Nohara v. DeJoy
| Docket Number | Civ. 20-00553 JMS-RT |
| Decision Date | 02 June 2023 |
| Parties | DRAKE M. NOHARA, Plaintiff, v. LOUIE DEJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ECF NO 44
Before the court is a Motion, ECF No. 44, by Defendant Postmaster General, Louie DeJoy and Defendant United States Postal Service (“USPS”), seeking summary judgment on all claims asserted by USPS employee Drake Nohara (“Plaintiff” or “Nohara”) in his Complaint, ECF No. 1.[1] Plaintiff alleges that he experienced seven discrete acts of retaliation for participating in protected Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) activity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that these acts further resulted in a hostile work environment. Id. at PageID.3-4. For the reasons provided below, the court GRANTS the Motion as to five of the alleged discrete acts and the hostile work environment claim and DENIES the Motion as to two of the alleged discrete acts.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII. See ECF No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following seven discrete acts of retaliation:
ECF No. 1 at PageID.3-4.
Plaintiff has been a USPS employee since July 20, 1996. ECF No. 50-6 at PageID.471. Prior to December 2016, Plaintiff had not received any disciplinary actions. Id. Plaintiff claims that he experienced each alleged act of retaliation for engaging in protected EEO activity.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him in acts 1, 2, 3, and 4 because of his “affiliation with [a USPS] employee, Keith Arakaki, who had filed an EEO complaint” against both Tomooka and Hirai on August 6, 2014. ECF No. 50-6 at PageID.471; ECF No. 45-6 at PageID.191. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants retaliated against him in acts 5, 6, and 7, for filing his own EEO complaint on March 3, 2017. ECF No. 1 at PageID.3-4. In that EEO complaint, Plaintiff also claimed retaliation for his affiliation with Arakaki. ECF No. 45-6 at PageID.191 ).
Arakaki and former USPS employee, Roslyn Hanchett, provide supporting evidence for Nohara's allegations. See ECF No. 50-2; ECF No. 50-3. Similarly situated, Arakaki, Hanchett, and Nohara were all USPS Maintenance Managers who, at some point, reported to Tomooka and Hirai. ECF No. 50-2 at PageID.386; ECF No. 50-3 at PageID.412; ECF No. 50-6 at PageID.471.
On December 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed his Complaint. ECF No. 1. On March 14, 2023, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 44. On April 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion. ECF No. 48. And on May 1, 2023, Defendants filed their Reply. ECF No. 53. A Concise Statement of Facts (“CSF”) and Exhibits accompanied the Motion and Opposition. ECF Nos. 45, 50. The court held a hearing on May 15, 2023. ECF No. 57.
The purpose of summary judgment is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue is ‘genuine' only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a dispute is ‘material' only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
“The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010). “When the moving party has carried its burden . . ., its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”; instead, the opponent must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court views the facts and draws reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
Plaintiff alleges that he experienced seven discrete acts of retaliation for participating in protected EEO activity, and that these acts further resulted in a hostile work environment. ECF No. 1 at PageID.3-4. After setting forth the relevant law, the court analyzes each claim below.[2]
Title VII includes different governing provisions for the private and federal sectors. For the federal sector, including the USPS, Title VII requires that “all personnel actions affecting employees . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Personnel actions in the federal employment context “include most employment-related decisions, such as appointment, promotion, work assignment, compensation, and performance reviews.” Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S.Ct. 1168, 117273 (2020). And while the private sector provision contains a specific prohibition against retaliation, §2000e-3(a), the federal sector provision does not. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit previously held that the retaliation provision in § 2000e-3 is “equally applicable to action by the federal government.” White v. Gen. Srvs. Admin., 652 F.2d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Ayon v. Sampson, 547 F.2d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1976).
More recently, the Supreme Court has clarified that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) federal sector provision-which has identical language to Title VII's federal sector provision-by itself prohibits retaliation. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 488 (2008).[3] And because Gomez-Perez applies equally to Title VII, § 2000e-16(a), like the ADEA, contains its own retaliation provision. See Huff v. Buttigieg, 42 F.4th 638, 646 (7th Cir. 2022).[4] The court further determines that it can borrow from § 2000e-3(a) to determine the contours and scope of § 2000e-16's anti-retaliation provision. See White, 652 F.2d at 917; see also Komis v. Sec. of U.S. Dep't of Labor, 918 F.3d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 2019) ().
To make a prima facie showing of retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) Defendants took an adverse action against him, and (3) there was a causal link between his involvement in the protected activity and the adverse action undertaken by Defendants. Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 541 (9th Cir. 2006).
With respect to the first element-and borrowing from § 2000e-3(a) to help define the contours and scope of a § 2000e-16(a) retaliation claim-an employee has engaged in a “protected activity” if “he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004).[5]
Under the second element, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In applying this test, Id. at 69. These two prongs of the Burlington standard-the materiality of the challenged action and the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position-work to “screen out trivial conduct while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in complaints about discrimination.” Id. at 69-70.
As noted above, for liability purposes, the third element centers on whether retaliation played any part in the adverse action.[6] And temporal proximity may support a finding of causation. “That an employer's actions were caused by an employee's engagement in protected activities may be inferred from ‘proximity in time between the protected action and the...
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