Noblin v. Randolph Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 December 1942 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2636. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | NATHANIEL NOBLIN v. RANDOLPH CORPORATION, J. L. RARDEN, LESSEE, EMPLOYER, ET AL. |
Present, Campbell, C.J., and Holt, Hudgins, Gregory, Browning and Eggleston, JJ.
1. STATUTES — Construction — Intention of Legislature Read into Every Act. — Into the construction of every act must be read the purpose of the legislature.
2. STATUTES — Construction — Decisions of Court. — The construction of a statute by a court of last resort becomes a component part of the statute.
3. STATUTES — Revival — Re-enactment Makes Prior Constructions Applicable. — Where a repealed statute, previously construed by the courts, is re-enacted by the legislature, the construction given to it is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature and becomes obligatory upon the courts.
4. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Effect of Acceptance of Provisions of Act — 1920 Amendment to Code Section 1887(12). — In construing the 1920 amendment to section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 1887(12) of the Code of 1936, it was held that the acceptance of an award from the Industrial Commission was not a bar to a claim by the injured employee against the negligence third party.
5. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Effect of Acceptance of Provisions of Act — 1920 Amendment to Code Section 188(12) — Effect of Procurement of Unsatisfied Judgment against Third Person. — In construing the 1920 amendment to section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 1887(12) of the Code of 1936, the procurement of a judgment which is unsatisfied is not a bar to the prosecution of a claim against the employer.
6. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Effect of Acceptance of Provisions of Act — 1936 Amendment to Section 1887(12) — Institution of Action against Negligent Third Party. — The 1936 amendment to section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 1887(12) of the Code of 1936, clearly contemplates that the injured employee, after accepting certain benefits from the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, may institute an action against a negligent third party. However, in such action, it permits or authorizes the employer, who has paid the stated benefits, to join in the action for the purpose of recovering the amount he has already paid to his employee or his beneficiary for injuries resulting from the same accident.
7. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Effect of Acceptance of Provisions of Act — 1936 Amendment to Section 1887(12) — One Full Recovery Permitted but Double Recovery Prohibited. — The 1936 amendment to section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 188(12) of the Code of 1936, is so worded that it gives to the injured employee an opportunity to obtain one full recovery but prohibits him from receiving a double recovery for his injuries. The right of the injured employee to pursue his action at law against the negligent third party is not prohibited. However, in the exercise of that common-law right, he must not prejudice the right of subrogation given to the employer.
8. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Judgment against Third Party Returned "No Effects" — Liability of Employer — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a formal application was filed by an employee with the Industrial Commission. Before the hearing the employee, at the suggestion or request of his employer, instituted an action for personal injuries against a third party who caused the injury. A judgment was recovered and execution was issued but returned, "No effects liable to levy."
Held: That since the employer advised the employee to institute an action against the third party and assisted in obtaining the judgment, the employer could not plead such judgment in bar of his liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
9. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Option of Proceeding under Act or Suing in Tort Action. — The interests of the parties in the outcome of the common-law action, the simplicity of the proceeding before the Industrial Commission, and the defenses available in a tort action render it advisable for the injured employee to pursue his remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act before obtaining a judgment at law against a third person. However, if the statutory right of subrogation is not impaired by reversing the procedure suggested, there is no reason to hold a judgment procured in the common-law action a bar to the claim for compensation.
10. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Code Section 1887(32) Provides Benefits in Lieu of Other Compensation. — The injuries scheduled in section 32 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 1887(32) of the Code of 1936, are compensated for a definite time, and the compensation benefits provided therein are in lieu of other compensation. This section is clearly an exception to sections 30 and 31, which cover total and partial incapacity. The benefits under the latter sections are predicated upon the incapacity to work produced by the accident. The benefits provided by section 32 are based upon the loss, or loss of use, of the members scheduled therein, irrespective of the future incapacity to work which may have resulted from the loss, or loss of use, of such member of members as are covered in the various schedules.
11. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Construction of Code Section 1887(32) — Loss of Both Eyes Must Result from Same Accident. — The amendment of 1930 to section 32 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 1887(32) of the Code of 1936, added the words, "in the same accident." This amendment makes it clear that the loss of both eyes must result from the same accident as a condition precedent to entering an award for total and permanent incapacity. It is reasonably clear from the terms of this amendment that the legislature did not intend that the loss of sight should be construed to mean a total and permanent incapacity unless the sight of both eyes was lost in the same accident.
12. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Compensation for Total Incapacity — Injury Must Be Sustained by Employee in Conduct of His Particular Business — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action for total incapacity under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 1887(30) of the Code of 1936, the evidence showed that the employee lost the sight of one eye in early childhood and lost the sight of the other eye in the accident involved in the instant case. He contended that total blindness was the equivalent of total permanent incapacity.
Held: That the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act clearly reveal that the legislature intended to hold the employer liable only for the amount of injury sustained by the employee in the conduct of his particular business.
13. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT — Action by Employee against Third Person — Effect on Insurance Carrier's Right of Subrogation — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a formal application was filed by an employee with the Industrial Commission. Before the hearing the employee, at the suggestion or request of his employer, instituted an action for personal injuries against a third party who caused the injury. A judgment was recovered and execution was issued but returned, "No effects liable to levy."
Held: That the employee in prosecuting his common-law action against the third person to a judgment did not prejudice the insurance carrier's statutory right of subrogation, but that the carrier was not entitled to exercise such right until he had paid the compensation for which the employer was liable, or had assumed the liability of the employer therefor. Since the carrier had not complied with these conditions, if and when he did so, the right of subrogation might be enforced in a proper proceeding in the circuit court where the judgment was obtained.
Appeal from an order of the Industrial Commission of Virginia.
The opinion states the case.
Allen & Allen, for the appellant.
John C. Goddin, William M. Tuck and John G. May, Jr., for the appellees.
On December 25, 1940, while performing his duties as porter, Nathaniel Noblin lost an eye as the result of a kick administered by William H. Lawson, Jr., a guest of the John Randolph Hotel in South Boston. Notice of the injury was filed on January 10, 1941, with the Industrial Commission. As the parties were unable to agree on an award, a formal application was filed with the Industrial Commission and hearing was set for September 18, 1941. Before the hearing, Noblin, at the suggestion or request of his employer, instituted an action for personal injuries against Lawson and recovered a judgment in the sum of $2,000. Execution was issued on this judgment and returned, "No effects liable to levy."
The employer contended before the Commission that the judgment against Lawson constituted a bar to the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. This view was adopted by the Commission, and it entered an order dismissing the claim. From that order Noblin obtained this appeal.
The dominant question presented is whether an unsatisfied judgment obtained by an injured employee against a negligent third party constitutes a bar to compensation from the employer for the same injuries.
The answer to this question is found in the construction of the 1936 amendment to section 12 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The General Assembly of Virginia has amended this section five times since 1918, when the act was originally adopted.
As first enacted, the section read: "The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee where he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this act respectively to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise on account of such injury, loss of service or...
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