Noble v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 88-3436

Decision Date06 June 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-3436,88-3436
Citation876 F.2d 1580
PartiesGeorge NOBLE, Petitioner, v. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, Respondent. Appeal
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Jay E. Emerson, Jr. and Higgs & Conchin, Huntsville, Ala., for petitioner.

Ronald E. Klipach, Tennessee Valley Authority, Knoxville, Tenn., for respondent.

With him on the brief were Edward S. Christenbury, Gen. Counsel, Justin M. Schwamm, Sr., Asst. Gen. Counsel and Harriet A. Cooper, Sr. Litigation Atty.

Before FRIEDMAN and RICH, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, Senior Circuit Judge.

BENNETT, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Noble appeals the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), No. AT03518810283, June 24, 1988, which sustained the action of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in separating petitioner by a reduction in force (RIF) in 1985 and in rejecting his claims of discrimination. We remand on other grounds.

OPINION

In the present appeal, petitioner abandons challenges he made to the MSPB about the RIF and discrimination. Instead, he asserts that the MSPB erred when it did not require the TVA to rehire him on the basis of his rights under the Veterans Preference Act (VPA) of 1944, as amended. This matter was not addressed in the MSPB opinion, although it was one basis for his appeal to the MSPB, so stated four times therein. It is uncontested that Noble is a veteran as defined by law. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2108 (1982), and entitled to veteran's preference. 5 U.S.C. Secs. 3501-3502 (1982).

We have held heretofore that positions with the TVA are excepted ones generally not subject to civil service laws as they pertain to the competitive service. Dodd v. TVA, 770 F.2d 1038, 1040 (Fed.Cir.1985). * However, we also held that the fact an employee of TVA is in an excepted position does not diminish his veteran's retention preference rights over nonpreference employees. Id. at 1041 n. 6. Whether these rights were violated here was not the subject of findings by the MSPB.

The TVA casts this case as one where the issue, as pertains to veteran's preference, is not retention over employees who were not veterans but were nevertheless retained over Mr. Noble. Rather, it says that the issue is whether having been laid off in a RIF petitioner had any rights to be rehired over RIF'd nonpreference employees. Upon this thesis, TVA concludes that the VPA does not apply and that neither the MSPB nor the court has jurisdiction over rehiring claims. It is well settled that one cannot claim back pay or restoration to a position from which he was legally separated or to which he was never appointed in the first place, unless some statute provides otherwise. Rejection by the administrative judge at a prehearing conference of any jurisdiction over the veteran's preference rehiring claim was, however, without any explanation.

The TVA in its brief and argument, concedes that in 1945 the Civil Service Commission, predecessor to the Office of Personnel Management, agreed with TVA that requirements of the VPA would be met within TVA which would, however, maintain its own personnel system separate from civil service. Accordingly, petitioner relies on the first two statutes quoted below. Title 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3315 (1982) provides in part:

(a) A preference eligible who has been separated or furloughed without delinquency or misconduct, on request, is entitled to have his name placed on appropriate registers and employment lists for every position for which his qualifications have been established, in the order named by section 3313 of this title. This subsection applies to registers and employment lists maintained by the Office of Personnel Management, an Executive agency, or the government of the District of Columbia. [Emphasis added.]

Title 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3316 provides:

On request of an appointing authority, a preference eligible who has resigned or who has been dismissed or furloughed may be certified for, and appointed to, a position for which he is eligible in the competitive service, an Executive agency, or the government of the District of Columbia. [Emphasis added.]

Title 5 U.S.C. Sec. 3313, referenced in section 3315, above, but not a section cited by petitioner, reads:

The names of applicants who have qualified in examinations for the competitive service shall be entered on appropriate registers or lists of eligibles in the following order--

(1) for scientific and professional positions in GS-9 or higher, in the order of their ratings, including points added under section 3309 of this title; and

(2) for all other positions--

(A) disabled veterans who have a compensable service-connected disability of 10 percent or more, in order of their ratings, including points added under section 3309 of this title; and

(B) remaining applicants, in the order of their ratings, including points added under section 3309 of this title.

The emphasized portions of sections 3315 and 3316 are not included in petitioner's brief.

It appears from the foregoing that petitioner Noble, a cement mason who is not alleged to have been in the competitive service, or to have been on a competitive register for such employees, or to have taken any examination for his employment, cannot, without more, draw much comfort from the foregoing statutes. Yet, it is equally clear that the fact Noble held an excepted position has no effect whatever on his retention preference rights which apply to each employee of an Executive agency and which by definition include an Executive department, government corporation, and independent establishment, i.e., the TVA. 5 U.S.C. Secs. 105, 3501(b) (1982). It cannot be disputed, and is not disputed, that the historic legislative policy in this nation has been to favor military veterans over nonveterans in employment by the federal government. Since the earliest days to the present this preference has constantly been expanded by law and in our considered judgment pertains both to preference in retention and to rehiring and to competitive and excepted positions. See Dodd, 770 F.2d at 1041 n. 7; cf. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 668, 672-73, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988) (preference eligible employees can appeal to MSPB and the Federal Circuit under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323, 339, 68 S.Ct. 1020, 1027-28, 92 L.Ed. 1416 (1948) (veteran preference is absolute). Viewing the statutes as a whole and with historic perspective, the distinction between the foregoing terms becomes artificial, untenable, and contrary to congressional intent as to veterans.

The TVA and Noble agree that the court must consider whether petitioner's claim that TVA's failure to rehire him for an excepted service...

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3 cases
  • Noble v. Tennessee Valley Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
    • December 22, 1989
    ...the MSPB did not address it. The appeal was disposed of on grounds mentioned in the order, which are no longer in issue. In Noble v. TVA, 876 F.2d 1580 (Fed.Cir.1989), we simply remanded for findings by the MSPB on the merits of the reemployment claim which the Board had not The order now a......
  • Stephens v. Department of Health and Human Services
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • May 23, 1990
    ... ... See Noble v ... Tennessee Valley Authority, 876 F.2d 1580, 1583, ... ...
  • BURROUGHS v. MERIT Sys. Prot. Bd.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit
    • April 8, 2011
    ...§ 7512, where appealable adverse actions are currently codified. Mr. Burroughs cites the panel opinion in Noble v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 876 F.2d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989), in support of his position that the Board had jurisdiction under the VPA. In Noble, the petitioner filed an appeal t......

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