Norquist v. Zeuske

Decision Date25 June 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-1812-OA,96-1812-OA
Citation211 Wis.2d 241,564 N.W.2d 748
PartiesJohn O. NORQUIST, Kevin M. Crawford, Michael R. Miller, Joseph Laux, Dan Thompson, Edward Huck and Gerald Jorgensen, Petitioners, d v. Cate ZEUSKE, in her official capacity as secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Respondent.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the petitioners there was a brief by Robert Horowitz, Kristine A. Euclide and Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, and oral argument by Robert Horowitz.

For the respondent the cause was argued by Alan Lee, Assistant Attorney General, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.

Amicus curiae brief was filed by H. Dale Peterson, Sverre David Roang, and Stroud, Stroud, Willink, Thompson & Howard, Madison for The Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation, Cooperative, The Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America, Wisconsin Division, The National Farmers Organization, The Wisconsin Agribusiness Council, The Wisconsin Agri-Service Association, Inc., The Wisconsin Cattlemen's Association, Cooperative, The Wisconsin Corn Growers Association, Inc., The Wisconsin Federation of Cooperatives, The Wisconsin Pork Producers Association, Cooperative, The Wisconsin Potato & Vegetable Growers Association, Inc., The Wisconsin Soybean Association, Inc., and The Wisconsin State Cranberry Growers Association.

Amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard J. Stadelman, Executive Director, Shawano, for the Wisconsin Towns Association.

¶1 JON P. WILCOX, Justice

On June 25, 1996, John Norquist, mayor of the City of Milwaukee; Kevin Crawford, mayor of the City of Manitowoc; Michael Miller, mayor of the City of West Bend; Joeseph Laux, mayor of the City of Menasha; Dan Thompson, executive director of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities; Edward Huck, executive director of the Wisconsin Alliance of Cities; and Gerald Jorgenson, an owner of agricultural land in Wisconsin, sought leave to commence an original action against Mark Bugher, in his capacity as the secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue pursuant to WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 3(2) and Wis. Stat. § 809.70(1)(1995-96). 1 We accepted the petition to commence an original action on October 21, 1996. On February 6, 1997, this court granted a joint motion by the parties to substitute the new secretary of the Department of Revenue, Cate Zeuske, for the former secretary of the Department of Revenue, Mark Bugher.

¶2 Three issues are identified for our consideration: (1) whether the petitioners have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r), (2) whether §§ 70.32(2r)(a) and (b) violate the Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, and (3) whether §§ 70.32(2r)(a) and (b) are severable from § 70.32(2r)(c). We hold that Jorgensen, who owns agricultural land, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 70.32(2r) and that given the state of the record, a decision by this court would be premature.

¶3 The relevant facts are not in dispute. Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) was enacted by Wis. Act 27, § 3362h and became effective January 1, 1996. Section 70.32(2r) provides:

2r (a) For the assessments as of January 1, 1996, and January 1, 1997, or until the farmland advisory council under s. 73.03(49) makes its final recommendation, but not to extend beyond January 1, 2009, the assessed value of each parcel of agricultural land is the assessed value of that parcel as of January 1, 1995.

(b) For each year beginning with 1998 or upon completion of the farmland advisory council's recommendation and promulgation of rules and ending no later than December 31, 2008, the assessed value of the parcel shall be reduced as follows:

1. Subtract the value of the parcel as determined according to the income that is or could be generated from its rental for agricultural use, as determined by rule, from its assessed value as of January 1, 1996.

2. Multiply .1 by the number of years that the parcel has been assessed under this paragraph, including the current year.

3. Multiply the amount under subd. 1. by the decimal under subd. 2.

4. Subtract the amount under subd. 3. from the parcel's assessed value as of January 1, 1996.

(c) For the assessment as of January 1 after the valuation method under par. (b) no longer applies and for each assessment thereafter, agricultural land shall be assessed according to the income that could be generated from its rental or agricultural use.

