Norman v. City of Whitefish

• Decision Date: 25 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-564,90-564
• Citation: 248 Mont. 490,812 P.2d 1259
• Parties: Lester NORMAN, Claimant/Appellant, v. CITY OF WHITEFISH, Employer, and City of Whitefish, Defendant/Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1259

812 P.2d 1259

248 Mont. 490

Lester NORMAN, Claimant/Appellant, v. CITY OF WHITEFISH, Employer, and City of Whitefish, Defendant/Respondent.

No. 90-564.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 28, 1991.

Decided June 4, 1991.

Rehearing Denied July 25, 1991.

John H. Bothe, Bothe & Lauridsen, Columbia Falls, for claimant/appellant.

Oiver H. Goe, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, Helena, for defendant/respondent.

HUNT, Justice.

Claimant Lester Norman appeals from an order of the Workers' Compensation Court denying him temporary total disability benefits.

We affirm.

Two issues are raised on appeal:

1. Whether substantial credible evidence supports the Workers' Compensation Court's finding that claimant's current condition is not causally related to his injury of February 12, 1987; and

2. Whether the court's order on rehearing is inconsistent with its prior findings and conclusions regarding the causal relationship between claimant's current condition and the February 12, 1987, injury.

Claimant Lester Norman was employed as a police officer for the City of Whitefish from 1969 until 1975, and again from 1979 until 1988, when he voluntarily left the force. Norman suffered compensable auto accident injuries on November 16, 1980, and February 12, 1987. He timely reported both injuries and filed appropriate claim forms. He suffered no immediate wage loss from either accident. Following the February 1987 accident, Norman continued to work until March 1988, when he quit due to what he characterized as a "nervous breakdown." He subsequently pursued disability retirement benefits, claiming his disability was from stress. No mention was made of any disability related to the February 12, 1987, auto accident.

On or about December 5, 1989, Norman filed a petition for hearing with the Workers' Compensation Court, alleging that the City of Whitefish was liable for his accident of February 12, 1987. When the matter was heard in March 1990, the issues presented were: (1) whether Norman's current cervical condition is related to the February 12, 1987, accident; (2) if it is related, whether Norman is entitled to temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits; and (3) whether he is entitled to a 20 percent delay increase. The court found, in August 1990, that Norman had failed to prove that his current inability to work was proximately caused by his February 12, 1987, auto accident, and that therefore, he was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits, or fees, costs, or penalty.

Norman then filed a motion for clarification, requesting the court to order the City of Whitefish to accept liability for his current cervical condition and pay medical benefits accordingly. The court classified Norman's motion for clarification as a motion for rehearing and denied it on the basis of its former finding that Norman lacked the requisite credibility to support a finding that the February 12, 1987, injury was medically related to his current cervical complaints. Norman appeals from that denial.

Does substantial credible evidence support the Workers' Compensation Court's finding that the claimant's current condition is not causally related to his injury of February 12, 1987?

The general rule is that the findings of the Workers' Compensation Court will not be overturned on appeal if substantial evidence supports them. Nelson v. ASARCO, Inc., 227 Mont. 272, 277, 739 P.2d 943, 946 (1987). Norman claims that he presented substantial evidence to show that the February 1987 accident, which occurred while he was working for the City of Whitefish, aggravated a pre-existing shoulder and back condition. He states that it is that condition which now prevents him from working, and that therefore, the City of Whitefish should be held liable. He argues that because his evidence was substantial and credible, the Workers' Compensation Court's decision not to grant benefits must have been erroneous.

Liability in workers' compensation cases is defined in Sec. 39-71-407, MCA (1985):

Every insurer is liable for the payment of compensation, in the manner and to the extent hereinafter provided, to an employee of an employer it insures who receives an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment or, in the case of his death from such injury, to his beneficiaries, if any.

An "injury" is defined as:

[A] tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause or unusual strain resulting in either external or internal physical harm and such physical condition as a result therefrom....

Section 39-71-119(1), MCA (1985). Norman reads these statutes together and reasons that because he had an injury and now claims a resultant physical condition the City is liable under Sec. 39-71-407, MCA (1985).

A review of the evidence does not yield the result Norman now urges the Court to reach. The following excerpts of findings and conclusions by the Workers' Compensation Court support its conclusion that the claimant is not entitled to benefits because he has failed to show a nexus between his 1987 injury and his present complaint:

1. The claimant was referred to a psychiatrist in February 1987 and was diagnosed with "generalized anxiety disorder and psychological factors influencing physical condition."

2. Claimant expressed symptoms of worsening stress and anxiety in 1988, which eventually led him to quit the police force.

3. By October 1988, Norman's psychiatrist indicated that Norman could return to work. By November...