Norman Printers' Supply Co. v. Ford

• Decision Date: 16 December 1904
• Citation: 77 Conn. 461,59 A. 499
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NORMAN PRINTERS' SUPPLY CO. v. FORD et al.

59 A. 499

77 Conn. 461

NORMAN PRINTERS' SUPPLY CO.

v. FORD et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 16, 1904.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; James Bishop, Judge.

Action of replevin by the Norman Printers' Supply Company against Avil E. Ford and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.

Henry G. Newton and Ward Church, for appellants.

George E. Beers, for appellee.

BALDWIN, J. The motion by the defendants that the plaintiff be required to make its declaration more specific, by stating more particularly the nature of its title and right of possession, was properly denied. The declaration was in the statutory form, and could not be treated as a complaint under the practice act (Gen. St 1902, §§ 607, 1058).

Certain of the articles replevied were described in the declaration as follows; "1 13x 19 Geo. P. Gordon printing press, with power fixtures; 1 countershaft, complete, including 1 shaft 2 hangers, 2 collars, 8 driving pulleys, 2 cone pulleys; 1 Dennison electric motor; 1 main, line shaft complete, including 1 shaft, 2 hangers, 2 collars, 1 driving pulley; 1 countershaft, complete, including 1 shaft 2 hangers, 2 collars, 1 driving pulley, 2 cone pulleys; 1 8x12 B. F. Gordon printing press, complete, No. 6,466."

The plaintiff, which is a corporation, claimed that a copartnership of the same name, to which it was a successor, had made a conditional sale of part of these articles to the defendant Ford in 1895, under an oral agreement that the title should remain in it until he had fully paid for them, which he had never done, and that it had delivered to him part of the articles replevied in 1897 on similar terms. In support of this claim, it introduced on the trial a page of the order-book of the copartnership, a book of original entry, with the testimony of one Norman, its president, who had been also a member of the copartnership, that the entries were copied in the ordinary course of business from order slips in his own handwriting. On this page was a description of certain of these articles, headed with the name of A. E. Ford & Co., under which the defendant Ford did business, and the words "on contract." These, the witness testified, had a well-defined meaning in the plaintiff's business, always denoting a conditional lease or sale. The evidence was all admissible. The words "on contract" were an inseparable part of the entry, and it was as proper and as necessary to prove their meaning as, if a private cipher had been used, it would have been to explain the signification of that.

The whole order book having been put in evidence, it appeared that a line had been drawn across most of the pages, but none across the page before mentioned. Testimony from the bookkeeper was thereupon, for similar reasons, properly received that by a custom of the business, known to the defendant Ford, who was familiar with the books, the absence of a line on any page signified that the goods were sold on lease.

It was admitted that the defendant Ford held a written receipt from the copartnership, signed in 1895, when the first lot of articles was delivered, in its behalf, by Norman, for $315, "on account of printing outfit" and that the price set on these articles was not less than $355. The plaintiff claimed the price to be $450. Norman testified in chief that in the order book of 1895 there were a dozen orders which were delivered on lease. On cross-examination he was asked by the defendants, "What was the amount of these orders?" This question was claimed on the ground that the answer would show that in no case of a lease had such a large payment on account been made on a bill of not over $450; but the court excluded it, and also a further question as to whether so large a payment had in fact ever been made on the delivery of goods under a lease. These questions were relevant to the issue, and it would have been proper to admit them. Peck v. Pierce, 63 Conn. 310, 314, 28 Atl. 524. They were adapted to elicit statements on which a legitimate argument could have been based in support of the defense set up. Plumb v. Curtis, 66 Conn. 154, 166, 33 Atl. 998. Nevertheless their exclusion is not necessarily ground for a new trial. The point to which they were directed was not to bring out any fact of substantial importance in relation to the issue. If admitted, the plaintiff might have asked the court to allow it to re-enforce the direct testimony of the witness by introducing explanations as to why the copartnership had been content with small payments on each of the other orders. Cross-examination must have some limits both as to subject-matter and to time, and that in this instance it was stopped a little too soon can hardly have been of such prejudice to the defendants as would justify setting aside the verdict for this cause alone.

The plaintiff introduced in evidence the deposition of one Harmon, who had been the other member of the copartnership, in which he testified that the copartnership furnished the defendant Ford in 1895 with the equipment of a printing office. The following questions and answers then appeared: "Q. 1. Upon what terms? A. Lease. Q. 2. What do you mean by 'lease'? A. A contract where the sale was protected by lease on the plant. Q. 3. Won't you state, then, what the arrangement between the company and Mr. Ford was. A. I can't give the terms of the lease. The agreement was made with Mr. Norman. Q. 4. Was a written lease entered into, do you know? A. I think there was. Q. 5. Do you know about it of your own knowledge? A. I don't remember of having seen the contract." Objections were made and entered at the taking of the deposition to question 2 on the ground that, if there was a lease, the lease was the best evidence; and to question 3, because it called for hearsay. On the trial objection was renewed to question 2, and an objection also taken to question 1, on the ground that the subsequent questions and answers showed that the answer must be hearsay; but both, together with the answers to them, were admitted. In this there was a material error. The vital point in controversy was whether the articles...