Nodarse v. Barnhart

• Decision Date: 23 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-22594-CIV.,02-22594-CIV.
• Citation: 319 F.Supp.2d 1333
• Parties: Ernesto NODARSE, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Page 1333

319 F.Supp.2d 1333

Ernesto NODARSE, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. 02-22594-CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

March 23, 2004.

Lizel Gonzalez, Esq., Vivian Chavez, Esq., Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., Miami, FL, for plaintiff.

David Haimes, Assistant United States Attorney, Miami, FL, for defendant.

ORDER AFFIRMING AND MODIFYING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND FINAL JUDGMENT

HUCK, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the January 14, 2004 Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of Magistrate Robert L. Dube. On January 24, 2004, Plaintiff filed his Objections to the R & R. On January 29, 2004, Defendant filed its Objections and Response to Plaintiff's Objections. On February 6, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Objections. Section 636(b)(1) of the Federal Magistrate Act requires this Court to make a de novo determination of those parts of the Magistrate Judge's R & R to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512-13 (11th Cir.1990). Upon de novo review, and for the reasons set out below, the Court affirms the R & R, grants Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Ernesto Nodarse was born in Cuba on November 7, 1947, and entered the United States near El Paso, Texas, on October 1, 1988, without inspection. He filed for asylum shortly thereafter, but his application was denied, and he and his family were placed in deportation proceedings. Nodarse subsequently applied for an adjustment of status and was granted lawful permanent residency on January 24, 2001, under the status category NC-6, a category which specifically indicates adjustment to legal residency under the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act ("NACARA"). Nodarse filed an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits, his second such application, on February 8, 2001.

As recounted more fully in the R & R, Nodarse's application for SSI was originally denied. He then filed a request for rehearing by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was granted. On April 3, 2002, the ALJ found that Nodarse was eligible for SSI as a Cuban/Haitian entrant as of January 24, 2001. Subsequently, the Acting Regional Commissioner of the Social Security Administration recommended that the Appeals Council review the decision of the ALJ on its own motion. The Appeals Council agreed to accept review and, then, on July 15, 2002, reversed the ALJ decision, finding that Nodarse's alien resident status does not currently make him eligible for benefits. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), on September 3, 2002, Nodarse filed a Complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the Appeals Council decision. Nodarse filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 1, 2003, and Defendant filed his response to that Motion and a cross-motion for summary judgment on June 12, 2003. The case was subsequently referred to Magistrate Judge Robert Dube, who held a hearing on the summary judgment motions on December 11, 2003. On January 14, 2004, Judge Dube issued his R & R, which recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and that Defendant's Motion be denied, thereby reversing the decision of the Appeals Council. Having received objections from both parties, the R & R is now ripe for consideration by this Court.

Analysis

The issues appealed from the Appeals Council are purely questions of law. Although a more restrictive standard of review applies if an appeal of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is based on that decision's factual findings, no presumption of validity attaches to the Commissioner's conclusions of law. See Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir.1991) (holding the district court can reverse the Commissioner's decision based on her "failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted"). Therefore, the Court must conduct its own analysis of the legal question involved in this matter.

The main question for resolution by the Court at this time is whether Plaintiff Ernesto Nodarse meets the alien resident status requirements necessary to be eligible for social security benefits under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"). That question hinges on the interaction of the PRWORA and two other statutes that must be analyzed and construed to determine Nodarse's alien resident status and whether that status makes him eligible for any federal public benefits.

The PRWORA states that "an alien who is not a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title) is not eligible for any Federal public benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a). The definition of qualified alien includes "an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant (as defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980)." Id. § 1641(b)(7). Even most qualified aliens are barred from receiving certain, specified federal benefits, including SSI. Id. § 1612(a). However, the Act allows several exceptions to this general rule, including allowing an alien who is "granted status as a Cuban and Haitian entrant (as defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980)" to collect SSI benefits for seven years after he or she has been granted such status. Id. § 1612(a)(2). The relevant portion of the Refugee Education Assistance Act ("REAA") defines Cuban/Haitian entrant as:

(1) any individual granted parole status as a Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending) or granted any other special status subsequently established under the immigration laws for nationals of Cuba or Haiti, regardless of the status of the individual at the time assistance or services are provided; and

(2) any other national of Cuba or Haiti —

(A) who —

(i) was paroled into the United States and has not acquired any other status under the Immigration and Nationality Act;

(ii) is the subject of removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act; or

(iii) has an application for asylum pending with the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and

(B) with respect to whom a final, nonappealable, and legally enforceable order of removal has not been entered.

Pub.L. 104-208, § 501(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1522 note. Finally, section 202 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act ("NACARA"), enacted in 1997, after both the REAA and the PRWORA, permitted the status of an alien to be adjusted to "that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" by filing an application prior to April 1, 2000. Pub.L. 105-100, § 202(a)(1), 111 Stat. 2160, 8 U.S.C. 1255 note. In order to qualify for the adjustment in status, the alien had to be a "national of Nicaragua or Cuba ... who has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period, beginning not later than December 1, 1995" and who was otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa and otherwise admissible to the United States for permanent residence. Id. § 202(a)(1), (b)(1).

Before the Magistrate Judge, Nodarse argued that he qualifies under the PRWORA exception as a Cuban/Haitian entrant under § 501(e)(1) of the REAA definition. Nodarse also argues that he should be considered to have been lawfully residing in the United States as a Cuban/Haitian entrant on August 22, 1996, under § 501(e)(2) of the REAA definition because, at the time of the passage of the PRWORA, he was a national of Cuba who was the subject of removal proceedings and against whom a final, nonappealable, and legally enforceable order of removal had not been entered. Defendant argued that Nodarse does not qualify under either of these definitions. In the R & R, the Magistrate Judge agreed with Nodarse that he did qualify as a Cuban/Haitian entrant under § 501(e)(1), but did not address Nodarse's alternative argument that he was a § 501(e)(2) Cuban/Haitian entrant on the ground that it had not been raised in the administrative proceedings. Nodarse objected to the Magistrate Judge's failure to address that alternative argument. Defendant objected to the Magistrate Judge's determination that Nodarse is a Cuban/Haitian entrant under § 501(e)(1), and further argued that Nodarse cannot be considered a Cuban/Haitian entrant under § 501(e)(2) because he was a lawful permanent resident at the time of his February 8, 2002 SSI application and, therefore, was not the subject of removal proceedings. The Magistrate Judge's recommendations and each of the objections shall be considered below.

I. Adjustment to Permanent Legal Resident Status Under NACARA

The purpose of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute. In determining congressional intent, courts should give overriding deference to the unambiguous language of a statute. See, e.g., Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct 1038 (2004); In re Paschen, 296 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir.) ("When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we need go no further, because we must presume that Congress `said what it meant and meant what it said.'") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1097, 123 S.Ct. 696, 154 L.Ed.2d 648 (2002). A court may look at evidence of legislative intent other than the statutory language in only three circumstances:

We may look to evidence of Congressional intent outside the four corners of the statute if "(1) the statute's language is ambiguous; (2) applying it according to its plain meaning would lead to an absurd result; or (3) there is clear evidence of contrary legislative intent."

Moore v. Am. Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 216 F.3d...