Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose, LLC v. City of Cookeville
| Decision Date | 14 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:16–00025,2:16–00025 |
| Citation | 207 F.Supp.3d 825 |
| Parties | NORMA FAYE PYLES LYNCH FAMILY PURPOSE, LLC, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF COOKEVILLE, Tennessee, acting through the City Council and the Planning Commission, and Putnam County, Tennessee, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Andrew N. Grams, J. Ross Pepper, Jr., Pepper & Brothers, PLLC, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.
Daniel Hurley Rader, III, Moore, Rader, Clift & Fitzpatrick, P.C., Jeffrey G. Jones, Wimberly, Lawson, Wright, Daves & Jones, PLLC, Cookeville, TN, for Defendants.
In this action that was removed from the Circuit Court for Putnam County, Tennessee, Plaintiff Norma Fay Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC has filed a Motion to Remand (Docket No. 21), to which Defendants City of Cookeville (Docket No. 26) and Putnam County (Docket No. 28) have responded in opposition. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion will be granted and, as a consequence, the Court will deny as moot Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Docket Nos. 3 & 17).
Defendants removed this action because Plaintiff pleaded claims that arise under federal law. "The Supreme Court has made clear that, to determine whether a claim arises under federal law, a court, under the ‘well-pleaded complaint’ rule, generally looks only to the plaintiff's complaint." Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 431 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Gully v. First National Bank , 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936) ; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley , 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908) ). Here, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following:
Plaintiff owns several tracts of land within the City of Cookeville, which is located in Putnam County. This includes a six acre parcel of land (the "Tract") located on the south side of Mine Lick Creek Road, 155 feet south of the intersection of that road and Park West Drive. This acreage adjoins the construction of a new interstate interchange on I–40.
The Tract was part of a larger tract of land, which Plaintiff owned, and which the City of Cookeville and Putnam County sought to acquire by way of a condemnation and partition action so that a business park could be built near the planned Mine Lick Creek Road interchange. Plaintiff was deeded the six acre Tract and two other parcels of land as part of a negotiated settlement of that condemnation and partition action.
Plaintiff claims that, as part of the settlement, the City of Cookeville and Putnam County promised to convey the Tract zoned commercial-industrial ("C–I"). Plaintiff later learned, however, that the Tract was split zoned C–I and Single Family Residential ("RS–20"), with approximately 52% of the Tract zoned C–I, and the remainder zoned RS–20.
In August 2015, Plaintiff petitioned the Planning Commission to re-zone the Tract (along with two others) to C–I. After a public hearing, the Planing Commission, on October 26, 2015, denied Plaintiff's request to re-zone the portions of the Tract designated RS–20 to C–I. Plaintiff appealed that denial to the City Council. After another public hearing, the City Council took no action, meaning that the request to re-zone was denied.
Plaintiff then filed suit in state court and advanced a number of state and federal claims. It brought a breach of contract claim against both Defendants, an inverse condemnation action against the City of Cookeville, and sought a declaratory judgment against the City of Cookeville under state law, claiming that the Planning Commission's and City Council's decisions not to re-zone the property were arbitrary and capricious. Finally, Plaintiff brought federal claims solely against the City of Cookeville for the alleged denial of due process and equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
As indicated, Defendant City of Cookeville (with Putnam County's consent) removed this action because of the asserted federal claims. Plaintiff now seeks to remand the case, arguing the federal claims are not ripe.
"The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by Article III of the Constitution to ‘Cases and Controversies[,]’ U.S. Const. art. III, § 2," and "[t]he ripeness doctrine is one of several justiciability doctrines ‘drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’ "
Kiser v. Reitz , 765 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. , 509 U.S. 43, 57 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) ). Thus, "[t]he ripeness doctrine has developed ‘to ensure that courts decide only existing, substantial controversies, not hypothetical questions or possibilities.’ " In re Cassim , 594 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty , 274 F.3d 377, 399 (6th Cir. 2001) ). "In other words, ‘[r]ipeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.’ " Id . (quoting Ky. Press Ass'n v. Kentucky , 454 F.3d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2006) ).
The leading decision regarding ripeness in the context of taking without just compensation is Williamson County Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), a case that arose out of this Court. There, a landowner sued a regional planning commission alleging that its application of zoning laws and regulations to plaintiff's property amounted to an unconstitutional taking. Though the case was tried to a jury verdict in favor of the landowner, the Supreme Court found that the takings claim was not ripe for two reasons. First, plaintiff had not "obtain [ed] a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulation to its property," even though "[t]he Board of Zoning Appeals had the power to grant certain variances from the zoning ordinance," and "[t]he Commission had the power to grant variances from the subdivision regulations." Id . at 187 & 188, 105 S.Ct. 3108. Second, the takings claim was not ripe because plaintiff "did not seek compensation through the procedures that the State has provided," including bringing an inverse condemnation action under Tennessee law in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–16–123.
Williamson County has been read as setting out a two-prong ripeness test, such that "a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not ripe for review until (1) the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision inflicting an actual, concrete injury, and (2) if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner has used the procedure and been denied just compensation." DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky , 381 F.3d 511, 529 (6th Cir. 2004). "The ripeness test is conjunctive: both prongs must be satisfied." Id .
Here, whether the first prong has been satisfied is unclear. Plaintiff suggest that it has been because, after the Planning Commission denied the re-zoning request, that decision was appealed to the City Council, which denied the request by refusing to take action. The City of Cookeville insists there was no final decision because Plaintiff failed to appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals. As for the second prong, Plaintiff was in the process of utilizing applicable state procedure to seek just compensation by filing the Complaint in the Putnam Circuit Court, which contained a count for inverse compensation pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29–16–123 —the very statute cited by the Supreme Court in Williamson County .
Although Williamson County was specifically limited to takings claims, "several ... circuits have expanded the applicability of the finality requirement from takings claims to equal protection and due process claims emerging in the context of land use disputes." Insomnia Inc. v. City of Memphis , 278 Fed.Appx. 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases). For its part, the Sixth Circuit has extended Williamson County to equal protection claims, Bannum, Inc. v. City of Louisville , 958 F.2d 1354, 1362 (6th Cir. 1992), and to due process claims, at least to the extent those claims are ancillary to takings claim, Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp. , 519 F.3d 564, 572–73 (6th Cir. 2008).
Pursuant to Williamson County and its progeny, Plaintiff was required to file suit in state court prior to bringing its constitutional claims in federal court. It follows that Defendants' removal was premature because "a defendant may remove a case only if the claim could have been brought in federal court[.]" Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). This is the very reason propriety of removal must be made by reference to the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, Hampton v. R.J. Corman R.R. Switching Co. , 683 F.3d 708, 711 (6th Cir. 2012), and serves as a "limit[ ] on a party's authority to pick its forum," Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner , 549 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2008).
The key cases on which Defendant City of Cookeville relies to support its argument that removal was proper are inapposite. It cites Wilkins v. Daniels , 744 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2014) for the proposition that the Sixth Circuit "has rejected the notion that the implication of a ‘taking,’ ancillary or not, automatically deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction," (Docket No. 27 at 11), and quotes and highlights the following from that opinion:
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