Nordan v. Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC

Citation382 F.Supp.2d 801
Decision Date11 August 2005
Docket NumberNo. 5:05-CV-48-FL(1).,5:05-CV-48-FL(1).
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
PartiesRichard P. NORDAN, as Ancillary Administrator for the separate Estates of Stephen S. Helvenston, Mike R. Teague, Jerko Gerald Zovko and Wesley J.K. Batalona, Plaintiff, v. BLACKWATER SECURITY CONSULTING, LLC; Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, Inc., and Justin L. McQuown, Defendants.

David F. Kirby, William B. Bystrynski, Kirby & Holt, Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiff.

Kirk G. Warner, Mark A. Ash, Smith Anderson Blount Dorsett Mitchell & Jernigan, Rachel Beaulieu Esposito, Patricia L. Holland, Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog, Raleigh, NC, for Defendants.

ORDER

FLANAGAN, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendants' motions to dismiss (DE # `s 5 & 8), and plaintiff's motion to remand (DE # 12). Plaintiff responded in opposition to the motions to dismiss, and defendants responded in opposition to the motion to remand. In this posture, the issues raised are ripe for ruling. For the reasons that follow, the court grants plaintiff's motion to remand and denies as moot defendants' motions to dismiss.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 5, 2005, in the Superior Court of Wake County, North Carolina, asserting claims arising out of the deaths of four security personnel assigned to work in the vicinity of Fallujah, Iraq. In the complaint, plaintiff asserts two state law claims for wrongful death and fraud.

On January 24, 2005, defendants filed a notice of removal in this court asserting federal question jurisdiction on the basis of "complete preemption" and "unique federal interests." (Notice of Removal, ¶¶ 34, 36). On January 31, 2005, defendants Blackwater Security Consulting, LLC, and Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, Inc. ("Blackwater") filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b), on the basis of a defense of preemption under the Defense Base Act ("DBA"), and for failure to state a claim. On February 1, 2005, defendant Justin L. McQuown ("McQuown") filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), also asserting a defense of preemption under the DBA or the related Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).

On February 11, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to remand to state court, arguing that the complaint only asserts state law claims, and that the DBA and LHWCA do not completely preempt the asserted claims. On March 7, 2005, defendants responded in opposition to the motion to remand, attaching copies of contracts referenced in the complaint and compensation benefits decisions by the United States Department of Labor, pertaining to the decedents in this action. Plaintiff replied on March 17, 2005, objecting to consideration of evidence outside the complaint, and arguing that neither complete preemption nor unique federal interests served to establish jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiff also responded to defendants' separate motions to dismiss, to which defendants have replied.

STATEMENT OF ALLEGED FACTS

The facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint may be summarized as follows. On March 8, 2004, defendant Blackwater, and another entity, Regency Hotel and Hospital Company ("Regency") entered into a contract ("security contract") with ESS Support Services Worldwide ("ESS") to provide security services "for ESS's catering operations in the Middle East." (Compl., ¶ 21). On March 12, 2004, defendant Blackwater entered into a sub-contract ("sub-contract") with Regency, which gave defendant Blackwater control over security details. On March 25, 2004, Stephen S. Helvenston, Mike R. Teague, Jerko Gerald Zovko and Wesley J.K. Batalona (hereinafter the "decedents") entered into "Independent Contractor Service Agreements" with Blackwater, which expressly incorporated the terms of the sub-contract and contract.

At the time the decedents entered into the Independent Contractor Service Agreements, Blackwater representatives told them that they would be performing security services in Iraq, with the following precautions mandated by the primary contract:

A. "[E]ach security mission would be handled by a team of no less than six (6) members."

B. "[E]ach security mission would be performed in armored vehicles."

C. "[S]ecurity teams would be comprised of at least two armored vehicles, with at least three security contractors in each vehicle, which would provide for a driver, a navigator, and a rear-gunner."

D. "[T]he rear-gunner would have a heavy automatic weapon, such as a `SAW Mach 46,' which could fire up to 850 rounds per minute, allowing the gunner to fight off any attacks from the rear."

E. There would be "at least 24-hours notice prior to any security mission."

F. "[E]ach security detail mission would be subject to a Risk Assessment completed prior to the mission, and that if the threat level was too high, they would have the option of not performing the mission."

