Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Denson

• Decision Date: 16 June 2000
• Citation: 774 So.2d 549
• Parties: NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. Vernon L. DENSON. Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. James A. Martin.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

774 So.2d 549

NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. Vernon L. DENSON.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. James A. Martin.

1965.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

June 16, 2000.

Crawford S. McGivaren, Jr., and Steve A. Tucker of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, for appellant.

Clarence M. Small, Jr., Duncan Y. Manley, and Deborah Alley Smith of Rives & Peterson, P.C., Birmingham, for appellees.

James E. Simpson, Stephen A. Rowe, and Jacquelyn A. Gonzales of Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Association of American Railroads.

COOK, Justice.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk Southern") appeals from judgments entered on jury verdicts in two separate actions awarding James A. Martin and Vernon L. Denson $575,000 and $225,000, respectively. We reverse and remand.

Virtually all the facts out of which these actions arose are undisputed. At approximately 2:55 p.m. on March 24, 1995, Martin and Denson, as engineer and conductor, respectively, were operating Norfolk Southern's locomotive number 8741. Martin and Denson had been employed by Norfolk Southern for 27 years and 30 years, respectively. Number 8741 was the lead locomotive on a train consisting of approximately 62 cars. The locomotive was travelling with the "nose," that is, the "short hood," forward. The temperature was in the "low 80s," the locomotive was not air conditioned, and the side windows were down.

As the train arrived in Fulton, at the point at which Norfolk Southern's track intersects Main Street, a tractor-trailer combination operated by Michael Weber and owned by his employer, Francis Powell Enterprises, Inc., attempted to cross the tracks in front of the train. When Martin realized that the truck was not going to stop for the train and that a collision was imminent, he instituted emergency procedures and lay down on the floor of the cab of the locomotive; Denson was already lying down.

The train struck the truck; it proceeded on down the track, dragging the truck and trailer for 1,642 feet before coming to a stop. However, the impact punctured the truck's fuel tank, and, approximately 450 feet from the point of impact, the fuel spilling from the tank ignited. As the train slowed, flames from the burning fuel began coming in the side windows. Consequently, Denson and Martin crawled to the back door to escape the heat. When Denson opened the door, he said, there was a "`poof of fire" and flames began coming into the cab through the opened door.¹ (Reporter's Transcript, at 272.) Both men were severely burned.

They both sued Norfolk Southern, pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. ("FELA"), as well as Powell and others ("the truck defendants"). Martin and Denson eventually settled with the truck defendants for $625,000 and $275,000, respectively. In the trial of the remaining claims in the two actions, the jury considered only two theories of recovery against Norfolk Southern. First, the plaintiffs contended that in providing them with a locomotive that was not air conditioned, Norfolk Southern had failed to provide them a safe place to work. Second, they sought recovery under a theory that Norfolk Southern had failed to train them on how to protect themselves in the event of a collision.

In each case, the trial court denied Norfolk Southern's motions for a judgment as a matter of law as to both claims. The jury returned general verdicts in favor of each plaintiff, decreased by the amounts of the settlements with the truck defendants. To Martin, the jury awarded $575,000 ($1,200,000 [total damages]—$625,000 [received in settlement] = $575,000). To Denson, it awarded $225,000 ($500,000 [total damages]—$275,000 [received in settlement] = $225,000). Norfolk Southern moved for a judgment as a matter of law. When that motion was denied, Norfolk Southern appealed. The Association of American Railroads filed a brief in this Court as amicus curiae.

The appeal presents two dispositive issues. The first is whether the FELA imposes upon Norfolk Southern a duty to provide its conductors and engineers with air-conditioned locomotives. The second is whether the FELA imposed upon Norfolk Southern a duty to train the plaintiffs to take shelter in an area of the locomotive in which, in this case, they would not have been exposed to flames entering the windows.

