Norman v. Stevenson Theatres, Inc.

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: STABLER, J.
• Citation: Norman v. Stevenson Theatres, Inc., 156 S.E. 357, 159 S.C. 191 (S.C. 1931)
• Decision Date: 02 January 1931
• Docket Number: 13051.
• Parties: NORMAN et al. v. STEVENSON THEATRES, Inc., et al.

156 S.E. 357

159 S.C. 191

NORMAN et al. v. STEVENSON THEATRES, Inc., et al.

No. 13051.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 2, 1931

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Union County; T. J Mauldin, Judge.

Action by Ruby Norman, by her guardian ad litem, Mrs. J. C. Norman against the Stevenson Theatres, Inc., and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

J Ashby Sawyer, of Union, for appellants

Hughes & Russell and J. Raymond Flynn, all of Union, for respondent.

STABLER J.

This is an action for damages based on alleged libel and slander. The complaint sets forth:

That the defendant Stevenson Theatres, Inc., owns and operates a moving picture theater in the city of Union, S. C., one of its many throughout the country, with the defendant Chastaine as its manager. That the plaintiff, a minor above the age of fourteen years, was also, at the times alleged, in the employment of the defendant corporation as its cashier at that place, and that she worked under the direction and control of its manager and agent, the defendant Chastaine.

"That on or about the 27th day of April, 1929, the defendants, with intent to injure plaintiff in her good name and character and with the further intent to injure her in securing other employment, did wantonly, wilfully and maliciously subject her to the ridicule, and contempt of all the world by uttering, advertising and publishing in the Union Daily Times the following malicious, libelous and defamatory words of and concerning the plaintiff--

"'To Whom It May Concern--It is the desire of the proprietors of the Stevenson Theatre, Union, S. C., that all employees pay cash for any and all purchases of every description for both personal and theatre use. Therefore, please take notice that this company will not become responsible for any debts incurred by anyone whether connected with this theatre or not, unless such merchant or person shall have written authority from the proprietors to establish a credit account. Anyone selling on credit to this theatre, or its employees, does so at their own risk. We have every confidence in our employees, but we wish to make our position clear. Dick Chastaine, Manager, Stevenson Theatres, Inc., Proprietors, Henderson. N. C.'

"That the publication and circulation of the above-described language was meant and intended to refer to the plaintiff, as defendants so stated or inferred; that such statement was so understood to refer to the plaintiff by various and sundry persons in and around the City of Union, South Carolina and the surrounding country; that the said defamation of plaintiff was published by the defendant Stevenson Theatres, Inc., and Dick Chastaine with the willful and malicious intent of charging the plaintiff with such an utter disregard in paying her obligations that her creditors in great numbers were forced to request her employer to pay such debts; that such said statement was published and circulated with the further willful and malicious intent and object of imputing to the plaintiff the crime of obtaining goods by false pretense, by falsely and dishonestly representing to sundry persons that she was purchasing merchandise for the defendants, such imputation being untrue and absolutely unfounded; and that the said publication and circulation of the aforesaid defamatory statement was so understood by divers and sundry persons in the City of Union and surrounding territory, all to the great damage and injury of the plaintiff and her character and reputation.

"That such aforesaid defamatory statements and publication, both direct and by way of innuendo, were without reasonable or probable cause; that the same were false and were known to be false by the defendants; and that the same were issued, uttered and published wantonly, willfully and maliciously, all to the great shame, embarrassment and injury of the plaintiff in her character and reputation."

Damages were asked for in the sum of $20,000.

The defendants, answering, admitted that the Stevenson Theatres, Inc., owned and operated a moving picture theater at Union; that the defendant Chastaine was in the employ of his codefendant as its manager at that place, and that the plaintiff also was employed there as its cashier, and that a notice similar to that alleged in the complaint "was published in the Union Daily Times, Union, S. C., concurrently with similar notices at other towns, in which defendant, Stevenson Theatres, Inc., operated theatres, as a general policy of the company to buy for cash and effect the saving incident to purchasing," but denied all other allegations of the complaint.

The case was tried at the February, 1930 term of the court of common pleas for Union county, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,500 actual damages. The defendants' motions for a directed verdict and for a new trial were overruled by the court, and from judgment entered in the case this appeal is taken.

The exceptions are many; but appellant's counsel, for the purpose of his argument, has very properly grouped them under four general heads of assigned error: (1) Error in ruling on the admission and rejection of evidence; (2) error in refusing motion for a directed verdict; (3) error in charge to the jury; and (4) error in refusing motion for a new trial. In our consideration of the appeal, we will adopt and follow this general grouping.

We shall consider, first, the exceptions which allege error in the admission or rejection of evidence. When the plaintiff was on the stand, her counsel asked her to what she attributed her failure to procure other employment, and she answered, "To this statement." Counsel for the defendants objected, but stated no grounds, whereupon the court remarked that the witness could testify as to what she did, but that the jury alone could draw conclusions. While there is nothing for this court to consider, no grounds of objection having been stated at the trial, the ruling of the trial judge was all that the appellants could have demanded under proper objection. The witness was also asked whether she knew that the published notice had been applied to her specifically and personally in the city of Union, to which she answered, ""Yes." Counsel for appellants thereupon suggested that such knowledge would depend on hearsay on her part. While counsel did not interpose any formal objection to the testimony or move to strike out the answer, which he should have done if he regarded it as being objectionable, the court correctly ruled that the witness could testify as to whether she knew as a matter of fact that such intelligence had reached others. Her counsel also asked her this question: "You were sorter made the butt of the joke." Appellants objected, but stated no grounds, the witness did not answer, and the court made no ruling. Hence the assignment of error cannot be considered.

On direct examination, the plaintiff testified to a conversation which she had with the defendant Chastaine, after the notice was published in the newspaper. She stated that she charged him with having told the operator and door boy that the notice was not intended to refer to them, and that he made no denial. On cross-examination she was asked whether she heard Chastaine tell the other boys that it did not apply to them, to which she answered, "No, sir, but the other boys told me." Defendants' counsel then moved to strike out the answer. The court ruled that standing alone it was incompetent, but that, if it was a part of a conversation had with Chastaine, about which the witness had already testified, it would be competent. No ground was stated for the motion to strike out the answer, but, waiving this, we find no error in the court's ruling.

When the defendant Chastaine was...