Noriega v. Thaler
| Decision Date | 16 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-09-3959 |
| Parties | ELIBERTO VEGA NORIEGA, TDCJ #1397819, Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
State inmate Eliberto Vega Noriega (TDCJ #1397819) has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging three state court convictions. The respondent has filed an answer, arguing that Noriega is not entitled to the relief he seeks. (Docket No. 8). Noriega has filed a reply. (Docket No. 11). After considering all of the pleadings, the state court records, and the applicable law, the Court denies relief and dismisses this case for reasons that follow.
A local grand jury returned three indictments against Noriega, charging him with aggravated sexual assault of a child in cause numbers 930147, 930148, and 936811. At trial, the state presented evidence that Noriega sexually assaulted his own daughter on numerous occasions while she was between the ages of six and nine. A jury in the 232nd District Court of Harris County, Texas, found Noriega guilty as charged in all three indictments and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
On direct appeal, Noriega's appointed attorney filed a brief along with a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (an "Anders brief"), certifying that the record disclosed no reversible error and that the appeal was without merit. In response to his counsel's motion, Noriega made the following general allegations in a pro se brief: (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt; (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (3) the prosecutor engaged in unethical misconduct. After considering the record, the Anders brief filed by counsel, and the issues raised by Noriega, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. See Noriega v. State, No. 01-06-00764-CR, 01-06-00765-CR, 01-06-00766-CR, 2008 WL 203046 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 24, 2008). Noriega did not appeal further by filing a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Noriega challenged his convictions further by filing a state habeas corpus application under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in each case. In those applications, Noriega raised several claims concerning the validity of the charges against him, among other things, and he also argued that he was denied the right to counsel on appeal when his attorney filed an Anders brief. The state habeas corpus court, which also presided over the trial, entered findings of fact and recommended that relief be denied. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not disagree, but remanded the proceeding for additional consideration of several ineffective-assistance allegations madeby Noriega in a supplemental pleading. See Ex parte Noriega, Nos. 71, 882-01,-02, &-03 (Tex Crim. App. June 3, 2009). After considering affidavits from defense counsel and Noriega, the state habeas corpus court entered additional findings of fact and concluded that Noriega was not entitled to relief with respect to his supplemental ineffective-assistance allegations. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and denied relief, without a written order, adopting the habeas corpus court's findings. See Ex parte Noriega, Nos. 71, 882-01,-02, &-03 (Tex Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2009).
Noriega, who remains in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division (collectively, "TDCJ"), now seeks a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pending petition, Noriega contends that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. Noriega also maintains that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. The respondent maintains that Noriega's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is barred from federal habeas review and that all of his ineffective-assistance claims are without merit. The respondent argues, therefore, that Noriega's petition must be dismissed. The parties' contentions are discussed further below under the governing federal habeas corpus standard of review.
Federal habeas corpus proceedings filed after April 24, 1996 are governed by provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the "AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Tothe extent that the petitioner's claims were "adjudicated on the merits" in state court, the AEDPA standard found at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies.1
Claims presenting pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which precludes habeas relief unless a petitioner demonstrates that the state court's decision to deny a claim "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2001). A state court's decision is deemed contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established precedent if it identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the case. See Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). Under this standard, an unreasonable application is more than merely incorrect or erroneous; rather, the state court's application of clearly established law must be "objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
Where pure questions of fact are concerned, a petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he demonstrates that the state court's decision was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Buntion v. Quarterman, 524 F.3d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 2008). Moreover, a state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct on federal habeas review, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption extends not only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court as well. Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
As this deferential standard reflects, the AEDPA has "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002) (quotation omitted). In that respect, the AEDPA standard "stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings." Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). The Supreme Court has recently underscored the extent of this deferential standard:
[28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)] preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes no farther. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, " not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federalcourt, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. The deferential AEDPA standard of review applies even where the state court fails to cite applicable Supreme Court precedent or fails to explain its decision. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002); see also Richter, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (). Thus, a federal habeas corpus court's inquiry is not altered where the state court denies relief without a written opinion. See Schaetzle v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 2003).
Noriega argues that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) because the jury's guilty verdict was not based on sufficient evidence. Noriega observes that, although the victim testified against him at trial, the "outcry" witness did not. Noriega notes further that the physician who performed a sexual assault examination on the victim did not observe any "visible scars or injuries." Noriega argues, therefore, that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal. The respondent argues that these claims are procedurally barred because Noriega did not exhaust these claims or raise them in a proper manner in state court.
The federal habeas corpus scheme of review requires petitioners for relief to first present their claims in state court and to exhaust all state court remedies through proper adjudication. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). "To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must fairly present the substance of his federal claim to the highest state court." Ries v. Quarterman, 522 F.3d 517, 523 (5th Cir. 2008). If a claim has...
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