Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Board of Supervisors, No. 1:00CV484-B-D (N.D. Miss. 5/30/2002)
| Decision Date | 30 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:00CV484-B-D.,1:00CV484-B-D. |
| Parties | NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF ALCORN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, MISSISSIPPI-ALABAMA RAILROAD AUTHORITY and REDMONT RAILWAY COMPANY, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This cause comes before the court on the following motions: the motion for partial judgment as to the issue of federal preemption filed by the Board of Supervisors of Alcorn County, Mississippi [Board of Supervisors], the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment filed by Illinois Central Railroad Company [Illinois Central], the joint motion for summary judgment filed by Mississippi-Alabama Railroad Authority [MARA] and Redmont Railway Company, Inc. [Redmont] and the motion for summary judgment filed by Norfolk Southern Railway Company [Norfolk Southern]. Having held oral argument on these motions on May 13, 2002 and upon due consideration of the parties' memoranda and exhibits, the court is ready to rule.
At issue in this declaratory action is an order issued by the Board of Supervisors on October 2, 2000 requiring Norfolk Southern, MARA and Redmont to pay the costs of increasing the weight limits of five overhead bridges in Alcorn County, Mississippi. The following facts are undisputed. For an unspecified number of years prior to 1988, Illinois Central owned and operated railroad tracks stretching from Fulton, Kentucky to Haleyville, Alabama that passed through Alcorn County, Mississippi. Illinois Central sold the line in 1988 to Norfolk Southern. In 1995, after a few years of operation, Norfolk Southern considered abandoning a section of the line here under consideration, but decided rather to convey it to MARA, which presently owns the tracks. Redmont agreed to lease the line acquired by MARA and has operated the line since that time. It was stipulated at the hearing on this matter that the section of the line presently owned by MARA and operated by Redmont covers only forty-one miles and services only a single train per week on behalf of one business, a petfood manufacturer.
Shortly prior to the date of the order at issue, Alcorn County's engineers examined the weight-bearing limits of five public roadway bridges that traverse over the tracks owned by MARA and operated by Redmont and thereby discovered that the maximum capacity of each bridge was well below the average weight of a school bus.1 In response to the finding of the county engineers, the Board of Supervisors rerouted its school buses and issued the order mandating Norfolk Southern, MARA and Redmont to pay an estimated cost of $1,905,000 to increase the weight capacity of the bridges so that school buses can safely travel over them. Illinois Central was not named in the order. The order was expressly issued pursuant to Miss. Code. § 77-9-251 which imposes a duty on railroad companies to "erect and keep in order" bridges at railroad-highway crossings.2
Norfolk Southern filed the instant action on December 5, 2000, requesting this court to declare the Board of Supervisors' order and Miss. Code. § 77-9-251 as void and to permanently enjoin the Board of Supervisors from enforcing the order. The complaint names the Board of Supervisors, MARA, Redmont and Illinois Central as co-defendants. Shortly thereafter, the Board of Supervisors filed cross-claims against MARA and Redmont. On May 13, 2002, the court held a hearing on the motions filed in this cause. At the hearing the parties stipulated the absence of a factual dispute with respect to Illinois-Central's liability; accordingly, the court issued a bench ruling granting Illinois-Central's summary judgment motion, leaving MARA, Redmont, Norfolk Southern and the Board of Supervisors as the remaining parties in this action.
On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 275 (1986) (). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the non-movant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-movant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, 552 (1986).
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. Const. art VI, cl.2. As such, any state law that conflicts with federal law is preempted and thus "without effect." Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 422 (1992). The United States Supreme Court has identified three forms of preemption: (1) express preemption, where Congress explicitly defines the extent to which its enactments preempt state law; (2) field preemption, where state law regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively; and (3) conflict preemption, where it is impossible to comply with both state and federal laws, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 L.Ed.3d 65, 74 (1990). The overriding concern in any preemption analysis is the intent of Congress in enacting the federal law. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152, 73 L.Ed.2d 664, 675-676 (1982).
Congress in 1995 significantly changed federal regulation of the railroad industry by enacting the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act [ICCTA], 49 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. ICCTA granted a newly-established regulatory agency, the Surface Transportation Board [STB], jurisdiction over rail transportation in both interstate and intrastate commerce. ICCTA provides:
is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.
49 U.S.C. § 10501. The issue before the court is whether this express provision preempts Miss. Code § 77-9-251 and the Board of Supervisors' order.
As a general rule, there is a presumption, especially in fields where the states have traditionally reigned, that historic police powers should not be preempted by the federal statutes unless preemption was "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 135 L.Ed.2d 700, 715 (1996). The principle gives way, however, when the state or local law at issue bears upon "an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence." United States v. Lock, 529 U.S. 89, 108,146 L.Ed.2d 69, 88 (2000). MARA and Redmont maintain that given Congress' long-established domain over the railroad industry, the traditional presumption against preemption should not apply to this action. At issue in this cause, however, is not the railroad industry generally, but the specific matter of bridges over rail-highway crossings. It has been consistently held that state and local governments have the traditional police power reserved by the United States Constitution to regulate rail-highway crossings and allocate the costs of constructing, maintaining and improving such crossings to railroad companies. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 346 U.S. 346, 98 L.Ed. 51 (1953); Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U.S. 24, 73 L.Ed. 161 (1928); Erie R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U.S. 394, 65 L.Ed. 322 (1921); Southern Ry. Co. v. City of Morristown, 448 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922, 30 L.Ed.2d 792 (1972).3 Miss. Code § 77-9-251, which requires railroad companies to "make proper and easy grades" at rail-highway crossings and "erect and keep in order" all bridges at such crossings, is consistent with the police power of states and local governments to regulate crossings discussed in the aforementioned cases. Accordingly, the court finds that the traditional presumption against supplanting historic state or local police powers applies to this...
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