Norfolk Airport Authority v. Nordwall, 921894

• Decision Date: 05 November 1993
• Docket Number: No. 921894,921894
• Parties: , 144 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2644 NORFOLK AIRPORT AUTHORITY, v. Carl M. NORDWALL. Record
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 436

436 S.E.2d 436

246 Va. 391, 144 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2644

NORFOLK AIRPORT AUTHORITY, v. Carl M. NORDWALL.

Record No. 921894.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Nov. 5, 1993.

William M. Furr, Norfolk (Conrad M. Shumadine; Willcox & Savage, on briefs), for appellant.

Henry E. Howell, III, Virginia Beach, for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

STEPHENSON, Justice.

The principal question in this appeal is whether Code § 40.1-61, a part of Virginia's Right to Work Law, prevents a government employer from prohibiting one of its supervisory employees from joining a union.

Carl M. Nordwall filed a motion for judgment against Norfolk Airport Authority (the Authority) alleging, inter alia, that the Authority violated the Right to Work Law, Code § 40.1-58 et seq., when it terminated Nordwall's employment because he joined a union. In a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the termination of Nordwall's employment because of his union membership violated Code § 40.1-61. Consequently, the court reinstated Nordwall to his former position with the Authority, directed the Authority to restore Nordwall's benefits, and awarded Nordwall damages in the amount of $17,875.71 for lost wages and benefits during the period of his termination. We awarded the Authority an appeal from the trial court's judgment.

The evidence germane to this appeal can be stated briefly and, in accordance with established appellate principles, will be stated in the light most favorable to Nordwall, the prevailing party at trial. The Authority is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth whose primary function is the operation of the Norfolk International Airport. The Authority's fire fighters are public employees. As such, neither they nor their union have any collective bargaining rights, Code § 40.1-57.2, ¹ and the employees are prohibited from striking, Code § 40.1-55.

Prior to his termination, Nordwall had worked for the Authority for nine years. He began as a fire fighter, and, at the time he was discharged, he held the rank of captain.

As captain, Nordwall was the shift commander and was responsible for fighting all fires on the airport property. At times, when neither the fire chief nor the deputy fire chief is at the airport, the captain is the highest ranking fire official.

On August 29, 1991, Nordwall joined Local 3406 of the International Association of Fire Fighters. On August 30, 1991, the Authority placed Nordwall on administrative leave with pay, and, on September 6, 1991, the Authority terminated Nordwall's employment.

The Authority's Executive Director, called by Nordwall as an adverse witness, testified that he had full discretion and made the final decisions regarding personnel matters. He stated that Nordwall was discharged "because ... as captain in the fire department he ... joined a union, which we felt was in conflict with his loyalty and his duties to the authority." ²

The trial court made a factual finding that Nordwall's employment was terminated because he joined the union. The Authority claims that the finding is not supported by the evidence. We do not agree.

A factual finding of a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is "plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Code § 8.01-680. In the present case, the Authority's Executive Director stated unequivocally that Nordwall was fired because he joined the union. Clearly, the evidence supports the trial court's finding.

Turning to the statute, Code § 40.1-61 provides that "[n]o person shall be required by an employer to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment." This section is consistent with the declared public policy of the Commonwealth that "the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization." Code § 40.1-58.

The Authority contends that Code § 40.1-61 does not protect Nordwall because he is a supervisory employee. The Authority notes that the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the Federal Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., exclude supervisory employees from their protection. Thus, the Authority asserts, if Virginia's Right to Work Law were read to extend its protection to supervisors when the federal labor acts exclude such protection, the Right to Work Law would "innovate upon, unsettle and disregard an entire body of labor law." Additionally, the Authority argues that the application of Code § 40.1-61 to supervisory employees would lead to an absurd and irrational result because it would allow captains to be in the same union with subordinate fire fighters, thereby compromising the captain's authority.

Nordwall contends, on the other hand, that, by its plain and unambiguous language, Code § 40.1-61 affords him protection. He disputes the contention that this interpretation of the statute will lead to an absurd result and asserts that the provisions of the federal labor acts have no bearing on his case.

We are unpersuaded by the Authority's reliance upon the federal statutes. Federal labor law does not apply to employees of the states or their political subdivisions. The regulation of such employees is left entirely to the states. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1793, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Therefore, we must look to Code § 40.1-61.

It is well established that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must accept its plain meaning and not...