Norris v. Barbour
| Decision Date | 10 January 1949 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 3413. |
| Citation | 188 Va. 723 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | HANNON E. NORRIS, ET AL. v. JOHN V. BARBOUR, ET AL. |
Present, Hudgins, C.J., and Gregory, Eggleston, Buchanan, Staples and Miller, JJ.
1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION — Distribution of Personal Estate — Common Law Origin of Code Sections 5273 and 5276. — Under sections 5273 and 5276 of the Code of 1942 (Michie) the surviving spouse is given a distributive share in the surplus, after the payment of funeral expenses, charge of administration and debts, of the personal estate of his or her consort who dies intestate. Section 5273 of the Code of 1942 (Michie), as amended, fixes the amount of this distributive share, depending upon whether the intestate left surviving children or descendants of the marriage which was dissolved by the death of the intestate, or of a former marriage, or by legal adoption. Section 5276 of the Code of 1942 (Michie), as amended, fixes the amount of the distributive share where the surviving spouse renounces the will of his or her deceased consort. These statutes have their origin in the common law which provided for the allowance to the wife and children of the intestate "reasonable parts (rationabiles partes)" in his estate. So far as the children are concerned, Virginia has nothing like the doctrine of rationabiles partes, but as to the wife the statutory provision is very similar to it, and doubtless suggested thereby.
2. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION — Wife as Distributee of Deceased Husband — Alienation by Husband in His Lifetime Bars Wife's Rights. — While a husband cannot defeat his wife's claim to her distributive share of his estate by will, he may do so by any irrevocable disposition of the property in his lifetime, although he secure a life estate to himself, and although his declared purpose is to disappoint the wife's claim as one of his distributees.
3. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES — Requisites and Validity — Trust Not Enforceable as Gift Where Corpus Delivered Is Promise to Pay Money — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to settle an estate and determine the validity of a trust, decedent had delivered to a trustee a bond payable one year after decedent's death with interest, which declared on its face that it was given and received and the profits were to be applied according to a trust instrument executed by decedent to the trustee. This instrument recited that the object of the trust was to secure a personal indebtedness to the trustee and thereafter to make provision during decedent's life for certain beneficiaries. The trustee was to collect the bond upon maturity and pay the personal indebtedness and divide the rest between the beneficiaries. Payment of the bond with interest would exhaust decedent's personal estate, leaving nothing to apply to the wife's share. The wife's administrator contended that the bond and trust were not enforceable as a gift because there was no delivery of property but only of a promise.
Held: The contention was sound. Decedent did not deliver to the trustee the securities which later constituted the corpus of his personal estate, nor did he divest himself of title thereto and vest title in the trustee or in the beneficiaries. He transferred to the trustee a mere promise to pay to the trustee a certain sum of money for the benefit of and to be distributed among the beneficiaries.
4. CONTRACTS — Contract for Payment of Debt After Death Valid. — One may create a valid debt binding on him personally and on his estate, although made payable after his death.
5. CONTRACTS — Presumption of Consideration in Sealed Instruments — Remedy in Equity When Instrument Not Supported by Actual Consideration — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to settle an estate and determine the validity of a trust, decedent had delivered to a trustee a bond payable one year after decedent's death with interest, which declared on its face that it was given and received and the profits were to be applied according to a trust instrument executed by decedent to the trustee. This instrument recited that the object of the trust was to secure a personal indebtedness to the trustee and thereafter to make provision during decedent's life for certain beneficiaries. The trustee was to collect the bond upon maturity and pay the personal indebtedness and divide the rest between the beneficiaries. It was conceded that the bond and trust obligation was given and received with the intent to deprive the wife of her distributive share of decedent's estate. Payment of the bond with interest would exhaust the personal estate, leaving nothing to apply to the wife's share. The wife's administrator contended that the bond and trust were not enforceable as a contract because there was no consideration. The trustee insisted that the bond and trust instrument, being executed and delivered during decedent's life, constituted a valid debitum in praesenti, binding on him and his estate, because both instruments were under seal and not subject to attack for lack of consideration.
Held: That the instant case was not one between the parties to the contract. It was a proceeding in equity in which the beneficiaries under the trust were seeking enforcement of its provisions and those of the bond therein incorporated, and the wife a third party, was attacking the validity of the transaction on the ground that it operated as a fraud. It fell within that class of cases in which a court of equity, notwithstanding the seal, would inquire into whether the instrument was supported by an actual consideration.
6. FRAUD AND DECEIT — Remedies — Jurisdiction in Equity. — It is elementary that a court of equity, which looks to the substance and not merely to the form of the transaction, may be resorted to in order to prevent a fraud.
7. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION — Distribution of Personal Estate — Wife as Distributee of Deceased Husband. — During her husband's lifetime a wife has no interest whatever in his personal estate. He may transfer it, give it away, or squander it. But instantly upon his death the statutes give his widow an interest therein, a right which he can defeat only by divesting himself absolutely, during his life, of the ownership of and title to such property.
8. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION — Wife as Distributee of Deceased Husband — Validity of Trust Device to Bar Wife's Rights — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to settle an estate and determine the validity of a trust, decedent had delivered to a trustee a bond payable one year after decedent's death with interest, which declared on its face that it was given and received and the profits were to be applied according to a trust instrument executed by decedent to the trustee. This instrument recited that the object of the trust was to secure a personal indebedness to the trustee and thereafter to make provision during decedent's life for certain beneficiaries. The trustee was to collect the bond upon maturity and pay the personal indebtedness and divide the rest between the beneficiaries. It was conceded that the bond and trust obligation was given and received with the intent to deprive the wife of her distributive share of decedent's estate. Payment of the bond would exhaust the personal estate, leaving nothing to apply to the wife's share. The trustee contended that the bond and trust instrument, being executed and delivered during the life of decedent, constituted a valid debitum in praesenti, binding on him and his estate, because both instruments were under seal and not subject to attack for lack of consideration.
Held: There was no merit in the contention. There was no case which went so far as to sustain the validity of a voluntary obligation unsupported by a valuable consideration, payable after the consort's death, and given with the intent to deprive the surviving spouse of his or her distributive right in the consort's personal estate.
9. CONTRACTS — Presumption of Consideration in Sealed Instruments — Burden of Proof as to Actual Consideration — Sufficiency of Evidence to Shift Burden — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to settle an estate and determine the validity of a trust, decedent had delivered to a trustee a bond payable one year after decedent's death with interest, which declared on its face that it was given and received and the profits were to be applied according to a trust instrument executed by decedent to the trustee. This instrument recited that the object of the trust was to secure a personal indebtedness to the trustee and thereafter to make provision during decedent's life for certain beneficiaries. The trustee was to collect the bond upon maturity and pay the personal indebtedness and divide the rest between the beneficiaries. It was conceded that the bond and trust obligation was given and received with the intent to deprive the wife of her distributive share of decedent's estate. Payment of the bond with interest would exhaust the personal estate, leaving nothing to apply to the wife's share. The wife's administrator contended that the bond and trust were not enforceable as a contract because there was no consideration. The trustee testified that he knew of no other consideration than that expressed in the bond and the declaration of trust, and a friend testified that he was very confident there was no consideration, but the trustee insisted that the bond and trust instrument, being executed and delivered during decedent's life, constituted a valid debitum in praesenti, binding on him and his estate, because both instruments were under seal.
Held: Since the beneficiaries were seeking enforcement of the bond and trust, the primary burden was on them to show the validity of the obligation. The production of the instruments, under seal, made out a prima facie case in their favor and cast upon the wife and those claiming under her the duty of showing that the obligation was voluntary...
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