G. There would be an "opportunity to review the travel routes, gather intelligence about each mission, do a pre-trip inspection of the route and determine the proper logistics to carry out the security detail."

H. The security detail "would arrive in the Middle East and have at least 21 days prior to any operations to become acclimated to the area, learn the lay of the land, gather intelligence, and learn safe routes through the area."

(Compl., ¶ 13). The decedents relied upon these representations in entering into the Independent Contractor Security Agreements.

In preparing decedents for work under the Independent Contractor Security Agreements, Blackwater representatives conducted training and preparation programs for security missions in Iraq. One of the representatives who conducted training, defendant McQuown, "failed to provide adequate training and intelligence data" to decedents, (Compl., ¶ 28), and "harbored extreme animosity toward decedent Scott Helvenston relating to Helventson's superior credentials, abilities, training, education, experience and knowledge." (Compl., ¶ 40).

Furthermore, plaintiff alleges that the training programs and preparations provided for decedents were compromised by defendant Blackwater's interest in higher profits. Decedents were not given twenty-one (21) days preparation time prior to operations in Iraq, and, as such, were not permitted to become acclimated to the area, learn the lay of the land, gather intelligence, or learn safe routes through Iraq. Rather, on March 27, 2004 they "were advised that they would be leaving in two days for Baghdad to start their first mission." (Compl., ¶ 43). Specifically, although decedent Helvenston was physically ill, defendant McQuown ordered Helvenston to depart for Baghdad at 5:00 a.m. on March 29, 2004, to join the three other decedents for a security mission.

On March 30, 2004, Helvenston, Teague, Zovko and Batalona were directed to conduct a security mission for Blackwater. Pursuant to mission directions, the decedents were required to "escort three ESS flatbed trucks" carrying food supplies, "from the City of Taji to a U.S. Army base in Iraq," known as Camp Ridgeway, on the outskirts of the City of Fallujah. (Comp., ¶¶ 21, 57, 59). At the time, Fallujah was "universally known to be extremely hostile territory in control of Iraqi insurgents." (Compl., ¶ 59).

Even though the decedents were entering hostile territory, defendant Blackwater failed to provide the decedents with the protections, tools and information that it initially promised to provide. Specifically, a Blackwater representative refused to provide maps of the area and told decedents that it was "too late for maps." (Compl., ¶ 55). In addition, defendant did not provide them with the minimum number of six members on the security detail team, although six members were available. Defendant did not provide them with armored vehicles, and defendant did not permit them to have three team members in each vehicle, which resulted in each vehicle containing only a driver and a navigator, but no rear-gunner to quell any attacks.

Moreover, it is alleged, defendant did not provide them with heavy automatic machine guns, but instead merely with semi-automatic rifles, which had not even been tested or sighted. Likewise, defendant did not provide decedents with twenty-four (24) hours notice or a Risk Assessment prior to the March 30, 2004 security mission. Finally, defendant did not provide them with the opportunity to gather intelligence concerning the travel route or to do a pre-route inspection. In sum, the decedents were obligated to set out on their mission grossly under-prepared for the risks they faced.

Because the decedents "had not been able to perform a pre-trip analysis of their route and [were] denied maps and logistical information concerning the area, they set out toward Camp Ridgeway on a road which led directly through the heart of the hostile Fallujah." (Compl., ¶ 60). "Unbeknownst to them, there was an alternative, safer route which led around the outskirts of Fallujah and would have only taken them approximately two and a half hours longer to get to Camp Ridgeway." (Id.).

"Without having any information about the route or even a map of the area, they became lost and ended up driving through the center of the City of Fallujah." (Compl., ¶ 17). "While stopped in traffic, several armed Iraqi insurgents walked up behind these two unarmored vehicles and repeatedly shot these four Americans at point blank range, dragged them from their vehicles, beat, burned and disfigured them and desecrated their remains." (Id.). In particular, "two of the burnt bodies were strung up from a bridge over the Euphrates River for all of the world to see." (Compl., ¶ 61).

In support of the wrongful death claim, plaintiff alleges that "[w]hen the Defendants sent Helvenston, Teague, Zovko and Batalona out on this security mission in this condition, without the proper...

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