I. Duty Under the FELA to Provide Air-Conditioned Locomotives

"The FELA provides the exclusive remedy for an injury caused by `the negligence of [the railroad] ... or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its ... equipment.'" Waymire v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 65 F.Supp.2d 951, 953 (S.D.Ind.1999). "To prevail on an FELA negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove the traditional common law elements of negligence: duty, breach of that duty, foreseeability, and causation." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Dansby, 659 So.2d 35, 37 (Ala.1995). "Pursuant to the FELA, a railroad company has the duty to provide its employees with a reasonably safe work environment; it must use reasonable care in fulfilling this duty." Id.

Under this theory of recovery, the plaintiffs reason as follows: (1) the FELA imposes a duty upon Norfolk Southern to provide a safe place to work; (2) because locomotive 8741 was not air conditioned, it was being operated with the windows down; (3) because the windows were down, the flames entered the windows and burned the plaintiffs; (4) because locomotive 8741 was not air conditioned, it was not a safe place to work; and, therefore, (5) the FELA imposes a duty upon Norfolk Southern to equip its locomotives with air conditioning, and it breached that duty in this case.

"While federal law governs the substantive rights of the parties in FELA cases, procedural matters are governed by applicable state rules when [the cases are] tried in state court." Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 786 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.), cert. denied sub nom., Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Mitchell, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 247, 112 L.Ed.2d 205 (1990). The rule in Alabama is that the court, rather than the jury, determines the existence of a duty. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So.2d 834 (Ala.1998). This rule is procedural in nature; it is not a substantive right. 786 S.W.2d at 661. Thus, whether the FELA imposes a duty upon Norfolk Southern to provide its conductors and engineers with air-conditioned locomotives is a question this Court must decide as a matter of law.

In deciding that question, we do not write on a clean slate. The issues before us involve matters that are heavily regulated by Congress. See, e.g., the Federal Railway Safety Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq. (the "FRSA"), and the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq. (the "FLIA") (formerly, the Boiler Inspection Act).

We do not overlook the fact that these actions were based on the FELA, and, therefore, that they do not involve a question of federal preemption of a state-law claim. Instead, we are applying federal common law as informed by Congressional and federal administrative actions. Nevertheless, the issues before us involve policy considerations that closely parallel those involved in preemption cases.

One of the primary goals of preemption is uniformity. "Through the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress may induce uniformity of regulation and eliminate barriers among states by preemption of state regulation." Christi Davis & Douglas M. Branson, Interstate Compacts in Commerce and Industry: A Proposal for "Common Markets Among States," 23 Vt. L.Rev. 133, 135 (1998) (footnote omitted). "Congress frequently states uniformity to be both the goal of its substantive federal legislation and its purpose in enacting express preemption provisions, and the language of those provisions [reflects] the uniformity goal. The examples of ERISA, the FRSA and the Vehicle Safety Act are illustrative." Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 Vill. L.Rev. 1, 19 (1995) (emphasis added). Indeed, the FRSA provides in pertinent part:

"[§ 20101] The purpose of this chapter is to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents."

"[§ 20103] (a) The Secretary of Transportation, as necessary, shall prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety supplementing laws and regulations in effect on October 16, 1970."

"[§ 20106] Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or order—

"(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard;

"(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government; and

"(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce."

(Emphasis added.) See also Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. Doyle, 186 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir.1999) ("The FRSA also advanced the goal of national uniformity of regulation because [§ 20106] expressly preempts state laws regulating rail safety."); Springston v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 130 F.3d 241, 245 (6th Cir.1997) ("Federal law preempts plaintiff's claims based upon the need for extra-statutory warning devices on the train."); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Fordice, 30 F.Supp.2d 945, 955 (S.D.Miss.1997); ("to ensure national uniformity of all laws and standards relating to railroad safety, the FRSA includes a broad preemption provision"); O'Bannon v. Union Pacific R.R., 960 F.Supp. 1411, 1416 (W.D.Mo.1997) (the FRSA's ...