Norris v. Chrysler Corp.

Citation391 Mich. 469,216 N.W.2d 783
Decision Date16 April 1974
Docket NumberNo. 7,7
PartiesCurtis NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Second Injury Fund, Defendants-Appellees. 391 Mich. 469, 216 N.W.2d 783
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

Marston, Sachs, O'Connell, Nunn & Freid, P.C. by, David K. Barnes, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Hayim I. Gross, Lacey & Jones, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Chrysler Corp.

Before the Entire Bench.

COLEMAN, Justice.

FACTS

Plaintiff is appealing the Court of Appeals' denial of his application for leave to appeal a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board reversing an award of benefits granted by the hearing referee.

Plaintiff was employed at defendant's Mack Avenue plant in Detroit. On November 2, 1954 plaintiff arrived at the plant a few minutes prior to his 11:00 p.m. starting time. The employee parking lot was allegedly full so plaintiff parked across the street from the plant. In crossing Mack Avenue, he was struck by a car.

A coworker and friend of plaintiff witnessed the accident. The chief guard gave the friend permission to go to plaintiff's assistance. The friend later received permission from the chief guard to accompany the police and assist in completing the accident report. The friend testified that when he returned to work he told plaintiff's foreman about the accident.

Plaintiff never returned to work. He had continuing medical problems with his legs, which were injured in the accident. In January 1956 a decision was made to amputate plaintiff's right leg. That action was not taken at that time and treatment continued. Plaintiff left leg was amputated in 1960; his right in 1967.

On May 29, 1968 plaintiff filed a petition for a workmen's compensation hearing. A decision was made on September 21, 1970. The referee found.

'that the defendant had notice of the accident and injury. It cannot now urge that no claim for compensation was made in consequence of its own failure to take affirmative action.'

A separate finding declared that plaintiff 'was clearly within the course of his employment when injured'.

The appeal board ordered this decision reversed finding 'that plaintiff failed to provide defendant with notice within three months and claim within six months of the date of the injury'. The board felt that the decision in Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 29 Mich.App. 398, 185 N.W.2d 403 (1971) required reversal. The information transmitted to the foreman was deemed insufficient to require any action by the corporation. The board did not address the referee's other findings.

By a 2--1 vote the Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's application for leave to appeal on April 3, 1973. This Court granted leave to appeal on July 19, 1973.

ISSUES

Was the information received by the corporation on November 2, 1954 sufficient to satisfy statutory requirements of notice so that the statutory limitations were tolled?

STATUTES

The following statute in effect at the time of plaintiff's injury is pertinent. M.C.L.A. § 412.15; M.S.A. § 17.165 provided in part:

'No proceedings for compensation for an injury under this act shall be maintained, unless a notice of the injury shall have been given to the employer within 3 months after the happening thereof, and unless the claim for compensation with respect to such injury, which claim may be either oral or in writing, shall have been made within 6 months after the occurrence of the same; . . . In all cases in which the employer has been given notice of the happening of the injury, or has notice or knowledge of the happening of said accident within 3 months after the happening of the same, and fails, neglects or refuses to report said injury to the compensation commission as required by the provisions of this act, the statute of limitations shall not run against the claim of the injured employee or his dependents, or in favor of either said employer or his insurer, until a report of said injury shall have been filed with the compensation commission.'

M.C.L.A. § 412.16; M.S.A. § 17.166 requires the notice to be written but M.C.L.A. § 412.18; M.S.A. § 17.168 provides that lack of such written notice 'shall not be a bar to proceedings under this act, if it be shown that the employer had notice or knowledge of the injury'.

DISCUSSION

The discussion must be limited to the one specific issue. The referee made several findings. One concerned notice. Another concerned the question of whether

the accident occurred within the course of employment. The appeal board first addressed the notice question 'since if defendant's contention is correct, plaintiff's claim would fail thus negating determination of the remaining issues'. Defendant's contention was sustained.

