Noe v. Ward
| Decision Date | 11 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1090,84-1090 |
| Citation | 754 F.2d 890 |
| Parties | 36 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1777, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,985 Annalee NOE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R.A. WARD, Director, Oklahoma Department of Transportation; Paul Adams, Director of Accounting, Oklahoma Department of Transportation; Betty Schardt, Accounting Division Supervisor, Ada District Office, Oklahoma Department of Transportation, as an individual; Max Hinderliter, Division Engineer, Ada District Office, Oklahoma Department of Transportation, as an individual; Doyle Johnston, Assistant Engineer, Ada District Office, Oklahoma Department of Transportation, as an individual, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Diana G. Mueller, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff-appellant.
Norman N. Hill, Gen. Counsel, Oklahoma Dept. of Transp., Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants-appellees.
Before BARRETT, BREITENSTEIN and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir.R. 10(e). The cause is thereby submitted without oral argument.
This is a civil rights action charging religious discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. The district court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for the defendants because of the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the 90-day time limitation as provided in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). She appeals. We affirm.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC, found no cause for religious discrimination. On March 29, 1983, it sent plaintiff a "Right to Sue" letter. Plaintiff had been represented before the EEOC by an attorney. The "Right to Sue" letter was received by plaintiff on April 4, 1983, and the letter to her attorney was received in her office on April 11, 1983. Appellant's brief, p. 2. Plaintiff filed her law suit on July 7, 1983. The question is whether the 90-day period begins to run from the date plaintiff received the "Right to Sue" letter or from the date the plaintiff's attorney received the letter.
Section 2000e-5(f)(1) provides in pertinent part:
"... If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section or the Attorney General has not filed a civil action in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved...." [Emphasis supplied.]
The statute is clear. The party aggrieved may bring suit within ninety days after the giving of notice by the EEOC. The plaintiff, the aggrieved party, received notice on April 4 and did not bring suit until July 7, 94 days after receiving notice. She argues that the 90 days runs after her attorney received notice. The attorney received notice on April 11 and the suit was brought July 7 or 87 days after notice. She argues that the time did not begin to run until her attorney had received the notice.
We recognize the well established rule that notice to an attorney is imputed to the client. See Gonzalez v. Stanford Applied Engineering, Inc., 9 Cir., 597 F.2d 1298, 1299; Mays v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, W.D.Tenn., 517 F.Supp. 232, 233; and ...
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