Noll v. OM Scott & Sons Company

Decision Date27 September 1972
Docket Number71-1519.,No. 71-1518,71-1518
Citation467 F.2d 295
PartiesClyde M. NOLL and S. Joseph Fortunato, as Trustees, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The O. M. SCOTT & SONS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Stanley L. Amberg and William F. Kilgannon, New York City, for Noll and Fortunato; Richard Whiting, Davis, Hoxie, Faithfull & Hapgood, Alfred H. Hemingway, Jr., New York City, on brief; Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Robert T. Keeler, Cincinnati, Ohio, James O. Seymour, Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, Columbus, Ohio, of counsel.

John D. Nies, Arlington, Va., for O. M. Scott & Sons Co.; Richard D. Multer, Strauch, Nolan, Neale, Nies & Kurz, Arlington, Va., on brief; Richard J. Brentlinger, Gingher & Christensen, Columbus, Ohio, of counsel.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge, and McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment for defendant in a patent infringement action. A brief outline of the facts is essential to an understanding of the issues presented to this court. Reference is made to the comprehensive opinion of District Judge Joseph P. Kinneary reported at 169 U.S.P.Q. 336 (1971) for a more complete discussion of the facts.

The patent in suit, No. 2,678,625, was granted on May 11, 1954, to Arthur Schwerdle as assignor to Vineland Chemical Company on an application filed in July 1951. It is directed to selective post-emergent herbicides, describing and claiming a method of destroying crabgrass while doing little or no harm to desirable grasses. Schwerdle discovered the selective herbicidal qualities of disodium methyl arsonate (DSMA) in 1949. In 1950 and 1951 he offered samples of DSMA to O. M. Scott and Sons for testing and evaluation. At that time he identified the samples only as an organic arsenic compound. Scott was impressed with the samples, requested more material for further testing, and began consideration of a dry formulation of the material for commercial use.

In 1954 Schwerdle began marketing "Crab-E-Rad," a wet spray formulation of DSMA. In response to Scott's inquiry, Schwerdle disclosed the DSMA was the herbicidally active ingredient of Crab-E-Rad and was identical with the samples furnished Scott since 1950. Scott's plan to market a dry formulation of DSMA became fixed in 1955. Inquiry was made of Schwerdle as to his ability to supply Scott with substantial quantities of DSMA. Shipments to Scott commenced in April 1956 and Scott began marketing its dry formulation under the name "Clout" by early summer. Scott purchased its DSMA requirements from Schwerdle until March 1957, paying patent royalties of $0.555 per pound. Thereafter, purchases were made from others without payment of any royalties.

We digress from the above chronology to discuss related events. Schwerdle had been an officer and employee of American Research Associates (ARA) from mid-1945 through August 1949. A co-worker accidentally had discovered the selective herbicidal qualities of phenyl mercuric acetate, an organic mercury compound. Schwerdle was placed in charge of a program for evaluation of organic arsenic compounds for similar activity. He procured several of such compounds and forwarded them to Rhode Island University in May 1949 for testing. One of the compounds sent was DSMA. Schwerdle left ARA in August 1949 to form a partnership with his wife under the name Vineland Chemical Company. The test results from the University were not reported to ARA until November 1949. Schwerdle, unaware of the University test results, undertook his own testing of DSMA in September 1949. The results of these tests showed the chemical's effectiveness, culminating in the patent at issue.

In November 1955 ARA asserted ownership of the patent by virtue of Schwerdle's employment. An action was brought against Schwerdle in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that ARA was the equitable owner of the patent and demanding assignment of the patent to it. In January 1959, a lengthy opinion was filed, disposing of the litigation, which had been extremely bitter because of personal animosity between the litigants. The court in essence found that both parties had been guilty of grossly inequitable conduct and refused to lend the aid of its equitable powers to either of them. In an unusual turn of events, the court was persuaded by counsel to withdraw and impound its opinion, permitting the parties to stipulate to dismissal without an adjudication on the merits but with prejudice, in order to enter a settlement agreement. The agreement assigned the patent to a trust, with counsel for the parties designated as trustees, and granted each of the parties nonexclusive licenses. The trustees were to license the patent to responsible formulators, accounting to the parties for royalties received on an equal basis. The trustees carried out the terms of the agreement, licensing formulators of DSMA and other organic arsenic compounds.