I Purpose of Notice

The requirement that the employee give notice of an injury affords the employer certain important opportunities. The provision was analyzed in Littleton v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 276 Mich. 41, 267 N.W. 781 (1936):

'The purpose of the notice is to give the employer an opportunity to examine into the alleged accident and injury while the facts are accessible and also to employ skilled physicians or surgeons to care for the employee so as to speed his recovery and minimize the loss. See Podkastelnea v. Railroad Co., 198 Mich. 321, 164 N.W. 418; Herbert v. Railway Co., 200 Mich. 566, 166 N.W. 923; Johnson v. Bergland Lumber Co., 231 Mich. 34, 203 N.W. 840.' 1

Notice to the employer also works to the benefit of the employee. The statute provides that limitations on the filing of claims are not applicable if the employer, having notice of the injury, fails to report it properly.

For many years there was a judicially imposed six year limitation on compensation claims. See Hajduk v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 268 Mich. 220, 255 N.W. 770 (1934). This limitation was lifted in Autio v. Proksch Construction Co., 377 Mich. 517, 141 N.W.2d 81 (1966). The plaintiff lost the industrial use of a hand in 1952 while employed by the construction company. The company failed to file an accurate report of the loss although it received notice. Plaintiff filed his claim in 1961. Because the company's failure to file a report tolled the limitations, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Also see Pevarnic v. Northwestern Leather Co., 378 Mich. 48, 142 N.W.2d 689 (1966) and Cook v. Northwestern Leather Co., 378 Mich. 518, 146 N.W.2d 646 (1966).

The plaintiff in Martin v. White Pine Copper Co., 378 Mich. 37, 142 N.W.2d 681 (1966) filed a claim in 1963 based upon her husband's death in 1956. On the day of the incident, the supervisor filed a factual report and concluded that the accident was not industrially related. The next day a union representative disputed that conclusion. The company never notified the compensation commission.

"The self-evident purpose of rule 3 (referred to as Rule 3) in effect at the time of the death. It required that the commission be notified "on or before the 14th day after the employer has notice or knowledge of the alleged injury or death in all cases where the right of the injured or dependent to compensation is disputed". The Court adopted the following analysis of the appeal board:

"The self-evident purpose of rule 3 . . . is to enable the department to advise the employee or dependent of the fact that the employer has denied statutory liability and also to inform said party of his/her right to have a hearing to determine the issue of liability."

The Martin court cited M.C.L.A. § 412.15, saying that it contained the 'sanction for failure to notify the department of such injury or death'. The penalty is the tolling of the limitations. Since notice was never submitted by the company, the wife's action was deemed timely filed.

In Cibor v. Fabricon Products Co., 379 Mich. 229, 150 N.W.2d 769 (1967), the Court said:

'We made known to employers in Weenink v. Allen Electric & Equipment Co. (1936), 276 Mich. 561, 564, 268 N.W. 739, that if they did not report to the commission 'the nature and extent of the injury fully and in detail,' their neglect to do so would be a bar to the employers' right to raise the defense of six months' statute of limitations; and, again, in Paridee v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1936), 278 Mich. 191, 270 N.W. 263, we made it plain that the report of an accident must set up the injury with such particularity of location and effect, known to the employer, as to indicate its nature and to identify it for the purpose of the compensation law.'

Martin and Cibor indicate that giving of notice of an injury is not solely to enable an employer to conduct a prompt investigation. The employee's giving of notice imposes a duty upon the employer--the duty to report to the commission. Failure to report suspends statutory limitations. The employee profits further when notice is given because the Workmen's Compensation Department is enabled to advise anvise an employee or dependents of their rights.

II Who Must Receive Notice

At plaintiff's hearing a witness testified that notice of the accident was given to the chief guard and to plaintiff's foreman. Without considering other issues, it is clear that this constitutes notice to the company and satisfied statutory requirements. See Hutchinson v. Tambasco, 309 Mich. 597, 16 N.W.2d 87 (1944); Banks v. Packard Motor Car Co., 328 Mich. 513, 44 N.W.2d 166 (1950) and West v. Northern Tree Co., 365 Mich. 402, 112 N.W.2d 423 (1961).

The appeal board agreed that 'notice to a foreman is notice to the corporation' and that 'a guard could equally transmit such notice'.

III Sufficiency of Notice

The notice given in the instant case was not deemed sufficient.

Defendant argues that under the state of the law at that time it did not receive notice of a compensable injury and therefore was not required to report. There are cases which do state that the employer must be informed of a 'compensable' accident. However, close examination of the cases will disclose that this is a result of...

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