Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson

• Citation: 740 So.2d 392
• Parties: NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. James E. JOHNSON.
• Decision Date: 30 July 1999
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

740 So.2d 392

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. James E. JOHNSON.

1971524.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 30, 1999.

Crawford S. McGivaren, Jr., and John M. Graham of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, for appellant.

James H. Wettermark of Burge & Wettermark, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.

MADDOX, Justice.

This interlocutory appeal (pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P.) presents a question of first impression, calling for an interpretation of the scope of Ala.Code 1975, § 12-16-8.1, which prevents employers from discharging employees because they serve on juries.

The specific question is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff-employee's complaint alleging wrongful termination. The employer denied that he had been wrongfully terminated and alleged that he had been terminated because of misconduct while he was serving on a jury in a case in which his employer was a defendant. Based on the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court's denial of the employer's motion for summary judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

James E. Johnson was employed by Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk Southern") from 1978 until he was terminated in October 1996. At the time of his termination he was a conductor. The facts leading up to this controversy involve Johnson's jury service in the summer of 1996, when Johnson was summoned for jury duty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. One of the cases on the docket at the time was T.B. Gilbert v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., CV-94-HM-1183-NW. The defendant Norfolk Southern in the Gilbert case is also the defendant in the present action.

This particular litigation arose as a result of Johnson's service as a juror in the Gilbert litigation, and it specifically involves answers Johnson gave during the jurors' voir dire examination in the Gilbert case. The following colloquy occurred between Johnson and the attorney for Norfolk Southern in that case:

"Norfolk Southern's Attorney: ... Mr. Johnson, have you ever had an on-the-job injury?

"Johnson: Nonreportable, everybody— You bump your knees or something like that.

"Attorney: When you say nothing reportable, nothing in your opinion serious enough to report to the company?

"Johnson: Right."

Johnson served on the jury in the Gilbert case. The jury returned a verdict against Norfolk Southern, but in January 1998, the trial judge entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Norfolk Southern.

Notwithstanding the answers Johnson gave on voir dire examination, he in fact had had four previous on-the-job traumatic injuries that he had reported to Norfolk Southern. In fact, Johnson had received medical treatment for three of those injuries. As to one injury, Johnson had settled a claim with Norfolk Southern's claims department for $2,500. Johnson was also a member of a plaintiff class in an action against Norfolk Southern and in that class action he received $8,000 for a hearing-loss claim. Johnson justifies the answers he gave during his voir dire examination in the Gilbert case by saying he thought Norfolk Southern's lawyers had wanted to know only about "serious" injuries. Johnson points out that when the lawyers directed questions to him they had just finished questioning everyone about only "serious" injuries.

As a result of his statements at the voir dire examination in the Gilbert case, Norfolk Southern charged Johnson with conduct unbecoming an employee, pursuant to a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement between Norfolk Southern and Johnson's union. A formal investigation and hearing were conducted, and Norfolk Southern terminated Johnson's employment in October 1996.

Pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement and the Railway Labor Act, Johnson's union filed an administrative appeal of his termination. Norfolk Southern declined that appeal. Johnson then appealed to a Public Law Board. In May 1997, the Public Law Board ordered reinstatement, without backpay for time lost. The Public Law Board's opinion stated:

"The record substantiates that [Johnson] stated that he had not previously sustained any reportable injuries when, in fact, he had. However, we believe that permanent dismissal is excessive. [Johnson] will be reinstated without pay for time lost."

Johnson is presently working for Norfolk Southern.

Johnson later filed this present action against Norfolk Southern, under § 12-16-8.1, Ala.Code 1975, alleging retaliatory discharge. He alleged that he was fired because of his service on a jury that returned a verdict against Norfolk Southern.¹ Section 12-16-8.1(a) reads as follows:

"(a) No employer in this state may discharge any employee solely because he serves on any jury empanelled under any state or federal statute; provided, however, that the employee reports for work on his next regularly scheduled hour after being dismissed from any jury."

Subsection (b) creates a cause of action for any employee discharged in violation of subsection (a).

Norfolk Southern moved for a summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion. Norfolk Southern then moved the court to "reconsider" the denial. In response, the trial court entered an order stating:

"The plaintiff contends that Section 12-16-8.1... protects him from a retaliatory discharge by his employer even if he participates in rendering a verdict adverse to his employer. The defendant contends that § 12-16-8.1 ... only protects the employee for being absent from his job while serving as a juror. The defendant further contends that it has the right to discharge an employee for unbecoming conduct if the employee testifies or makes false statements during the course of the trial. The Court has not found, nor has it been provided, any decisions on this issue. It appears that this may be a case of first impression. Without other precedent the court is of the opinion that § 12-16-8.1 ... provides protection for an employee for more than the mere attendance at trial as a juror as a result of a summons."

The trial court also entered the statement called for by Rule 5(a), Ala. R.App. P., so that Norfolk Southern could seek permission to appeal the interlocutory order. This Court granted Norfolk Southern's petition for permission to appeal the denial of its summary judgment motion.

Issues

This appeal raises three issues:

I. Did the evidence create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee was discharged "solely" for "serving" on the jury that rendered a verdict against his employer (as the employee contends) or was discharged for making false statements during voir dire examination as a prospective juror (as the employee contends)?

II. Did the Public Law Board's finding that the employee had made false statements in the voir dire examination entitle the employer to a judgment as a matter of law in the employee's action, pursuant to § 12-16-8.1, alleging a retaliatory discharge?

III. Did the Public Law Board's ruling have, under the doctrine of res judicata, a preclusive effect that barred the employee's retaliatory-discharge claim brought under § 12-16-8.1?

We will address each issue in turn.

Scope of Review

To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, Norfolk Southern was required to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988). In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court must evaluate the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313, 317 (Ala.1992)(citing Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412, 413 (Ala.1990)).

Analysis

I.

As to the first issue, Norfolk Southern contends that, under the plain language of Ala.Code 1975, § 12-16-8.1., it was entitled to a summary judgment. Norfolk Southern argues that this Court has consistently looked to the "plain language" of a statute in determining its effect. As a result, Norfolk Southern argues, we should interpret § 12-16-8.1, Ala.Code 1975, to simply prohibit an employer from discharging an employee solely because that employee answers a summons to serve on a jury. Under Norfolk Southern's interpretation, the statute would protect only the right of an employee to serve on a jury and would not protect an employee who was alleged to be guilty of misconduct while serving on a jury. Johnson argues that to adopt Norfolk Southern's strict construction of the statute would defeat the purpose of the statute and that the statute "should be construed in a reasonable manner to protect jurors' actions which they take necessary to their jury service."

Is Johnson in the class of persons the Legislature intended to protect by adopting Ala.Code 1975, § 12-16-8.1?

This Court has held that the fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting a statute. IMED Corp. v. Systems Engineering Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992). If possible, a court should gather the legislative intent from the language of the statute itself. Advertiser Co. v. Hobbie, 474 So.2d 93 (Ala.1985). If the statute is ambiguous or uncertain, the court may consider conditions that might arise under the provisions of the statute and examine results that would flow from giving the language in question one particular meaning rather than another. Clark v. Houston County Comm'n, 507 So.2d 902, 903-04 (Ala.1987). The legislative intent may be gleaned from the language used, the reason and necessity for the act, and the purpose sought to be obtained by its passage. Tuscaloosa County Comm'n v. Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n of Tuscaloosa County, 589 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala.1991)(citing Ex parte Holladay, 466 So.2d 956 (A...