Norris v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, COUNTY OF GREENVILLE

Citation309 F. Supp. 1113
Decision Date10 March 1970
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 68-959.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesMalvin E. NORRIS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, COUNTY OF GREENVILLE, et al., Respondents.

Edward A. Harter, Jr., Director, Legal Aid Service Agency, Columbia, S. C., and Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Columbia, S. C., for petitioner.

Emmet H. Clair, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C., for respondents.

HEMPHILL, District Judge.

Reacting to an unfavorable appeal from a conviction for murder, Petitioner asks this court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner's difficulties arise out of an altercation which took place on August 25, 1965. The factual circumstances of the occurrence and the differences in the witnesses' testimony are fully discussed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State v. Norris, 168 S.E.2d 564, filed July 2, 1969, which has been made a part of this record by Respondent's return, and agreed as constituting a part of the record by counsel in briefs. Counsel for Petitioner declined to offer additional testimony at the hearing in this forum and elected to stand upon the facts as the South Carolina Supreme Court found them to be. Accordingly, no dispute of fact is projected here. A summary factual discussion is given below to facilitate understanding of the issues.

At the time of the fatal shooting Petitioner and his common-law wife were operating a small grocery store in Greenville, S. C. At closing time Petitioner's wife took the day's receipts and went to a car. Petitioner followed her and demanded the money which she refused. A fight ensued between Petitioner and his wife during which Petitioner brandished a revolver and fired a shot into the car in which she was seated. While the fight was in progress, or shortly after it had ended, the wife's father, Clyde Ledbetter, came upon the scene; Petitioner shot and killed him. There is conflict in the testimony as to whether the deceased made physical contact with Petitioner.

At trial Petitioner's counsel requested the court to charge voluntary manslaughter, which the trial judge refused. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial judge stating, "* * * under the facts of this case and the rule of law above cited * * * the trial judge was correct in not submitting to the jury the offense of manslaughter."1

The South Carolina legislature has never undertaken to define manslaughter, thus the courts of the state rely upon the common law and manslaughter is a common law offense. State v. Barnett, 218 S.C. 415, 63 S.E.2d 57 (1951). In its opinion in State v. Norris, the court said, "Voluntary manslaughter is usually defined as the unlawful killing of a human being in the sudden heat of passion upon a sufficient legal provocation," citing State v. Gardner, 219 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d 130 (1954). On the facts produced in trial the Supreme Court found an absence of "sufficient legal provocation", an essential element of the offense.

South Carolina holds that slight physical aggression is sufficient provocation to reduce a homicide to manslaughter, State v. Gallman, 79 S.C. 229, 60 S.E. 682 (1908). The court here determined that rule to be inapplicable. In explanation of the governing principles, the court said,

The law does not reduce from murder to manslaughter every homicide committed in the heat of passion; it must be passion justly excited by legal provocation. State v. Smith, 10 Rich. 341. If an adequate legal provocation does not exist, the killing, even in the heat of passion is murder and not manslaughter. Assuming, as the appellant contends, that the deceased grabbed him by the shoulder, under the facts revealed by this record, such was not a sufficient legal provocation which would reduce the homicide from murder to manslaughter. When the deceased found that his daughter was in danger of death or receiving serious bodily harm as a result of the felonious assault made upon her by the appellant, in going to her defense the father was exercising his legal right in protecting his endangered daughter.

In the Norris (supra) opinion, South Carolina, adopting the ruling in Edmonds v. State, 201 Ga. 108, 39 S.E.2d 24 (1946) stated:

The exercise of a legal right, no matter how offensive to another, is never in law deemed a provocation sufficient to justify or mitigate an act of violence.
* * * * * *
That which is perfectly justifiable on the part of the deceased, can not be any legal provocation to the slayer. Lingo v. State, 29 Ga. 470(4).

In determining that there was no "sufficient legal provocation" for the homicide, Petitioner contends that the trial judge and the South Carolina Supreme Court usurped the function of the jury and in so doing abridged the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying Petitioner the right to that trial by jury, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner contends that by ruling as a matter of law that the elements of manslaughter were absent the court answered at least three factual questions: (1) At the time the deceased reached the scene was his daughter being attacked by the Petitioner? (2) When the deceased reached the scene did he believe it was necessary to intervene with force in order to save his daughter? (3) Was the deceased justified in saying nothing and intervening forcefully?

