Nogueras v. Ling
Decision Date | 03 June 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 95-394-M,95-394-M |
Parties | Raul NOGUERAS v. Song LING et al. P. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Patrick T. Conley, Jr., Paul Nogueras, for Plaintiff.
Robert J. Cosentino, Providence, Andrew R. Gold, Warwick, for Defendant.
Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.
This is a real estate wrangle over an agreement to buy a three-bedroom house in Providence. The parties were supposed to proceed to a closing a long time ago, but for reasons that are still unresolved, they have failed to do so. Because the buyers and the seller are pointing fingers at each other for creating this snafu and because the evidence is disputed in regard to which of them is at fault, summary judgment was not the proper way to determine this controversy. Accordingly we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
On July 20, 1985 defendants, Song Ling and Sceur Ly Ling (the Lings), entered into a purchase-and-sale agreement (contract) whereby plaintiff-owner, Raul Nogueras (Nogueras), agreed to convey to them a three-bedroom house and certain real estate located at 150 Linwood Avenue (the property) in the city of Providence. The Lings agreed to pay Nogueras $33,000 for the property, and they deposited $6,800 toward the purchase price with either Nogueras or the broker, Buy-Rite Real Estate. The parties set and extended a closing date several times and ultimately rescheduled it for May 23, 1986. However, Nogueras and his attorney refused to attend the closing and failed to convey title to the Lings. The Lings thereafter filed suit in the Providence County Superior Court (docketed No. PC 86-3400, hereinafter 86-3400), seeking specific performance of the contract. In due course a justice of the Superior Court sitting without a jury tried the case and found as a matter of fact that Nogueras had refused to perform the contract and that the Lings had been diligent, ready, willing, and able to proceed with the closing on the agreed-upon date. Accordingly, after ruling in favor of the Lings and against Nogueras on all claims, the court granted the Lings' prayer for specific performance and entered a judgment on June 28, 1993 that ordered Nogueras to transfer the property to the Lings for $33,000 minus the $6,800 deposit.
Notwithstanding this determination, over the next year and a half the specific-performance judgment remained executory: Nogueras never transferred the deed to the premises, nor did he return the Lings' deposit; and the Lings never paid the balance of the $33,000 consideration to Nogueras.
On January 19, 1995 Nogueras filed an independent action in the Superior Court (docketed No. PC 95-302, hereinafter 95-302), seeking removal of a lis pendens that the Lings had filed in the land evidence records with respect to their claim to the property. Nogueras alleged in his complaint that despite the earlier specific-performance award the Lings had refused to close on the property or to tender the balance of the purchase price to him. Hence Nogueras requested either that the court order the closing to be held or, in the alternative, that it remove the lis pendens and clear the Lings' claim from the title.
Thereafter the Lings filed a motion on July 18, 1995 in the original action (86-3400) to adjudge Nogueras in contempt of the specific-performance judgment. On November 21, 1995, the Superior Court justice who had ruled on the Lings' specific-performance lawsuit ordered the contempt motion held in abeyance pending resolution of Nogueras' action in 95-302. On June 20 and 23, 1995, another Superior Court justice heard Nogueras' motion for summary judgment on his complaint to vacate the lis pendens and to obtain clear title to the property. After reviewing the parties' affidavits and hearing arguments of counsel, the hearing justice granted the motion and ordered the lis pendens discharged. As grounds therefor the hearing justice stated in her bench decision that she was However, soon after granting summary judgment to Nogueras, the hearing justice entered an order stating that she would allow the Lings to file a counterclaim seeking restitution of their deposit moneys.
The Lings then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court, seeking review of the hearing justice's grant of summary judgment to Nogueras. We issued the writ so that we could review the summary judgment.
Our scrutiny of an order granting summary judgment employs the same standard used by the motion justice. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we examine the record, including the pleadings and any affidavits or discovery materials, to determine whether any material facts remain in genuine dispute such that the case should proceed to trial and to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sjogren v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 703 A.2d 608, 610 (R.I.1997).
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