing a petitioner's mental condition at the time of his state trial? Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) sets forth the competency standard in Federal Criminal cases which reads:

"(T)he `test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\'"

State courts, on the other hand, apply different and varying standards to determine a defendant's fitness to proceed. When the Federal court is called upon by a habeas corpus petition to assess the mental condition of a state prisoner at the time of his trial, should the court apply the standard that was, or would have been, used by the state trial court, or should it apply the test applicable in Federal criminal cases?

The answer appears to us to be that the Federal standard for competency must be applied even though the original proceeding was before a state court. Since this is a Federally...