We return to the present suit. The trustees filed this patent infringement action in 1962, alleging that Scott had directly infringed and actively induced infringement of the Schwerdle patent through its marketing of Clout. Scott interposed the typical array of defenses: non-infringement; invalidity by reason of lack of novelty, obviousness, vagueness and overbreadth; and unenforceability by reason of laches, misuse and lack of title. By final pretrial order the issues were reduced to the infringement of claim 2 and the defenses of overbreadth and vagueness, obviousness, lack of novelty and misuse. Following an extensive trial, Judge Kinneary found that claim 2 was invalid for overclaiming, but valid with respect to the asserted lack of novelty, vagueness and obviousness; that no misuse had been proved; and that the claim would have been infringed if valid.1

The trustees appeal from the holding of invalidity. Scott cross-appeals from the holding of infringement and enforceability.

I. VALIDITY

Claim 2, construed to include all the limitations of generic claim 1 from which it depends, 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(c), reads as follows:

"The method of selectively controlling the growth of crabgrass which comprises applying to an area containing crabgrass a composition comprising a mixture of at least one arsenic compound selected from the group consisting of arsonic acids and having the formula:
where R is methyl, and salts thereof; and an inert diluent therefor, in a concentration and amount sufficient to destroy crabgrass but insufficient to destroy material quantities of the useful grasses and plants."

The structural formula of the claim represents methyl arsonic acid. The "salts" of this acid are those chemical compounds in which one or both of the hydrogen ions, represented in the formula by the symbol "H", are replaced by another ion. DSMA is one of the sodium salts in which both hydrogen ions are replaced by sodium ions. In the other sodium salt (monosodium methyl arsonate) only one hydrogen is so replaced. Because of the vast number of ions capable of replacing hydrogen in methyl arsonic acid, there are literally thousands of salts of this acid. Thus, the number of "mixtures of at least one arsenic compound selected from the group consisting of methyl arsonic acid, . . . and salts thereof" is virtually unlimited.

Scott introduced into evidence the results of ex parte tests of various organic arsenic compounds conducted in 1962. Judge Kinneary found that these tests "demonstrated that copper methyl arsonate and phenyl mercury methyl arsonate are inoperable compounds because they were not selective." 169 U.S.P.Q. at 357. Bound by what it comprehended to be the per se rule of this Circuit that inoperativeness of some subject matter literally within the scope of the claim mandated a holding of invalidity, the District Court held claim 2 invalid. The court relied on the line of Sixth Circuit cases beginning with Kalle & Co. v. Multazo Co., 109 F.2d 321, modified, 110 F.2d 814 (1940). As stated in Kalle:

"Where within a general classification disclosed by the claims, are compounds which do not answer the description of the specification, even though there be a general quality common to them all, yet if there be no common quality in respect to their effectiveness in achieving the inventive concept, claims for their exclusive use cannot be sustained." 109 F.2d at 325.

The trustees seek to distinguish this line of cases on the ground that they presented situations where the alleged infringement involved subject matter within the scope of the asserted generic claim but not specifically described in the specification. It is urged that the Kalle rule is inapplicable to cases where the infringer has appropriated the invention both as broadly claimed and specifically described, and that claim 2 should be construed in light of the specification to embrace only operative methyl arsonates.

We are unable to adopt this distinction. The first difficulty in this approach lies in its application. It is often stated that the claims define the invention and that limitations in the specification will not be incorporated into unambiguous claims to uphold their validity. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277, 69 S.Ct. 535, 93 L.Ed. 672 (1949) (Graver I). Yet it is also stated "that claims are to be construed in the light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view to ascertaining the invention." United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49, 86 S.Ct. 708, 713, 15 L.Ed.2d 572 (1966). We have considered the numerous cases on this issue and find the limitation-construction distinction to be unworkable. For example, in Graver I, the Court refused to "limit" claims broadly reciting metallic silicates to those operative metallic silicates set forth in the specification, while in Adams, claims omitting any recitation of an electrolyte were "construed" to...

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