North Carolina v. Alford, 14

Decision Date17 November 1969
Docket NumberNo. 14,14
CitationNorth Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969)
PartiesNORTH CAROLINA v. Henry C. ALFORD
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Appellee was indicted for the capital crime of first-degree murder.At that time North Carolina law provided for the penalty of life imprisonment when a plea of guilty was accepted to a first-degree murder charge; for the death penalty following a jury verdict of guilty, unless the jury recommended life imprisonment; and for a penalty of from two to 30 years' imprisonment for second-degree murder.Appellee's attorney, in the face of strong evidence of guilt, recommended a guilty plea, but left the decision to appellee.The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to second-degree murder.The trial court heard damaging evidence from certain witnesses before accepting a plea.Appellee pleaded guilty, although disclaiming guilt, because of the threat of the death penalty, and was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment.The Court of Appeals, on an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, found that appellee's guilty plea was involuntary because it was motivated principally by fear of the death penalty.Held: The trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting appellee's guilty plea.Pp. 31-39.

(a) A guilty plea that represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternatives available to a defendant, especially one represented by competent counsel, is not compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because it was entered to avoid the possibility of the death penalty.Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747. Pp. 31-39.

(b)Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 47 S.Ct. 127, 71 L.Ed. 347, which held that a federal court may impose a prison sentence after accepting a plea of nolo contendere, implicitly recognized that there is no constitutional bar to imposing a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling to admit guilt but who is willing to waive trial and accept the sentence.Pp. 35-36.

(c) An accused may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even though he is unwilling to admit participation in the crime, or even if his guilty plea contains a protestation of innocence, when, as here, he intelligently concludes that his interests require a guilty plea and the record strongly evidences guilt.Pp. 37-38.

(d) The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights do not prohibit the States from accepting pleas to lesser-in-cluded offenses.P. 39.

405 F.2d 340, vacated and remanded.

Jacob L. Safron, Raleigh, N.C., for appellant.

Doris R. Bray, Greensboro, N.C., for appellee.

Mr. Justice WHITEdelivered the opinion of the Court.

On December 2, 1963, Alford was indicted for first-degree murder, a capital offense under North Carolina law.1The court appointed an attorney to represent him, and this attorney questioned all but one of the various witnesses who appellee said would substantiate his claim of innocence.The witnesses, however, did not support Alford's story but gave statements that strongly indicated his guilt.Faced with strong evidence of guilt and no substantial evidentiary support for the claim of innocence.Alford's attorney recommended that he plead guilty, but left the ultimate decision to Alford himself.The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of second-degree murder, and on December 10, 1963, Alford pleaded guilty to the reduced charge.

Before the plea was finally accepted by the trial court, the court heard the sworn testimony of a police officer who summarized the State's case.Two other witnesses besides Alford were also heard.Although there was no eyewitness to the crime, the testimony indicated that shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stated his intention to kill the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carrier out the killing.After the summary presentation of the State's case, Alford took the stand and testified that he had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the threat of the death penalty if he did not do so.2 In response to the questions of his counsel, he acknowledged that his counsel had informed him of the difference between second- and first-degree murder and of his rights in case he chose to go to trial.3The trial court then asked appellee if, in light of his denial of guilt, he still desired to plead guilty to second-degree murder and appellee answered, 'Yes, sir.I plead guilty on—from the circumstances that he(Alford's attorney) told me.'After eliciting information about Alford's prior criminal record, which was a long one,4the trial court sentenced him to 30 years' imprisonment, the maximum penalty for second-degree murder.5

Alford sought post-conviction relief in the state court.Among the claims raised was the claim that his plea of guilty was invalid because it was the product of fear and coercion.After a hearing, the state court in 1965 found that the plea was 'willingly, knowingly, and understandingly' made on the advice of competent counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case.Subsequently, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, first in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, and then in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.Both courts denied the writ on the basis of the state court's findings that Alford voluntarily and knowingly agreed to plead guilty.In 1967, Alford again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina.That court, without an evidentiary hearing, again denied relief on the grounds that the guilty plea was voluntary and waived all defenses and nonjurisdictional defects in any prior stage of the proceedings and that the findings of the state court in 1965 clearly required rejection of Alford's claim that that he was denied effective assistance of counsel prior to pleading guilty.On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Alford's guilty plea was made involuntarily.405 F.2d 340(1968).In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138(1968), which the court read to require invalidation of the North Carolina statutory framework for the imposition of the death penalty because North Carolina statutes encouraged defendants to waive constitutional rights by the promise of no more than life imprisonment if a guilty plea was offered and accepted.Conceding that Jackson did not require the automatic invalidation of pleas of guilty entered under the North Carolina statutes, the Court of Appeals ruled that Alford's guilty plea was involuntary because its principal motivation was fear of the death penalty.By this standard, even if both the judge and the jury had possessed the power to impose the death penalty for first-degree murder or if guilty pleas to capital charges had not been permitted, Alford's plea of guilty to second-degree murder should still have been rejected because impermissibly induced by his desire to eliminate the possibility of a death sentence.6We noted probable jurisdiction.394 U.S. 956, 89 S.Ct. 1306, 22 L.Ed.2d 558(1969).We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.

We held in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747(1970), that a plea of guilty which would not have been entered except for the defendant's desire to avoid a possible death penalty and to limit the maximum penalty to life imprisonment or a term of years was not for that reason compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.Jackson established no new test for determining the validity of guilty pleas.The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.SeeBoykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274(1969);Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513, 7 L.Ed.2d 473(1962);Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009(1927).That he would not have pleaded except for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of guilty was not the product of a free and rational choice, especially where the defendant was represented by competent counsel whose advice was that the plea would be to the defendant's advantage.The standard fashioned and applied by the Court of Appeals was therefore erroneous and we would, without more, vacate and remand the case for further proceedings with respect to any other claims of Alford which are properly before that court, if it were not for other circumstances appearing in the record which might seem to warrant an affirmance of the Court of Appeals.

As previously recounted after Alford's plea of guilty was offered and the State's case was placed before the judge, Alford denied that he had committed the murder but reaffirmed his desire to plead guilty to avoid a possible death sentence and to limit the penalty to the 30-year maximum provided for second-degree murder.Ordinarily, a judgment of conviction resting on a plea of guilty is justified by the defendant's admission that he committed the crime charged against him and his consent that judgment be entered without a trial of any kind.The plea usually subsumes both elements, and justifiably so, even though there is no separate, express admission by the defendant that he committed the particular acts claimed to constitute the crime charged in the indictment.SeeBrady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at 1468;McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418(1969).Here Alford...

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