¶4 Thus, the statute provides for three phases in transforming agricultural land 2 assessments for property taxes from a market value system 3 to a use value system. The first phase, created by subsection (a), freezes assessments of agricultural land at the January 1, 1995, assessment level. This freeze, which began in 1996, will last for at least two years. Subsection (b) provides for a mixed assessment system that will last from the end of the initial freeze until 2009. During this period, agricultural land will be assessed based partly on the frozen market value assessments and partly on land's agricultural use value. In each year during this phase, the market value assessment is reduced by ten percent and the use value portion of the assessment is increased by ten percent. In 2009, the mixed assessment period ends and agricultural land will be assessed based entirely on its agricultural use value.

¶5 Jorgensen owns agricultural land in the State of Wisconsin and pays real property taxes on that land. His land is subject to the freeze in the assessments of agricultural land created in Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(a). The remaining petitioners, including the mayors, each own land in the State of Wisconsin that is not designated as agricultural land and each pays real property taxes on that land.

¶6 The petitioners brought this action to challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r). The petitioners contend that the freeze established in subsection (a) violates the Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. The petitioners further contend that subsection (b) also violates the Uniformity Clause because the market value portion of the mixed assessment is based on the frozen amount designated in subsection (a). Finally, the petitioners assert that because subsections (a) and (b) are not severable, § 70.32(2r) must be invalidated in its entirety. Zeuske not only disagrees with the petitions contentions regarding the constitutionality of § 70.32(2r) and the severability of subsections (a) and (b), but also maintains that the petitioners lack standing to challenge the statute.

I.

¶7 The first issue that we consider is whether the petitioners have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r). The central standing question is whether "a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." State ex rel. First National Bank of Wisconsin Rapids v. M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 95 Wis.2d 303, 307-08, 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980), quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). Wisconsin employs a two-step standing analysis. The analysis requires the court to determine (1) whether the plaintiff has suffered a threatened or actual injury, and (2) whether the interest asserted is recognized by law. Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc., v. State of Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 144 Wis.2d 499, 505, 424 N.W.2d 685 (1988); First National Bank, 95 Wis.2d at 308, 290 N.W.2d 321; Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 69 Wis.2d 1, 10, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975).

¶8 The petitioners assert that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) violates the Uniformity Clause. The Uniformity Clause as set forth in Article VIII, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in relevant part:

The rule of taxation shall be uniform, but the legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to collect and return taxes on real estate located therein by optional methods.... Taxation of agricultural land and undeveloped land, both as defined by law, need not be uniform with the taxation of each other nor with the taxation of other real property.

(emphasis added). The last sentence of the Uniformity Clause, quoted above, was established in 1974. This amendment makes clear that agricultural land need not be uniformly taxed as compared to other types of property, but it must be taxed uniformly as compared to other agricultural land. See McManus v. Department of Revenue, 155 Wis.2d 450, 454-455, 455 N.W.2d 906 (Ct.App.1990)("Under the amendment, agricultural land may be taxed in a manner that is not uniform with the taxation of other real property. However the uniformity requirement still applies within the agricultural classification itself.").

¶9 The petitioners claim that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r)(a) violates the Uniformity Clause because the freeze of assessments at 1995 levels will result in more preferential tax treatment for some agricultural land than for other agricultural land. They point out that, inevitably, the value of some agricultural land will decrease and the value of other agricultural land will increase during the period of the freeze. Thus, according to the petitioners, the freeze in assessments will result in non-uniform taxation.

¶10 One of the petitioners, Jorgensen, owns agricultural land. As he owns agricultural land, his status is logically related to his claim that Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r) violates the Uniformity Clause. Jorgensen, however, must also satisfy the actual injury requirement.

¶11 Jorgensen asserts that he has proven actual injury because he may be compelled to pay higher property taxes as a result of Wis. Stat. § 70.32(2r). This possibility of higher taxes derives from the fact that Jorgensen owns agricultural land which is subject to the market value freeze created by subsection (a). The property value of at least...

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