Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 06 June 1983
• Docket Number: S.F. 24449
• Citation: 663 P.2d 904,192 Cal.Rptr. 134,34 Cal.3d 1
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 663 P.2d 904 Mary Teresa NORMAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Appellant; EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

Page 134

192 Cal.Rptr. 134

34 Cal.3d 1, 663 P.2d 904

Mary Teresa NORMAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Appellant EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

S.F. 24449.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

June 6, 1983.

Rehearing Denied July 14, 1983.

Charlton G. Holland, Asher Rubin, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Robert J. Shull, Mary Norman, Community Legal Services, San Jose, for plaintiff and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

Does the voluntary termination of one's employment in order to follow a nonmarital "loved one" to another location constitute "good cause" for purposes of determining eligibility to receive unemployment compensation benefits? (See Unemp.Ins.Code, § 1256; further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) Concluding that it does not, we will reverse the trial court's judgment which sets aside a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board) denying unemployment compensation benefits.

Section 1256 provides in relevant part: "An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause ...." We apply this standard to the record before us.

On January 4, 1979, plaintiff commenced her employment with Mohawk Data Sciences Corp. in California. In July 1979, plaintiff's boyfriend, with whom she had been living, found employment in the State of Washington. Plaintiff thereupon gave notice to her employer that she intended to quit her job as of September 7, 1979, in order to move to Washington to join him.

Plaintiff inquired about work in Washington before leaving California but was told that no positions were available. She nonetheless felt that she could obtain employment and moved as she had intended. After her further job search was unsuccessful she filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits with the California Employment Development Department (Department). On October 4, 1979, she was informed by Department that she was ineligible to receive benefits because "There was no compelling reason for the move," and therefore there was no "good cause" for leaving her work with Mohawk.

During the hearing of her administrative appeal, plaintiff acknowledged that she had no definite job prospects in Washington and had left her position "Because my fiance was moving to Washington and I moved up here with my fiance." In her words, the "sole reason" she quit work was to join her fiance and "it kind of put me on the spot, either come up here and live with him up here in Washington or to break up." Plaintiff further testified that in January 1979 she and her fiance decided to marry in June 1980. She did not, however, represent that her marriage was imminent, that her presence in Washington was required to prepare for the wedding, or, indeed, that she had any definite or fixed marital plans.

The administrative law judge found that plaintiff's reasons for leaving her employment did not constitute "good cause." On appeal, the Board affirmed. Plaintiff then petitioned for a writ of mandate in the superior court. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5.) While adopting the findings of fact of the administrative law judge, the trial court held that plaintiff had voluntarily quit with good cause, and that the absence of any marital relationship did not, as a matter of law, preclude an award of unemployment compensation benefits. The Board and the Department appeal.

In section 100, the Legislature described its policy underlying the creation of an unemployment insurance system as "providing benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimum." It has been said that in determining whether an employee has "left work voluntarily" within the meaning of section 1256, "the cases have not given that phrase its literal meaning. An employee need not actually choose to be unemployed; it is enough that his unemployment is the result of his own fault--a willful act causing or instigating his unemployment. [Citations.]" (Evenson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1016, 133 Cal.Rptr. 488.) However, a voluntary departure does not disqualify an employee from benefits so long as "good cause" is shown which we have defined very generally as "an adequate cause, a cause that comports with the purposes of the California Unemployment Insurance Code and with other laws." (Syrek v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (1960) 54 Cal.2d 519, 529, 7 Cal.Rptr. 97, 354 P.2d 625; Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 55, 70, 141 Cal.Rptr. 146, 569 P.2d 740.) One court has suggested that "Good cause may exist for personal reasons but those reasons must be so imperative and compelling as to make the voluntary leaving 'involuntary.' [Citation.]" (Evenson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, 133 Cal.Rptr. 488.)

Former section 1264, repealed in 1976, had provided that an employee who left "employment to be married or to accompany his or her spouse to join her or him at a place from which it [was] impractical to commute" was deemed ineligible for benefits unless the individual at the time of his or her voluntary departure and filing of the claim was "the sole or major support of his or her family." The repeal of this section followed the decision of the Court of Appeal in Boren v. Department of Employment Dev. (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 250, 130 Cal.Rptr. 683. Boren held that the effect of section 1264 was to disqualify improperly a group of claimants from certain benefits without any demonstration by the state of a compelling governmental interest justifying the discriminatory statutory classification.

Under former law, even the marriage state and respect for the obligations deriving therefrom did not, standing alone, constitute good cause for termination from work. Thus, in Douglas v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 110, 133 Cal.Rptr. 604, unemployment insurance benefits were denied when, knowing that she had no guarantee of reemployment, a wife left her former employment in order to accompany her husband who had been assigned to the State of Washington for three months. (See also, In re Kerekes, Cal. Unemp. Ins. App. Bd. Precedent Benefit Dec. No. P-B-26 (1968) [Decision pursuant to § 409 which permits the board to designate certain decisions as precedents thereafter controlling as to referees and the director.] Wife was denied benefits where evidence established (1) she intended to leave area before her marriage, (2) marriage occurred soon before wife left employment, and (3) wife wanted to move and did not move simply to accompany husband.)

Whether or not there is "good cause" is an issue of law. (Perales v. Department of Human Resources Dev. (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 332, 336, 108 Cal.Rptr. 167.) In this connection, plaintiff relies heavily upon Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106, and the appellate decision in Department of Industrial Relations v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 72, 156 Cal.Rptr. 183, in arguing that her nonmarital relationship is the equivalent of a marriage for purposes of determining "good cause." We conclude otherwise.

In Marvin, we emphasized the property rights of nonmarital partners when their relationship terminated, holding that "adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights .... So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such agreements." (18 Cal.3d at p. 674, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106, italics added.) As to the marital relationship, however, we carefully emphasized that "the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of marriage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution." (P. 684, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106.) The essence of Marvin thus was that nonmarital partners were not barred by virtue of their relationship from asserting those contractual rights and remedies which are available to other persons.

Similarly, in Department of Industrial Relations v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 72, 156 Cal.Rptr. 183, the issue was a nonmarital partner's entitlement to death benefits. Labor Code section 3503 provides: "No person is a dependent of any deceased employee unless in good faith a member of the family or household of the employee ...." There was substantial evidence that the claimant had been a member of the decedent's household and at least a partial dependent. After reviewing Marvin, and the implications flowing from the repeal of former Penal Code section 269a, which had made living "in a state of cohabitation and adultery" a criminal offense, the appellate court held that the nonmarital partner was a "good faith" member of the deceased employee's household and dependent upon the employee. The survivor's unmarried relationship with the decedent did not bar her from benefits to which she was otherwise entitled under the statute.

Recent appellate opinions have recognized the limitations of Marvin and have declined to equate a nonmarital relationship with marriage. Thus, in People v. Delph (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 411, 156 Cal.Rptr. 422, the court was examining the term "spouse" within the "marital communications" privilege. (Evid.Code, §§ 970, 980.) In declining to extend this privilege to nonmarital partners, the court accurately characterized Marvin as providing: "... a method for equitable resolution of property disputes in situations where...