Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.

Citation204 F. Supp. 929
Decision Date24 April 1962
Docket NumberNo. 1781.,1781.
PartiesRuth M. NOEL et al., Libellants, v. UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP., Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware

Murray M. Schwartz, Wilmington, Del., Stephen M. Feldman and Joseph G. Feldman, of Feldman, Feldman & Feldman, Philadelphia, Pa., for libellants.

William Prickett, of Prickett, Prickett & Tybout, Wilmington, Del., for respondent.

LAYTON, District Judge.

This is a ruling on a motion under 28 U.S.C.A. Admiralty Rule 23 by Libellants to amend their libel by adding a claim sounding in breach of implied warranty of fitness in an action for wrongful death brought under the Death on the High Seas Act (hereinafter cited DOHSA).1

Libellants are the personal representatives of Marshall L. Noel who was a passenger on a plane which caught fire and crashed into the high seas on June 19, 1956, while en route from New York City to Caracas, Venezuela. All aboard were killed. The airliner was owned and operated by Linea Aeropostal Venezolana (L.A.V.), a Venezuelan airline company, which is not a party here. Respondent was the manufacturer of the propellers and related parts of the plane. Respondent allegedly sold the propellers directly to L.A.V. in New York prior to the time of the accident. The libel charges that a defect in the design or manufacture of the propeller caused the crash. After two years of discovery on the issues of negligence and damages, Libellants have moved to amend their libel by adding a cause of action based upon breach of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability of the propellers and related parts to all whom it knew would ride in the plane, including the decedent.

Respondent opposed the amendment because of unreasonable delay by Libellants in making the motion; because the amendment seeks to insert a completely new cause of action which is now barred by the statute of limitations; and, particularly, because privity is lacking between decedent and respondent.

The first two reasons are not found to be persuasive and the remainder of this opinion will be directed to the question whether the DOHSA provides a cause of action for injury or death of an airline passenger against the manufacturer of the airplane's propellers based upon breach of implied warranty of fitness.

It is axiomatic that the amendment cannot be allowed unless it states a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Whether a claim can be based upon implied warranty of fitness and merchantability under the circumstances here alleged depends on which law is found to be controlling. In a previous opinion,2 it was determined that the law of the airliner's flag, namely the law of Venezuela, cannot be invoked; that Section Four of the DOHSA is inapplicable here;3 and that Libellants must prevail, if at all, exclusively by way of Section One of the DOHSA.4 Section One reads as follows:

"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State * * * the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued." (Emphasis supplied.)

Originally, the admiralty, as did the common law Courts, denied a right of action for damages for death on the high seas. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358 (1886); 1 Benedict, on Admiralty § 140 at 372 (6th Ed. 1940). However, in 1920, Congress passed the DOHSA permitting the personal representatives of a decedent to institute an action for wrongful death on the high seas. Since Libellants had nothing before Section One of the DOHSA was passed, Section One gives them all they now have.5

To determine what law governs this action and whether implied warranty of fitness is a claim upon which relief can be granted, the sole reference must be to the Act itself, legislative intent and past Court construction of its terms.

The Act expressly provides that actions under Section One are brought "in admiralty." Respondent does not question the settled view that wrongful death due to airplane accidents over the high seas is a maritime tort falling within admiralty jurisdiction.6 Nor does Respondent question that the words "in admiralty" require that actions under Section One be brought exclusively in admiralty forums. Ann. 66 A.L.R.2d 1002.

Respondent's contention apparently is that this admiralty forum must look to state law in determining whether or not the implied warranty of fitness amendment states a valid claim. Respondent cites Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602, 76 A.L.R.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. den. 358 U.S. 910, 79 S.Ct. 236, 3 L.Ed.2d 230, which adhered to the rule that federal Courts in diversity cases must apply the conflicts rules of the state in which the Court sits.7 Applying Delaware conflicts rules to the facts here presented, Respondent argues that this Court must apply the law of the state where the sale of the propellers from Respondent to L.A.V. (the airline company) was made, namely New York.8

Jurisdiction in all the cases cited by Respondent was based on diversity of citizenship, and thus they are readily distinguishable from the case at bar, in which jurisdiction is based on a federal statute. Besides, this Court thinks that the application of the law of New York, or of any other state, to Libellants' rights cannot be justified by the mere fact that this federal Court is sitting in Delaware. Noel's death cut off any rights Libellants may have had in New York and in Delaware except as those rights may have been preserved by a wrongful death act. Delaware conflict rules alone cannot empower this Court to give Noel rights under State law when such rights do not otherwise exist. No rights are claimed by Libellants under any state death act. And no authority may be found in the Death on the High Seas Act for applying the substantive law or conflict rules of particular states.

Indeed, application of State law here would directly conflict with Congressional intent in passing the Act. The Committee report stated:

"The general purpose of the measure is to give a uniform right of action in the United States admiralty courts for death by negligent acts occurring on the high seas * * *. State Wrongful Death Acts, diverse in their terms and conflicting in their remedies, are but a poor makeshift for the uniform simple legislation which Congress alone can enact. The present bill is designed to remedy this situation by giving a right of action for death to be enforced in the courts of admiralty both in rem and in personam. The right is made exclusive for deaths on the high seas, leaving unimpaired the rights under state statutes as to deaths on waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the states."9

Application of state law here would defeat the very uniformity which Congress sought to promote when the Act was passed.

In addition, the better reasoned opinions of the Courts suggest that the words "in admiralty" require that Section One be construed in the light of federal maritime, rather than state, law. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.Calif.1954); Middleton v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 328-29 (2d Cir. 1934). In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States has said that any application of state law which conflicts with uniform federal admiralty law, invades the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress over admiralty and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917).10 In a case such as this, where no overriding state interest appears, it seems that the Jensen rule still controls. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 81 S.Ct. 886, 6 L.Ed. 2d 56 (1961).

The Court concludes that the intent of Congress and authoritative decisions of the Courts require that Libellants' rights under Section One of the DOHSA be determined exclusively in the light of federal maritime law.

It must now be decided whether the words "wrongful act, neglect, or default" in Section One of the DOHSA permit the estate of an airplane passenger killed in a crash over the high seas to recover from the manufacturer of a defective airplane part, which allegedly caused the fatal accident, upon the theory of a breach of implied warranty of fitness.

Respondent insists that the quoted language means negligence and nothing more. Some support may be found for this view for, admittedly, the word "negligence" appears repeatedly throughout the Committee Reports without mention of theories other than negligence.11 However, the very language of the Act suggests that something more than negligence is intended. Had Congress meant litigants to benefit only from negligence theories, it could have so indicated in a manner admitting of no doubt by employing the words "neglect" or "negligence" alone. Instead, the words "wrongful act" and "default" are added. It is an accepted rule that a statute will be construed, where possible, to give independent meaning to each word used in the enactment. Middleton v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934) cert. den. 293 U.S. 577, 55 S.Ct. 89, 79 L.Ed. 674. The words "wrongful act" and "default" connote something more than negligence, as the Third Circuit Court recently held in Tungus v. Skovgaard, 252 F.2d 14 (1957), aff'd 358 U.S. 588, 79 S.Ct. 503, 3 L.Ed. 2d 524. There the identical language, "wrongful act, neglect, or default", appearing in the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 was being construed. The Court said:

"The nature of the conduct which will create liability under the New Jersey statute is of crucial importance. The legislature describes it as `wrongful act, neglect or default.' It is presumed that the legislature did
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