Norland v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service

• Citation: 412 N.W.2d 904
• Decision Date: 23 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-1520,86-1520
• Parties: Deloma M. NORLAND, Appellant. v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE, and First Interstate Bank of Mason City, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 904

412 N.W.2d 904

Deloma M. NORLAND, Appellant. v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF JOB SERVICE, and First Interstate Bank of Mason City, Appellees.

No. 86-1520.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 23, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 22, 1987.

Phillip N. Norland, Northwood, for appellant.

Blair H. Dewey and William C. Whitten, Des Moines, for appellees.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, SCHULTZ and LAVORATO, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

We consider in this judicial review proceeding whether the district court erred in sustaining the Iowa Department of Job Service's ¹ denial of unemployment benefits to Deloma M. Norland. Norland had refused an offer of temporary work from her previous employer after losing her job during a lengthy leave of absence. When the final department decision refusing benefits was rendered and rehearing was denied, Norland filed a petition for judicial review. The district court sustained a special appearance based on Norland's failure to name the employer as a party. The court of appeals, however, reversed, Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 387 N.W.2d 365 (Iowa App.1986), and the district court then upheld the department's decision to deny benefits. In a separate action which alleged wrongful discharge, we have already affirmed a summary judgment for Norland's employer. Norland v. First Interstate of Iowa, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1986) (table).

Norland now argues the district court erred in sustaining the department's decision to deny benefits. She claims the department acted improperly in its failure to conform its findings to statutory requirements of format and substantive content, that it did not make the necessary burden of proof determination, and that its decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, and was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious in nature. Because we think the district court acted properly in rejecting these challenges and upholding the department's decision, we now affirm.

The department's findings of fact in Norland's case reveal that since December 1981 Norland had been employed as an operations secretary at the United Central Bank & Trust Company (now the First Interstate Bank) of Mason City. The bank placed her on disability leave on July 25, 1983, because of a serious medical problem. On September 12, her physician released her to return to her job, and she worked half days until returning to full-time hours one week later. After only two days of full-time work, however, the bank asked Norland to take a thirty-day leave of absence because it felt she had not recovered sufficiently from her medical problems.

When Norland called the bank on October 21 to reclaim her position at the end of her leave, she was told the job had been filled during her absence and no other work was available. Three days later a bank personnel officer offered Norland a temporary position that was similar to and at the same wage as her original job. This opening was expected to last six weeks, while a regular employee was on maternity leave. The department hearing officer found that Norland "refused [the job offer] only because ... the offered position was of a temporary nature, and because it might interfere with [her] ability to accept other work."

When Norland applied for unemployment compensation, the department held that she was disqualified for benefits because she had refused to accept "suitable work." The hearing officer, whose findings affirmed those of a claims deputy and were later adopted by the department appeal board, quoted Iowa Code section 96.5(3) ² in full and then reviewed the department's factors for determining the suitability of work, see 345 Iowa Admin.Code 4.24(15), ³ as they applied to Norland's case:

No apparent risk to the health, safety, or morals of the claimant appears, the claimant has been released for work by her physician, the claimant's prior training fit her for the offered position, the claimant had been unemployed since July, but only because of her medical problems, the work was similar to the work previously performed by the claimant and for the same employer, and the work was offered at the same wage as that previously offered the claimant.

The hearing officer concluded the temporary nature of the work offered to Norland did not make it "unsuitable" within the meaning of Iowa Code section 96.5(3)(a). Because failure, without good cause, to accept "suitable work" is a ground under which one may be disqualified for unemployment benefits, see Iowa Code § 96.5(3), Norland was found to be ineligible for such benefits.

After the hearing officer's ruling was incorporated by reference into the department's appeal board decision, Norland applied for and was denied a rehearing. She then filed a petition for judicial review, which was challenged in the special appearance noted above, and the district court ultimately upheld the department's final decision to deny benefits.

Norland's appeal in this court raises three issues: first, whether the format and content of the department's ruling conformed to statutory requirements that call for the inclusion of authorities and reasons behind the findings and for specific discussion of the statutory factors for determining the suitability of work and good cause for refusal of the offered work; second, whether the burden of proof regarding suitability was properly assigned and satisfied; and third, whether the findings of suitability and lack of good cause were sound, in that they were not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and were supported by substantial evidence in the record.

I. Scope of Review.

Except when there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary, judicial review of agency action is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), chapter 17A of the Iowa Code. City of Davenport v. PERB, 264 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1978); Iowa Code § 17A.19. Because there is no such specific statutory provision applicable in this case, see Iowa Code § 96.6(3), our review will be governed by the IAPA.

When, under the IAPA, this court reviews a district court decision on the validity of an agency action, we ask only whether the district court has correctly applied the law. Jackson County Pub. Hosp. v. PERB, 280 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Iowa 1979). The district court is itself acting "in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency. In our review of such action by the district court, we merely apply the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court." Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 404 N.W.2d 158, 161-62 (Iowa 1987) (citations omitted); accord Jackson County Pub. Hosp., 280 N.W.2d at 429-30; Ray v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 398 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Iowa App.1986). When the conclusions are the same, we must affirm. Jackson County Pub. Hosp., 280 N.W.2d at 430.

Because "law issues are determinable by the judiciary alone," Iowa Malleable Iron Co. v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm'n, 195 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 1972) (citation omitted), we owe an agency only limited deference on matters of law, including statutory interpretation. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist. v. Department of Job Serv., 376 N.W.2d 605, 609 (Iowa 1985); see also Brumley v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 292 N.W.2d 126, 128 (Iowa 1980); Iowa R.App.P. 4. But "[w]e are not free to interfere with [an agency's] findings where there is conflict in the evidence or when reasonable minds might disagree about the inferences to be drawn from the evidence whether disputed or not." Ward v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Iowa 1981) (citation omitted). We must ask "not whether the evidence might support a different finding but whether the evidence supports the findings ... actually made. Hence the findings of [an agency] are binding on appeal unless a contrary result is demanded as a matter of law." Id. at 237-38 (citing Wetzel v. Wilson, 276 N.W.2d 410, 412 (Iowa 1979)).

This limited scope of factual review is warranted by the presumably greater expertise an agency has over matters within its purview. So unless the agency is clearly shown to have acted unconstitutionally, in violation of a statutory mandate, or without substantial support in the record, Churchill Truck Lines, Inc. v. Transportation Regulation Bd., 274 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 1979); Davenport Water Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 190 N.W.2d 583, 591-92 (Iowa 1971), we should "broadly and liberally apply those findings in order to uphold rather than defeat the [agency's] decision," Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 237 (citing Holmes v. Bruce Motor Freight, Inc., 215 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1974)).

II. The Format and Content of the Department's Ruling.

Norland argues the department's final decision ⁴ as written does not comply with the statutory requirements of format and content, although the district court found it "sufficient." First, she claims the final decision does not, for some of the contested issues regarding suitability of the offered work, contain "a concise and explicit statement of underlying facts supporting the findings." Iowa Code § 17A.16(1). There is, in her view, an absence of "cited authority or ... reasoned opinion." Id. Second, Norland argues the department's decision fails to address whether she had good cause to refuse the offered work. See id. at § 96.5(3).

We must disagree with Norland's contentions. While we "have previously pointed out the crucial importance" of the requirement of section 17A.16(1) that there be "cited authority or ... reasoned opinion" to back up an agency's decision, Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 238, the department has satisfied its duty in this case. If "it is possible to work backward [from the agency's written decision] and to deduce what must have been [the agency's] legal conclusions and [its] findings of fact," an assignment of error must be rejected. Id. at 239.

Very little deduction is...