Noland v. Wootan
| Decision Date | 03 May 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 8102,8102 |
| Citation | 427 P.2d 143,102 Ariz. 192 |
| Parties | Harold NOLAND and Olive Noland, his wife, Appellants, v. Frank E. WOOTAN and Jane Doe Wootan, Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
McKesson, Renaud & Cook and Fred J. Pain, Jr., Phoenix, for appellants.
Snell & Wilmer, by John J. Bouma, Phoenix, for appellees.
Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Noland, plaintiffs below, brought this action to recover for property damage and personal injuries inflicted on them as a result of an automobile collision with the defendant while he was operating his motor vehicle. The collision occurred at the corner of East McDowell Road and North 10th Street in the City of Phoenix, on the evening of March 26, 1961. Just before the collision appellants' vehicle, under the control of Mr. Noland, was proceeding West along McDowell Road, a heavily traveled four-lane through street. The appellee, Mr. Wootan, was traveling East along the same thoroughfare. Mr. Noland attempted to turn left onto North 10th Street. Before the turn could be safely executed the appellee's automobile collided with the appellants' vehicle. At the time that Mr. Noland attempted to make his left hand turn onto North 10th Street, a tan car stationed opposite him facing East on McDowell Road in the lane closest to the centerline was signaling to make a left hand turn onto North 10th Street. The testimony as to the appellee's speed before the accident and his distance from the intersection when he changed lanes so as to avoid stopping behind the tan car, waiting to make a left turn onto North 10th Street, is contradictory. There was evidence that the appellee had drunk some intoxicating beverages before he drove his automobile on the day in question.
The jury delivered a verdict in favor of the defendant, Wootan. From the order of the trial judge denying the plaintiffs a new trial this appeal was taken.
The appellants claim that they were prejudiced by the jury instruction on what amounted to a violation of A.R.S. § 28--692 (). The court instructed the jury that it was negligence per se for a person to drive a motor vehicle on the public highway when that individual was under the influence of intoxicants. The court stated:
'A person is under the influence of liquor when as a result of drinking thereof, his nervous system, brain or muscle is so affected as to impair in An appreciable degree his ability to operate the vehicle in the manner of an ordinary prudent person in full possession of his faculties, using reasonable care, and under like conditions.' (Emphasis added.)
The appellants contend that by employing the term 'an appreciable degree', in the above instruction, the trial court violated our rule of longstanding that a person is guilty of the crime of driving while under the influence of intoxicants if his driving is impaired merely to the slightest degree.
In Hasten v. State, 35 Ariz. 427, 280 P. 670 (1929) we adopted the rule that one is guilty of the crime of driving while under the influence of intoxicants if his control of the vehicle is to the slightest degree affected by his consumption of the intoxicant. We have never departed from this rule of law. We take judicial notice of the terrible toll taken, both in personal injuries and property damage, by drivers who mix alcohol and gasoline, and we conclude that the test is as sound today as it was thirty-eight years ago when it was first enunciated. In Hasten v. State, supra, this Court expressly disapproved of an instruction similar to the one given in the present case. The Court stated that California had refused to adopt the 'slightest degree' test and had approved an 'appreciable degree' instruction in People v. Dingle, 56 Cal.App. 445, 205 P. 705 (1922). This Court in Hasten, supra, believed that there was a difference between the terms 'slightest degree' and 'appreciable degree'. We take this opportunity to reaffirm...
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RY-TAN CONST. v. WASHINGTON ELEMENTARY
...a party's substantial rights constitutes reversible error. Thompson, 187 Ariz. at 126,927 P.2d at 786 (citing Noland v. Wootan, 102 Ariz. 192, 194, 427 P.2d 143, 145 (1967)); Clauss, 177 Ariz. at 568,869 P.2d at 1221. However, "[w]e will not presume prejudice; it must appear affirmatively i......
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Rancho Pescado, Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1
...The function of the jury instructions is to inform the jury of the applicable law in terms it can readily understand. Noland v. Wootan, 102 Ariz. 192, 427 P.2d 143 (1967); Coyner Cropdusters v. Marsh, 90 Ariz. 157, 367 P.2d 208 3) Instruction number nineteen. Northwestern's objection to thi......
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Ontiveros v. Borak
...rule, its basis and its applicability under the present conditions. In doing so, we are mindful of our words in Noland v. Wootan, 102 Ariz. 192, 193, 427 P.2d 143, 144 (1967): CAUSATION All counsel agreed at oral argument that the common law rule was not a rule of immunity. Indeed, it is im......
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