Nolan v. Haley, Civil Action 21-cv-02424-PAB-MDB

• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-cv-02424-PAB-MDB
• Decision Date: 10 January 2023
• Parties: ROBERT NOLAN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN HALEY, DAVID ENCINAS, JACE MCCALL, 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY, and TODD QUICK, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

ROBERT NOLAN, Plaintiff, v. JOHN HALEY, DAVID ENCINAS, JACE MCCALL, 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY, and TODD QUICK, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-02424-PAB-MDB

United States District Court, D. Colorado

January 10, 2023

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Maritza Dominguez Braswell, Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on three Motions: (1) “District Attorney Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint” ([“District Attorney Motion”], Doc. No. 31); (2) “Defendant Encinias' [sic] Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint” ([“Encinas Motion”], Doc. No 39); and (3) “Defendants John Haley, Jace McCall, and Todd Quick's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Prisoner Complaint” ([“Haley Motion”], Doc. No. 48). Plaintiff has responded in opposition to all three Motions, and Defendants have replied. (Doc. No. 47; Doc. No. 50; Doc. No. 55; Doc. No. 60; Doc. No 61; Doc. No. 62.) The Motions have been referred to the undersigned, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1, for a recommendation regarding disposition. (Doc. No. 32; Doc. No. 40; Doc. No. 49.) The Court has reviewed the briefs, the case file, and the applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Attorney Motion (Doc. No. 31) be GRANTED, that the Encinas Motion (Doc. No. 39) be GRANTED, and that the Haley Motion (Doc. No. 48) be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pro se Plaintiff Robert Nolan [“Mr. Nolan”], an inmate in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at the Federal Correctional Institute in Florence, Colorado, brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims against The 16th Judicial District Attorney's Office [“District Attorney Defendant”]; the Bent County Sheriff, David Encinas [“Defendant Encinas”]; and three La Junta Police Department employees-Detective John Haley [“Defendant Haley”], Officer Jace McCall [“Defendant McCall”], and Chief Todd Quick [“Defendant Quick”]. (Doc. No. 20 at 2-32.)

Mr. Nolan's claims arise out of his 2018 federal indictment on seven felony drugs and weapons charges. (Doc. No. 31-1.) In his Third Amended Complaint, Mr. Nolan alleges that Defendants caused him to be prosecuted on those charges without probable cause. (Doc. No. 20 at 23-29.) Mr. Nolan alleges, specifically, that Defendants improperly coerced an unreliable confidential informant, Juan Ortega, to cooperate in the underlying criminal investigation; that they fabricated affidavits to obtain invalid search warrants; and that they then used those defective warrants as a pretextual justification to illegally search through Mr. Nolan's home and shop. (Id. at 6-32.)

During the searches of Mr. Nolan's home and shop, law enforcement seized quantities of methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, as well as multiple firearms. (Doc. No. 20-1 at 1; Doc. No. 20-3 at 7.) As a result, Mr. Nolan was taken into custody, and on June 21, 2018, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against him, charging him with the following offenses: (1) 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) - knowing and intentional possession of less than five grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) - felon in possession of a firearm; (3) 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) - knowing and intentional possession of fifty grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute; (4) 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) -knowing and intentional possession of heroin with intent to distribute; (5) 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) - knowing and intentional possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; (6) 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) - knowing and intentional possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; and (7) 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) - carrying a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking offense. (Doc. No. 31-1.) Count 1 of the indictment was based on a controlled buy between Mr. Nolan and Mr. Ortega that predated the issuance of the two search warrants, while Counts 2-7 were based on items seized during the execution of those search warrants. (Doc. No. 20-1 at 1.)

Following his indictment, Mr. Nolan's defense counsel filed a motion to suppress “all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful searches of Mr. Nolan's home and shop based on constitutionally invalid search warrants,” as well as a motion in limine to preclude admission of all statements made by the confidential informant, Mr. Ortega. (Id.; Doc. No. 31-4 at 3.) The motion to suppress was subsequently granted as to the search of Mr. Nolan's shop, but denied as to the search of Mr. Nolan's home. (Doc. No. 31-3 at 3; Doc. No. 31-4 at 2.) The motion in limine was also denied. (Doc. No. 31-4 at 3.)

After a three-day trial, on January 24, 2019, a jury found Mr. Nolan not guilty as to the first count of the indictment, and guilty as to all remaining counts. (Doc. No. 31-5 at 2-4.) The Tenth Circuit subsequently affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence seized from Mr. Nolan's home, and by extension, Mr. Nolan's conviction. United States v. Nolan, 854 Fed.Appx. 977, 981 (10th Cir. 2021). Mr. Nolan is currently serving a multi-year prison sentence in connection with the charged offenses for which he was convicted.

Based on the foregoing events, on September 7, 2021, Mr. Nolan commenced this § 1983 lawsuit. (Doc. No. 1.) On April 20, 2022, Mr. Nolan filed a Third Amended Complaint, asserting claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments against the five named Defendants and John and Jane Does 1-25. (Doc. No. 20.) After an initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the majority of Mr. Nolan's claims were dismissed as legally frivolous. (Doc. No. 25.) Mr. Nolan's remaining Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims against the five named Defendants were then drawn to a district judge and a magistrate judge. (Id.)

Defendants now move to dismiss Mr. Nolan's remaining claims against them, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 31 at 1; Doc. No. 39 at 1; Doc. No. 48 at 1.) Defendants argue, among other things, that Mr. Nolan's claims are barred by the favorable termination rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and by the applicable statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 31 at 10; Doc. No. 39 at 9; Doc. No. 48 at 4-8.) In addition, Defendants each argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity and/or prosecutorial immunity in this case. (Doc. No. 31 at 11-12; Doc. No. 39 at 10; Doc. No. 48 at 8-14.)

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

I. Pro Se Plaintiff

Plaintiff is proceeding Pro se. The Court, therefore, “review[s] his pleadings and other papers liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.” Trackwell v. United States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding the allegations of a Pro se complaint “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). However, a Pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). A court may not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that have not been alleged, or that a defendant has violated laws in ways that a plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); see Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that a court may not “supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint”); Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (the court may not “construct arguments or theories for the plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues”). The plaintiff's Pro se status does not entitle him to an application of different rules. Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 957 (10th Cir. 2002).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff's case. Rather, it calls for a determination that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the matter, attacking the existence of jurisdiction rather than the allegations of the complaint. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10^th Cir. 1974).

A court lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Id. at 909. The dismissal is without prejudice. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006).

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “must be determined from the allegations of fact in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusionary allegations of jurisdiction.” Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, however, the Court may consider matters outside the pleadings without transforming the motion into one for summary judgment. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). If a party challenges the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends, a court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's “factual allegations . . . [and it] has...