Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia

Citation104 S.Ct. 304,78 L.Ed.2d 29,464 U.S. 30
Decision Date01 November 1983
Docket NumberNo. 81-2332,81-2332
PartiesNORFOLK REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY, Etc. v. CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus

Respondent Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia (C & P) was required to relocate some of its transmission facilities by reason of a street realignment resulting from federally funded urban renewal projects carried out in Norfolk, Va., by petitioner Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA), a political subdivision of the State. C & P sought reimbursement from NRHA for the expenses incurred in this relocation, claiming that it was a "displaced person" within the meaning of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (Act), which provides in 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1) that any person displaced from his home or place of business by a federal or federally funded project is entitled to relocation benefits, including reimbursement for the "actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, business, farm operation, or other personal property." After receiving administrative rejections, C & P sued NRHA in Federal District Court, which denied relief. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Held: C & P is not a "displaced person" within the meaning of the Act. The Act did not change the long-established common-law principle that a utility forced to relocate from a public right-of-way must do so at its own expense. An analysis of the Act—the purposes of which were to ensure that persons displaced by federal and federally funded programs would receive uniform treatment and would not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole—and of its legislative history, particularly as it relates to the relocation provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 as a model for the provisions at issue here, shows that in passing the Act Congress addressed the needs of residential and business tenants and owners, and did not deal with the separate problem posed by the relocation of utility service lines. Pp. 307 - 311.

674 F.2d 298, reversed.

Francis N. Crenshaw, Norfolk, Va., for the petitioner.

Joshua I. Schwartz, Washington, D.C., for the federal respondent in support of the petitioner.

Joseph L. Kelly, Norfolk, Va., for respondent Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia.

Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (C & P) was required to relocate some of its telephone transmission facilities by reason of a street realignment. It sought compensation from petitioner Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA), the local government agency responsible for the urban renewal plan which caused the street realignment. C & P claimed that it was a "displaced person" as that term is defined in the Uniform Relocation Act,1 passed by Congress in 1970. We hold that C & P is not a "displaced person" within the meaning of the Act.

The Relocation Act provides that any person "displaced" from his home or place of business by a federal or federally-funded project is entitled to relocation benefits, including reimbursement for the "actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, business, farm operation, or other personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1). The Act by its terms binds only federal agencies; but a federal agency may not provide funds for state projects involving condemnation without first receiving "satisfactory assurances" that displaced persons will be given such relocation payments and assistance "as are required to be provided by a Federal agency" under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4630. In order to qualify for federal funds, therefore, many states, such as Virginia, see Va.Code § 25-235 et seq. (repl.1980), have adopted legislation modelled on the Relocation Act.

NRHA is a political subdivision of the state of Virginia, located in the City of Norfolk. During the 1960's, NRHA began four redevelopment projects in Norfolk for which federal funds were provided under the urban renewal program contained in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.IV) § 1450et seq.2 The development plans approved by the City and carried out by NRHA required the reshaping of certain land parcels, which in turn required a realignment of street patterns. After acquiring the land on both sides of the streets in question, NRHA successfully petitioned the City to close off those streets or parts thereof. Stipulations of Fact 5-6, App. 39-41. New streets were constructed in accordance with the development plans.

C & P is a privately-owned utility company engaged in the business of selling telephone and other telecommunication services in the city of Norfolk and throughout Virginia. To serve its customers, C & P had placed telephone transmission facilities, including manholes, conduits, cables and accessory fittings, within the public rights-of-way of certain streets throughout Norfolk, including streets within the urban renewal project areas.3 When the streets were realigned, C & P was forced to relocate some of its facilities. The manholes and conduits, too massive to move, were simply abandoned in place. The telephone cables were withdrawn and, for the most part, sold for their scrap value, though some cable was stored for possible reuse. Tr. 41 (testimony of Mr. Tucker), App. 100-101. Substitute facilities were installed beneath the new streets to prevent any interruption in service.

C & P sought reimbursement from NRHA for the expenses it incurred in this relocation, claiming that it was a "displaced person" within the meaning of the Relocation Act.4 After a series of administrative rejections, C & P sued NRHA in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.5 The District Court denied relief to C & P, but on appeal its decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 674 F.2d 298, for the Fourth Circuit. That court held that the definitional provisions of the Relocation Act compelled the conclusion that a utility was not excluded from the definition of "displaced person" under the Act, and that C & P was entitled to compensation as a "displaced person" for the sort of expenses incurred here.

We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals. --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. ----, 77 L.Ed.2d --- (1983). We now reverse. Our analysis of the statute and its legislative history convinces us that in passing the Relocation Act Congress addressed the needs of residential and business tenants and owners, and did not deal with the separate problem posed by the relocation of utility service lines. We hold, therefore, that the Relocation Act did not change the long-established common law principle that a utility forced to relocate from a public right-of-way must do so at its own expense; it is not a "displaced person" as that term is defined in the Act.

There is no doubt that a utility company could, under certain circumstances, be a "displaced person" within the meaning of the Relocation Act. Businesses as well as natural persons are eligible for relocation benefits.6 Thus, for example, if a branch office of C & P were located in a building condemned by the NRHA, C & P might well be entitled to recover the cost of moving its office equipment and furnishings. C & P, just like any other legitimate business, would be "displaced" by the federally-funded project. But whether C & P can be said to be "displaced" within the meaning of the Act when it relocates telephone lines because an urban renewal project calls for realignment of existing street patterns is a different question which requires more detailed analysis. When streets containing utility conduits are realigned, C & P is not "just like any other legitimate business;" it faces a problem unique to utilities.

Under the traditional common law rule, utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local authorities. 12 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 34.74a (3d ed. 1970); 4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 15.22 (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1970). This rule was recognized and approved by this Court as long ago as New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drainage Comm., 197 U.S. 453, 462, 25 S.Ct. 471, 474, 49 L.Ed. 831 (1905) (holding that the injury sustained by the utility is damnum absque injuria ).

It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that "[t]he common law . . . ought not to be deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose." Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623, 3 L.Ed. 453 (1812).7 Since the elements of the federal law of eminent domain are largely derived from the common law, see, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943), this canon of construction has a force in this case that it might not have in other contexts of federal statutory construction. We must, therefore, be satisfied that Congress addressed the problem of utility relocation costs in the Relocation Act before we can conclude that C & P is entitled to the benefits it seeks. "As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of the[ ] statute[ ] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve." Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1911, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979).

The passage of the Relocation Act in 1970 ended a decade of close consideration of the problems faced by persons displaced by federal and federally-funded projects. See Alexander v. U.S. Dept. of HUD, 441 U.S. 39, 49, 99 S.Ct. 1572, 1580, 60 L.Ed.2d 28 (1979). The principal sponsor of the bill, Senator Muskie, noted that over 50 federal programs resulted in condemnation proceedings and that the victims of such proceedings received...

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