Noriega v. Arizona
| Decision Date | 16 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-16-01015-PHX-JJT,CV-16-01015-PHX-JJT |
| Parties | Donna Noriega, Plaintiff, v. Arizona, State of, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
At issue are Plaintiff Donna Noriega's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 42, Pl.'s MPSJ), to which Defendants State of Arizona, Cara Christ, and Unknown Christ filed a Response , and in support of which Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 58, Pl.'s Reply); and Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment , to which Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 48, Pl.'s Resp.), and in support of which Defendants filed a Reply . The Court elects to resolve the parties' cross motions without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
Beginning in 2004, Plaintiff was employed by Arizona State Hospital ("ASH")—a State run facility and division of the Arizona Department of Health Services ("ADHS")—as an allied health administrator. Over the course of the following 11 years, Plaintiff held various titles with increasing levels of responsibility, including Chief Operations Officer. Eventually, in September 2013, Plaintiff was appointed Chief Executive Officer/Superintendent and occupied that position during the relevant time period.
Defendant Dr. Cara Christ has worked for ADHS since 2008 and is a licensed physician specializing in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Christ held several executive level positions within ADHS, including Chief Medical Officer for Public Health and Assistant Director of Licensing Services. On May 13, 2015, while Interim Director Corey Nelson was on leave, Dr. Christ was appointed Acting ADHS Director.
The parties allege and dispute a vast amount of facts regarding ASH's operations during Plaintiff's tenure as COO and CEO/Superintendent, Plaintiff's oversight responsibilities, and ASH's compliance with the requirements of various regulatory agencies, including the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The parties also detail specific incidents and investigations, local news reports and inquiries stemming from those incidents, and the possibility of a catastrophic loss of funding due to each. While these facts—which are categorically in dispute—may be relevant to Plaintiff's termination, and thus the factual merits of her wrongful termination claim in a vacuum, they are not dispositive in deciding the current Motions, and a complete recitation of the allegations would be of no benefit.1 It is sufficient to acknowledge the internal and external turmoil that enveloped ASH at the time of Plaintiff's termination and that the parties disagree as to cause, fault, and ultimate responsibility.
Purportedly in the wake of the foregoing investigations and tumult, Dr. Christ placed Plaintiff on administrative leave on May 13, 2015, while ADHS examined reports of negligence and malfeasance at ASH. During the proceeding weeks, neither Dr. Christ nor any other ASH representative or investigator contacted Plaintiff regarding the allegations against her. On May 29, 2015, Dr. Christ informed Plaintiff via telephone that she could resign or would be terminated. The same day, Plaintiff received a termination letter stating that her "services were no longer needed" and that "as an uncovered employee" she did not have the "right to grieve this action or the right to appeal this action to either the Law Enforcement Merit System Council or the State PersonnelBoard." Thus, Defendants did not offer Plaintiff any pre-termination notice or opportunity to be heard, nor did they provide a post-termination hearing. Defendants never explicitly informed Plaintiff of the charges against her, nor did they tell her she was being terminated for cause.
Although Dr. Christ ostensibly believed that Plaintiff was an at-will employee who could be freely fired under A.R.S. § 41-742(A)(2)(b), human resources representatives eventually informed her that Plaintiff could only be dismissed for cause under A.R.S § 36-205.2 Dr. Christ acknowledged a mistake was made but took no action because she thought that Plaintiff did not know of the statute or the rights and recourse it afforded her, and regardless, they had good cause to terminate Plaintiff.
On November 5, 2015, Plaintiff's counsel sent Defendants a "Notice of Claim Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01," informing them of the purported improper termination and Plaintiff's intent to file suit in Maricopa County Superior Court alleging claims arising out of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq., and A.R.S. §§ 23-1501 and 36-205. Plaintiff's Notice stated that Defendants identified no cause for her termination and offered to settle the claims for $570,960. Plaintiff did not request explanation of the charges against her, an opportunity to be heard or appeal, or reinstatement.
Plaintiff then filed her Complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court on March 22, 2016, alleging Wrongful Termination (Count 1), Due Process Violations (Count 2), and seeking Declaratory and Equitable Relief for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count 3). (Doc. 1 Ex. A.) On April 12, 2016, Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). (Doc. 1.)
Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when: (1) the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to anymaterial fact; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). Under this standard, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing [substantive] law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A "genuine issue" of material fact arises only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the non-moving party's evidence if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. "Summary judgment must be entered 'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" United States v. Carter, 906 F.2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on each remaining count of her Complaint. Plaintiff contends that: (1) she was wrongfully terminated without cause and in violation of statute; (2) her termination was carried out without due process; and (3) she is entitled to a declaratory judgment and reinstatement due to the preceding. Defendants respond that (1) Plaintiff's only remedy for her termination was administrative and by failing to avail herself of that remedy, she waived it; (2) Plaintiff also waived her due process rights by failing to demand their vindication; and (3) in waiving those rights, Plaintiff lost any entitlement to declaratory or equitable relief.
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her wrongful termination claim on the grounds that she was terminated (1) without cause in violation of A.R.S. § 36-205, and(2) in violation of public policy when Defendants failed to afford her pre-and-post-termination due process. (Pl.'s MPSJ at 5-6.)
Wrongful termination claims are governed by the Arizona Employment Protection Act ("EPA"), A.R.S. § 23-1501. Under A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(b), an employee has a claim against an employer for termination if the "employer has terminated the employment relationship . . . in violation of a statute of this state." Under A.R.S. § 36-205(C), the "superintendent shall be removed only for cause."
Here, it is wholly unclear whether Plaintiff was terminated for cause. While Defendants present facts detailing several incidents and investigations—as well as the grave consequences that could have resulted from them—which may have provided ample cause, Plaintiff disputes nearly all of those facts. (Compare Defendants' Statement of Facts ("DSOF") ¶¶ 51-54, 56-61, 65, 68-69 with Plaintiff's Controverting Statement of Facts ("PSOF") ¶¶ 51-54, 56-61, 65, 68-69, 94-141.) Moreover, Defendants never explicitly stated they were terminating Plaintiff for cause—either informally or in Plaintiff's termination letter—nor did they describe the charges set forth here contemporaneously with Plaintiff's dismissal. Thus, the Court cannot grant summary judgment to either party as to Count 1 on the grounds that Plaintiff was terminated with or without cause.
However, in their Response and offensive Motion, Defendants claim that Count 1 fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff's exclusive remedy for any wrongful termination is administrative. (Defs.' Resp. at 4-6; Defs.' MSJ at 11-12.) In support, Defendants cite A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b), which states "[i]f the statute provides a remedy to an employee for a violation of the statute, the remedies provided to an employee are the exclusive remedies for the violation . . ." Defendants contend that A.R.S. §§ 41-782 and 783—which authorize covered state employees to appeal dismissals from covered state service to the Arizona Personnel Board within 10 days of agency action—provide that statutory remedy exclusively and mandatorily. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees.
First, it is unclear that Defendants' stated statutes indeed provide remedies for violation of A.R.S § 36-205(C), much less exclusive ones. A.R.S. §§ 41-782 and 783 exist under a different title, in a different section, and do not explicitly set forth that they are remedies for violation of § 36-205, which does not itself set forth independent remedies. While...
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