Nolet v. Armstrong
| Decision Date | 15 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-11499-FDS |
| Citation | 197 F.Supp.3d 298 |
| Parties | Frank NOLET, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Catharina ARMSTRONG, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Frank Nolet, Bridgewater, MA, pro se.
James A. Bello, Dylan A. Knapp, Morrison, Mahoney LLP, Abigail L. Fee, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, MA, Jessica A. King, Koufman & Frederick, LLP, Salem, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
This is an action brought by a state prisoner for alleged medical malpractice arising out of injuries he suffered during surgery while in state custody. Plaintiff Frank Nolet, a prisoner at the Old Colony Correctional Center ("OCCC") in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, has filed a self-prepared § 1983 civil rights complaint against a number of defendants in their official and individual capacities. Those defendants are (1) Dr. Catharina Armstrong (of the Lemuel Shattuck Hospital ("LSH")); (2) Dr. Donna Roy (of LSH); (3) Dr. Kenneth Freedman (of LSH); (4) Dr. John Jameson (of LSH); (5) Dr. Joshua Lilienstein (of LSH); (6) Dr. [Joseph] Polak (of LSH); (7) Dr. [James] Petros (of LSH); (8) Thomas Groblewski (Medical Director for the Massachusetts Department of Correction); (9) Paul Caratazzola (Health Service Administrator at OCCC); (10) Shawna Nasuti (Nurse Practitioner at OCCC); (11) Linda Roza (Nurse Practitioner at OCCC); (12) LSH Chief of Surgery; and (13) LSH Hospital Administrator.
Nolet alleges a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims for negligence and medical malpractice under Massachusetts law. It appears that those claims are brought against all defendants. As relief, Nolet seeks a declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages, and an order providing that he continue on his pain medication without any decrease absent court approval.
Defendants Groblewski, Caratazzola, Nasuti, and Roza (the "DOC" defendants) have moved to dismiss the claims against them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Dr. Freedman, Dr. Jameson, and Dr. Lilienstein (the "Commonwealth defendants") have moved to dismiss the claims against them for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state claim for which relief can be granted. Defendant Dr. Roy has moved to dismiss the claims against her under Rule 12(b)(6) and for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60B.
For the following reasons, DOC defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part, and the motion for summary judgment will be denied without prejudice; Commonwealth defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part; and Dr. Roy's motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.
The facts are set forth as described in the complaint.
The complaint alleges that in April 2013, while a prisoner at Old Colony Correctional Center, Nolet experienced trouble breathing and standing, and, after being seen by OCCC Health Services staff, was transported by ambulance to Morton Hospital. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-13). After being stabilized at Morton, it was determined that Nolet should be transferred to Lemuel Shattuck Hospital for further treatment and recovery; the complaint states that "Plaintiff believes that [the decision to transfer Nolet to LSH] was implemented by defendant Thomas Groblewski." (Id. ¶¶ 16-17).1
Nolet was placed directly into the Intensive Care Unit at LSH. (Id. ¶ 20). The complaint alleges that defendants Doctors Jameson, Lilienstein, Freedman, Roy, Armstrong, Polak, and Petros were all "in charge of or assisted in [Nolet's] care ... and treatment" at LSH. (Id. ¶ 4).2 The LSH doctors performed "[c]hest x-rays, CT scans
, and bloodwork" on Nolet, and informed him that he had "severe pneumonia," for which they recommended placement of a "jejunostomy tube (‘j-tube’) for [ ] assistance in feeding." (Id. ¶¶ 22-23). According to the complaint, the LSH doctors told Nolet they had completed "j-tube" operations "numerous times," and that it "was a routine operation." (Id. ¶ 24). The complaint further alleges that Nolet "was never informed of the extreme risk of bodily injury or serious disfigurement" in having the operation. (Id. ¶ 27). Because of his weakened state and the doctors' assurances that the surgery was a normal procedure, Nolet consented to the operation. (Id. ).
The complaint alleges that the next thing Nolet remembers was waking up in the ICU at the Boston Medical Center ("BMC"). (Id. ¶ 30). He was informed that when the LSH doctors attempted to put the j-tube in his stomach, they had ruptured his bowels causing an infection to spread throughout Nolet's body. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 34). Nolet was told he had been rushed to BMC for "additional emergency surgeries," that he had sepsis upon his arrival at BMC, and that "it was assumed that he would not survive." (Id. ¶¶ 33-35).
Nolet remained at BMC for three or four months and underwent various additional surgical procedures to repair the bowel injury. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37). He alleges that thereafter he was transferred to LSH against his will, where he stayed two to three weeks before being transferred back to OCCC. (Id. ¶¶ 36-40).
After his return to OCCC, Nolet was prescribed dressing
changes several times a day "when informed to do so by defendants Paul Caratazzola, Shawna Nasuti, and Linda Roza," as well as pain medication for his wound. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42).3
In 2014, Nolet went back to BMC for a follow-up appointment, at which time the BMC surgeons allegedly informed him that they were unable to close the surgical site due to infection. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44). In March 2015, Nolet was taken to a plastic surgeon at BMC who examined his open wound
and called in other BMC surgeons for consultation. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47). The complaint alleges that one of the consulting surgeons "looked shocked" when he saw Nolet's wound, and "implied that this wound was one of the worst wounds he ha[d] seen." (Id. ¶¶ 49-51). The surgeon told Nolet that "the wound needed to be better cared for," and changed the wound-care procedures. (Id. ¶ 53). He further told Nolet that he was "upset with the progress of the wound healing [ ] and the lack of treatment [Nolet] had been receiving." (Id. ¶ 54).
The complaint alleges that, at least as of the time of filing, Nolet's wound
remains open, he is still in pain, and that he has been told that he "will likely need numerous skin grafts." (Id. ¶¶ 56-58). He further alleges that defendants Caratazzola and Roza are improperly "taking him off [his] pain medication." (Id. ¶ 58).
Nolet filed the complaint in this case on April 16, 2015. The complaint brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment () and a claim for medical malpractice (which the Court will deem Count Two); all claims appear to be asserted against all defendants.4 Defendants Groblewski, Caratazzola, Nasuti, and Roza have moved to dismiss the claims against them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Dr. Freedman, Dr. Jameson, and Dr. Lilienstein have moved to dismiss the claims against them for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state claim for which relief can be granted. Defendant Dr. Roy has moved to dismiss the claims against her under Rule 12(b)(6) and for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 60B.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court "must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and give plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom." Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. , 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino , 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1999) ). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Dismissal is appropriate if the facts as alleged do not "possess enough heft to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief." Ruiz Rivera v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC , 521 F.3d 76, 84 (1st Cir.2008) (quotations and original alterations omitted).
Defendants Groblewski, Caratazzola, Nasuti, and Roza (the "DOC defendants") have moved to dismiss the claims against them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under § 1983 or Massachusetts common law. In the alternative, DOC defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 on the ground that Nolet failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
State prison officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment if they exhibit a "deliberate indifference" to a pretrial detainee's serious medical needs. See Feeney v. Correctional Med. Servs. , 464 F.3d 158, 161–62 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 105–06, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ). In order to succeed on a...
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