Norris v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, COUNTY OF GREENVILLE
Citation | 309 F. Supp. 1113 |
Decision Date | 10 March 1970 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 68-959. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Parties | Malvin E. NORRIS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, COUNTY OF GREENVILLE, et al., Respondents. |
Edward A. Harter, Jr., Director, Legal Aid Service Agency, Columbia, S. C., and Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Columbia, S. C., for petitioner.
Emmet H. Clair, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C., for respondents.
Reacting to an unfavorable appeal from a conviction for murder, Petitioner asks this court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Petitioner's difficulties arise out of an altercation which took place on August 25, 1965. The factual circumstances of the occurrence and the differences in the witnesses' testimony are fully discussed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State v. Norris, 168 S.E.2d 564, filed July 2, 1969, which has been made a part of this record by Respondent's return, and agreed as constituting a part of the record by counsel in briefs. Counsel for Petitioner declined to offer additional testimony at the hearing in this forum and elected to stand upon the facts as the South Carolina Supreme Court found them to be. Accordingly, no dispute of fact is projected here. A summary factual discussion is given below to facilitate understanding of the issues.
At the time of the fatal shooting Petitioner and his common-law wife were operating a small grocery store in Greenville, S. C. At closing time Petitioner's wife took the day's receipts and went to a car. Petitioner followed her and demanded the money which she refused. A fight ensued between Petitioner and his wife during which Petitioner brandished a revolver and fired a shot into the car in which she was seated. While the fight was in progress, or shortly after it had ended, the wife's father, Clyde Ledbetter, came upon the scene; Petitioner shot and killed him. There is conflict in the testimony as to whether the deceased made physical contact with Petitioner.
At trial Petitioner's counsel requested the court to charge voluntary manslaughter, which the trial judge refused. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial judge stating, "* * * under the facts of this case and the rule of law above cited * * * the trial judge was correct in not submitting to the jury the offense of manslaughter."1
The South Carolina legislature has never undertaken to define manslaughter, thus the courts of the state rely upon the common law and manslaughter is a common law offense. State v. Barnett, 218 S.C. 415, 63 S.E.2d 57 (1951). In its opinion in State v. Norris, the court said, "Voluntary manslaughter is usually defined as the unlawful killing of a human being in the sudden heat of passion upon a sufficient legal provocation," citing State v. Gardner, 219 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d 130 (1954). On the facts produced in trial the Supreme Court found an absence of "sufficient legal provocation", an essential element of the offense.
In the Norris (supra) opinion, South Carolina, adopting the ruling in Edmonds v. State, 201 Ga. 108, 39 S.E.2d 24 (1946) stated:
In determining that there was no "sufficient legal provocation" for the homicide, Petitioner contends that the trial judge and the South Carolina Supreme Court usurped the function of the jury and in so doing abridged the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying Petitioner the right to that trial by jury, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner contends that by ruling as a matter of law that the elements of manslaughter were absent the court answered at least three factual questions: (1) At the time the deceased reached the scene was his daughter being attacked by the Petitioner? (2) When the deceased reached the scene did he believe it was necessary to intervene with force in order to save his daughter? (3) Was the deceased justified in saying nothing and intervening forcefully?
There appears to be ample authority for the general proposition that on questions of substantive law the federal courts are bound by those determinations made by the highest court of a state as to what constitutes that state's substantive law on a particular point. Federal courts are similarly bound by the state court's construction of a statute. This principle is especially applicable when, as here, there are no federal statutes on the subject and moreover, the South Carolina Supreme Court's determination of what are the necessary elements of manslaughter is in no way determinative of a federal question. In such a case the federal courts are bound by state statutory or common law, unless the state law is unconstitutional. Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938); Henry v. Miss., 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965); Memphis & Chas. Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241, 51 S.Ct. 108, 75 L.Ed. 315, 72 A.L. R. 1096. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners of Montana, 332 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 167, 92 L.Ed. 99 (1947); State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422 (1946); Hebert v. La., 272 U.S. 312, 47 S.Ct. 103, 71 L. Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102; Olson v. Tahash, 344 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1965); Crab Orchard Imp. Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 115 F.2d 277, cert. den. 312 U.S. 702, 61 S.Ct. 807, 85 L.Ed. 1135 (4th Cir. 1940); Mounts v. Boles, 326 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1963). A federal court hearing a habeas corpus petition has been bound by state court interpretation of a state statute requiring a defendant to be duly cautioned of the effect of his answers; the statute nevertheless was void in that petitioner was denied due process because he was not informed of his right to remain silent, et cetera; Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. 2d 982, 132 A.L.R. 1241 (6th Cir. 1941).2 A right gratuitously granted cannot be revoked without due process of law; City of Albertville v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 272 F. 2d 594, 84 A.L.R.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1959); Poulson v. Turner, 359 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1966) cert. den. 385 U.S. 905, 87 S. Ct. 219, 17 L.Ed.2d 136.
It is also well settled that habeas corpus proceedings are not intended to provide an additional appeal and is generally not supposed to provide collateral review of matters involving trial errors, unless constitutional rights are at issue. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770, 785; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, 860; Smith v. United States, 88 U. S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192 (1950) cert. den. 341 U.S. 927, 71 S.Ct. 792, 95 L.Ed. 1358; Daniels v. Allen, 192 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1951) aff'd 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469; 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 437, 97 L.Ed. 649; Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1969); Nance v. Baker, 400 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Baker, 399 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1968) cert. den. 394 U.S. 950, 89 S.Ct. 1289, 22 L.Ed.2d 485.
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Losinno v. Henderson
...770 (1963); Stewart v. Cox, 344 F.2d 947 (10th Cir. 1965); Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1960); Norris v. South Carolina, 309 F.Supp. 1113 (D.S.C. 1970); Williams v. Peyton, 297 F.Supp. 857 (W.D.Va.1969); United States ex rel. Hill v. Deegan, 268 F.Supp. 580, 596 n. 20 ......