There appears to be ample authority for the general proposition that on questions of substantive law the federal courts are bound by those determinations made by the highest court of a state as to what constitutes that state's substantive law on a particular point. Federal courts are similarly bound by the state court's construction of a statute. This principle is especially applicable when, as here, there are no federal statutes on the subject and moreover, the South Carolina Supreme Court's determination of what are the necessary elements of manslaughter is in no way determinative of a federal question. In such a case the federal courts are bound by state statutory or common law, unless the state law is unconstitutional. Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938); Henry v. Miss., 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965); Memphis & Chas. Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241, 51 S.Ct. 108, 75 L.Ed. 315, 72 A.L. R. 1096. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Commissioners of Montana, 332 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 167, 92 L.Ed. 99 (1947); State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S.Ct. 374, 91 L.Ed. 422 (1946); Hebert v. La., 272 U.S. 312, 47 S.Ct. 103, 71 L. Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102; Olson v. Tahash, 344 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1965); Crab Orchard Imp. Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 115 F.2d 277, cert. den. 312 U.S. 702, 61 S.Ct. 807, 85 L.Ed. 1135 (4th Cir. 1940); Mounts v. Boles, 326 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1963). A federal court hearing a habeas corpus petition has been bound by state court interpretation of a state statute requiring a defendant to be duly cautioned of the effect of his answers; the statute nevertheless was void in that petitioner was denied due process because he was not informed of his right to remain silent, et cetera; Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. 2d 982, 132 A.L.R. 1241 (6th Cir. 1941).2 A right gratuitously granted cannot be revoked without due process of law; City of Albertville v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 272 F. 2d 594, 84 A.L.R.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1959); Poulson v. Turner, 359 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1966) cert. den. 385 U.S. 905, 87 S. Ct. 219, 17 L.Ed.2d 136.

It is also well settled that habeas corpus proceedings are not intended to provide an additional appeal and is generally not supposed to provide collateral review of matters involving trial errors, unless constitutional rights are at issue. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770, 785; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, 860; Smith v. United States, 88 U. S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192 (1950) cert. den. 341 U.S. 927, 71 S.Ct. 792, 95 L.Ed. 1358; Daniels v. Allen, 192 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1951) aff'd 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469; 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 437, 97 L.Ed. 649; Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1969); Nance v. Baker, 400 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Baker, 399 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1968) cert. den. 394 U.S. 950, 89 S.Ct. 1289, 22 L.Ed.2d 485.

Indisputably, then, the federal courts are bound by the common law and statutory interpretations of the highest court of a state as to what the law of that state is. In the area of criminal law, such a pronouncement by the highest court of the state is binding, and unless unconstitutional, the decisions of the respective states' courts of last resort are conclusive. As the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, so wisely stated: (discussing the scope of federal review of state criminal proceedings)

In our federal system the administration of criminal justice is predominantly committed to the care of the States. The power to define crimes belongs to Congress only as an appropriate means of carrying into execution its limited grant of legislative powers. U.S.Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. Broadly speaking, crimes in the United States are what the laws of the individual States make them, subject to the limitations of Art. 1, § 10, cl. 1, in the original Constitution, prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
These limitations, in the main, concern not restrictions upon the power of the States to define crime, except in the restricted area where federal authority has pre-empted the field, but restrictions upon the manner in which the States may enforce their penal codes. Accordingly, in reviewing a State criminal conviction under a claim of right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, from which is derived the most far-reaching and most frequent federal basis of
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  • Losinno v. Henderson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 27 d1 Setembro d1 1976
    ...770 (1963); Stewart v. Cox, 344 F.2d 947 (10th Cir. 1965); Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1960); Norris v. South Carolina, 309 F.Supp. 1113 (D.S.C. 1970); Williams v. Peyton, 297 F.Supp. 857 (W.D.Va.1969); United States ex rel. Hill v. Deegan, 268 F.Supp. 580, 596 n. 20 ......

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