Noelker v. State
| Decision Date | 06 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-2384 |
| Citation | 148 N.E.3d 345 |
| Parties | Justin NOELKER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: J. Clayton Miller, Jordan Law, LLC, Richmond, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Ellen H. Meilaender, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Following a jury trial, Justin Noelker was found guilty of robbery, a Level 3 felony, and he subsequently admitted to being an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years at the Indiana Department of Correction, enhanced by fifteen years for his habitual offender status. Noelker appeals, raising one issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to dismiss because he was not tried within the time period allowed by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"). Concluding the trial court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss because, due to delays attributable to Noelker, the time period had not yet expired when he was brought to trial, we affirm.
[2] On July 28, 2015, the State charged Noelker with robbery, a Level 3 felony, for an incident that occurred on February 20, 2015. He was also alleged to be an habitual offender. At the time the information was filed, Noelker was incarcerated in Florida for allegedly stabbing two people on March 16, 2015. A warrant was issued for Noelker's arrest on the robbery charge.
[3] Noelker was arrested on the warrant on June 19, 2017, and returned to Indiana. At an initial hearing held on June 27, a public defender was appointed to represent him and trial was set for September 26. On August 30, Noelker, by counsel, moved for a continuance of the trial date to allow additional time to complete discovery, negotiations, and investigation. Appellant's Appendix, Volume 2 at 31. The motion was granted, and trial was re-set for November 28. On October 12, the trial court received a letter from Noelker requesting a new public defender. At a hearing on October 23, the trial court granted Noelker's request, vacated his previous public defender's appointment, and appointed a new public defender. Trial remained set for November 28. However, at a pre-trial conference on October 30, newly appointed counsel requested a continuance and trial was rescheduled for January 30, 2018.
[4] At pre-trial conferences on January 8 and March 5, 2018, Noelker's counsel again requested and was granted continuances, resulting in trial ultimately being set for June 5. In a letter to the court dated April 8, Noelker requested an immediate dismissal of the charges against him because he had been extradited from Florida on June 19, 2017 and had not yet been tried in violation of the time provisions of the IAD. Because Noelker was represented by counsel, the trial court took no action on his letter. At least five motions for continuance were requested by the defense thereafter and trial was ultimately set for May 7, 2019. At a pre-trial conference on April 10, 2019, Noelker's counsel acknowledged that from the first request for a continuance in August 2017 until the most recent trial setting, "[a]ll the continuances ... were continuances by defense counsel so those dates don't toll toward the IAD request." Amended Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 29-30.
[5] Subsequently, "disputes arose between the parties regarding the use of a video deposition in lieu of live trial testimony." Appellant's App., Vol. 2 at 82. Specifically, Noelker was identified and apprehended in Florida on the Indiana warrant after Noelker's DNA was collected in Florida and sent to Indiana.1 The parties agreed to conduct a video deposition of the person who collected the DNA and use the deposition in lieu of live testimony at trial. During the deposition, at which Noelker was present, it was discovered that a second person had mailed the sample, requiring a deposition of that person for chain of custody purposes. The week before trial, and before the second deposition could be conducted, Noelker's counsel advised the State that Noelker would not sign the stipulation allowing use of the video depositions and filed a motion to exclude. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on April 30, 2019. The State noted that one witness was in Florida and the other in Nevada and Noelker's last-minute refusal to agree to the procedure the parties had been operating under meant the State had two choices: Tr., Vol. II at 40. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that a continuance was necessary and vacated the May 7 trial date "because the State had relied to its detriment upon [Noelker's] earlier agreements relative to the admission of the video deposition(s) [and] could not procure the witnesses['] appearance for trial on such short notice." Appellant's App., Vol. 2 at 83.
[6] On May 8, the trial court issued an Order Regarding Matters Pertaining to Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The trial court noted that the parties agreed Noelker was before the court pursuant to the provisions of the IAD and stipulated that as of the date of the hearing, Noelker had been held for trial in Indiana for 128 days before the first defense continuance and fifty-two days remained in which to bring Noelker to trial. The court further noted that due to the circumstances, it must "determine which party bears responsibility for the days ‘lost’ due to the vacation of the most recent trial date." Id. The court reviewed the procedural history of the case to that point, noting the many continuances requested or delays prompted by Noelker,2 and then concluded:
Id. at 86. On May 9, Noelker's jury trial was reset to August 6. See id. at 11.3
[7] The State collected its own DNA sample from Noelker to eliminate the need for the out-of-state witnesses and Noelker's jury trial commenced as scheduled on August 6, 2019. After the jury was selected and sworn but before the presentation of evidence began, Noelker moved for dismissal based on violation of the IAD. Noelker acknowledged the May 8 order determined that the delay was attributable to the defense but objected to that determination. Noelker further acknowledged that at the time of the trial court's order the parties had stipulated fifty-two days remained in the IAD period but noted that time period had been exceeded. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, citing its earlier order, and the trial proceeded. The jury found Noelker guilty of robbery as charged and he thereafter admitted to his status as an habitual offender. Noelker now appeals.
[8] The ruling on a motion to dismiss under the IAD is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Smith , 882 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). However, we review the findings underlying the ruling under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. Findings are "clearly erroneous" when the record lacks any facts or reasonable inferences to support them. Schrenker v. State , 919 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied .
[9] "A detainer is ‘a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.’ " Webb v. State , 437 N.E.2d 1330, 1331 (Ind. 1982) (quoting United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) ). The IAD is an agreement among forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the United States creating uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer. Conn v. State , 831 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied ; Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. 2(a) (defining "state"). Both Indiana and Florida are parties to the IAD. Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4 ; Fla. Stat. § 941.45. The purpose of the IAD is to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of outstanding charges against persons already incarcerated" in another jurisdiction. State v. Robinson , 863 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Essentially, the IAD governs the speedy trial rights of a defendant incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction. State v. Thompson , 687 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) ; see also Fisher v. State , 933 N.E.2d 526, 529 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) () (quotation omitted). In relevant part, the statute provides:
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or...
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