North American Continental Co. v. The El Cuis

• Decision Date: 02 October 1952
• Docket Number: No. 19919.,19919.
• Citation: 107 F. Supp. 436
• Parties: NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CO., Inc. v. THE EL CUIS et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

107 F. Supp. 436

NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CO., Inc. v. THE EL CUIS et al.

No. 19919.

United States District Court E. D. New York.

October 2, 1952.

Hill, Rivkins & Middleton, New York City, Joseph T. McGowan, New York City, of counsel, for libellant.

Gray & Wythe, New York City, Horace M. Gray, Edward R. Phillips, New York City, of counsel, for claimant.

GALSTON, District Judge.

This is a motion brought by the claimant, Banco de Credito Industrial Argentino, for an order vacating an interlocutory decree entered on default, and permitting it to file a stipulation for costs and claim to the vessel, as mortgagee, and defend the libel.

It appears from the affidavit of Honorable Jorge I. Nicolini, Consul General of the Republic of Argentina at New York, that the claimant is a branch of the Treasury Department of the Government of Argentina, and that it "holds a mortgage of Two Million pesos secured upon said vessel El Cuis." It also appears that proctors were authorized on August 5, 1952, to appear and to take the necessary action to protect the claimant's interest in the vessel. However, according to the affidavit, difficulty was experienced in procuring a deposit of American dollars in this country to be used as collateral in order to secure the claimant's cost bonds, without which such claim could not be filed. As a consequence, the affidavit asserts, the funds were not secured until September 10, 1952, which was after an interlocutory decree had been entered on default on September 5. The delay in obtaining funds is attributed to the following causes:

"Owing to the death of Mrs. Peron, business was badly disrupted in Argentina for several weeks and Argentine Government departments were also greatly impeded and delayed by reason thereof.

"Because of stringent fiscal regulations in Argentina and the scarcity of United States dollars, the transfer of funds in dollars to the United States to provide such security in the suits pending against the El Cuis and those threatened, required the approval of various ministrys of the Argentine Government * * *".

The libellant, in opposing the motion, contends that an ordinary mortgagee is not entitled to intervene in a libel action against a vessel. It seems well established that an ordinary mortgage on a vessel is not a maritime contract, and, therefore, that a court of admiralty has no jurisdiction of a libel to foreclose it, or to assert either title or right of possession under it, The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1, 13 S.Ct. 498, 37 L.Ed. 345; Bogart v. The S. S. John Jay, 17 How. 399, 15 L.Ed. 95. It may be observed though that there is jurisdiction in admiralty under the provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C.A. § 911 et seq., to foreclose a "preferred mortgage". The claimant here, however, does not contend that its alleged mortgage is a preferred mortgage under that Act. Nor do the moving papers indicate that the provisions of the Act are applicable here.

Nevertheless, the courts have recognized the right of a mortgagee to appear as a claimant in libels filed against the vessel by third persons. For example, in Schuchardt & Gebhard v. Babbage, 19 How. 239, at page 241, 60 U.S. 239, at page 241, 15 L.Ed. 625, in affirming an order dismissing a libel filed by a mortgagee to enforce the payment of a mortgage, the Supreme Court, stated:

"The proper course for the mortgagees was to have appeared as claimants to the libels filed against the vessel, in which the questions presented in the case might have been raised and considered; or, on the sale of the vessel, and the proceeds brought into the registry, they might have applied by petition; claiming an interest in the fund: * * *."

If all that the claimant here desired was to enforce payment of its mortgage against the vessel, there would be no need to set aside the interlocutory decree. As the quoted passage from Schuchardt & Gebhard v. Babbage above indicates, the claimant could file a petition asserting an interest in the proceeds from the sale of the vessel. See Admiralty Rule 42, 28 U.S.C.A. (Claims against proceeds in registry.) However, it appears from the affidavit of Horace M. Gray, a member of the firm of Gray & Wythe, proctors for the claimant, that the purpose in intervening is to defend against the establishment of a maritime lien against the vessel by the libellant.

The right of a mortgagee to raise defenses against a libellant seeking to enforce a maritime...